Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Conference materials
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

How to Repair the Eurozone? And What Will Happen if We Fail?

100%
Rostowski J.
Bezpieczny Bank
|
2015
|
issue 3 (60)
19-22
EN
Therefore, I believe that the minimum requirement for a sustained eurozone recovery is the creation of two mechanisms - (1) the option to rescue or secure the presence of a given country in the eurozone by an unlimited purchase of its government bonds by the European Central Bank; and (2) the mechanism of taking a political decision on a country leaving the eurozone. Both these mechanisms require treaty change, and it is clear that such changes will not be easy to achieve. (fragment of text)
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Reflections about Too Big to Fail Banks and Moral Hazard

84%
Pawłowicz L.
Bezpieczny Bank
|
2015
|
issue 3 (60)
78-88
EN
Several reflections and suggestions concerning the planned regulations aimed at limiting moral hazard done by TBTF banks were presented in this article. The scope of reflection is mainly the effectiveness of implementation of a resolution regime. To allow effective implementation of the resolution process probably the TLAC (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity) mechanism will be used. The mechanism will, according to the author, probably start the division of TBTF banks due to additional capital restrictions. If the division mechanism of two banks from the G-SIB group were to start it would be enough to be moderately optimistic when it comes to limiting moral hazard in banking.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Adequate Loss-absorbing Capacity in the Resolution Process

84%
Borsuk M.
Bezpieczny Bank
|
2015
|
issue 3 (60)
54-77
EN
The recent financial crisis had a turbulent onset when professional institutional investors decided to withdraw their funding from banks, sparked by fear of credit losses and unmanageable capital requirements in, most notably, the investment portfolios of these banks. In recent years regulators developed a comprehensive set of reform measures aiming to improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, improve risk management and governance, strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures. At the same time, steps were taken to better prepare for the event of a gone concern situation: recovery plans and resolution plans were drafted by banks and regulators respectively. For G-SIBs, on top of these plans, additional loss absorbing capacity is needed to ensure that, in case of a default, these financial institutions can be resolved in an orderly manner without taxpayer support. The purpose of this article is to present recent regulatory initiatives in the field of loss-absorbing capital buffers and their impact on banks' capital structure and cost of financing.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

TLAC : Systemic Risk Issues and the Impact on Strategies of Cross-Border Banks

67%
Speyer B.
Bezpieczny Bank
|
2015
|
issue 3 (60)
23-36
EN
The FSB's proposal on Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) constitutes the last major building block of the post-crisis regulatory reform agenda for global financial markets. The proposal aims at creating the preconditions for an orderly liquidation of complex banking institutions that would ensure the continuation of critical financial services without the need to use taxpayers' money in the resolution. The FSB's proposals are fundamentally conducive to achieving these aims. However, the TLAC proposal will have considerable side-effects on the organisational structure and competitiveness of cross-border banking groups; specifically, it is likely to disadvantage banking groups with material foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, while the TLAC proposal provides a comprehensive framework concerning capital requirements for too-big-to-fail institutions, the treatment of other aspects which influence systemic stability, e.g. liquidity and rollover risk, are underdeveloped.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Structure of the Cost of Deposit in Selected EU Countries

67%
Mielus P., Mironczuk T.
Bezpieczny Bank
|
2015
|
issue 3 (60)
89-101
EN
As a result of the crisis of confidence in the financial markets caused by events that took place in the years 2007-2008 and later fiscal problems in the peripheral countries of the European Union, banks lost their ability of refinancing based on unsecured interbank deposits. This contributed to the growth of the importance of deposits from non-financial customers whose cost started differing significantly from money market indices based on the interbank market. Moreover, strong divergence between the rate applicable to off-balance-sheet items (OIS) and the price of cash applicable to balance-sheet flows appeared. This article presents an analysis of changes in the structure of interest rates in various segments of the market in four selected countries of the EU: two countries from the Eurozone and two non-Eurozone countries. Observations from the money market indicate that it is economically justified to create separate benchmarks for balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet items.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.