Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Constitution of the United States
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In January 2021, an unusual precedent was set in the history of the political system of the United States. For the second time in a single term, an incumbent president was impeached by the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. Due to the unusual circumstances of the expiration of the president’s term and the change in the balance of power in the upper chamber, the Senate hearing of the charges was accompanied by legal problems of a constitutional nature, for which answers had to be sought in the Constitution itself and in the possible previous practice of Congress. The analysis of Donald Trump’s second impeachment, as the aim of the presented article, seems necessary not only to historically document the specifics of the subsequent acquittal, but also to indicate the dissimilarities accompanying this particular political process.
EN
The article focuses on the protection against ill-treatment, as stipulated in the Amendment VIII to the United States Constitution in relation to the similar guarantee provided by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Using the case-law of the U.S. courts, the author analyses the meaning of words used in the Amendment VIII („cruel and unusual punishment”) in relation to their counterpart in the Convention („torture” and „inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). The use of particular words in the Amendment VIII causes a limitation of the protection against ill-treatment in the U.S. to criminal proceedings. In the subsequent part the author discusses two typical instances of use of the Amendment VIII: disproportional punishment and overstepping limits of criminalisation. The problem of compensation for ill-treatment is also described. The analysis of the aforementioned issues leads to the conclusion that the U.S. legal system offers a lower standard of protection against ill-treatment than its European counterpart.
EN
The article presents a critical analysis of the U.S. federal court rulings regarding restrictions on freedom of religion during the Covid-19 pandemic. The subject of judicial control were the executive orders prohibiting public religious gatherings or limiting the number of participants. The author shares the view of the part of the courts which assumed that the laws introducing stricter restrictions for churches and religious assemblies than for other comparable places and secular gatherings, in order to be constitutional, need to simultaneously pursue the compelling interest of the state and constitute proportional measures. While the protection of public health is a compelling interest of the government, the total prohibition of in-person church services or limiting religious gatherings to only a few people seem to violate the criterion of the least restrictive measure. When deciding what forms of social activity and businesses to exclude from the ban on public gatherings, the authorities cannot discriminatively assume that religious services are something secondary and not very urgent, especially if the same authorities consider the operation of e.g. liquor stores or shopping malls as “essential” or “life sustaining”.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono i poddano analizie orzeczenia amerykańskich sądów federalnych w zakresie ograniczeń wolności religii w początkowym okresie pandemii COVID-19. Przedmiotem kontroli sądów były przepisy zakazujące publicznych zgromadzeń religijnych lub ograniczające liczbę ich uczestników. Autor podziela stanowisko tej części sądów, które przyjęły, że przepisy wprowadzające surowsze obostrzenia dla świątyń i zgromadzeń religijnych niż względem innych porównywalnych miejsc i świeckich zgromadzeń dla swej konstytucyjności potrzebują jednocześnie realizować kluczowy interes i być środkiem proporcjonalnym. O ile ochrona zdrowia publicznego stanowi kluczowy interes władzy, o tyle całkowity zakaz liturgii i nabożeństw z udziałem wiernych czy ustalenie liczby uczestników aktów kultu na poziomie kilku osób wydają się naruszać kryterium najmniej restrykcyjnego środka. Decydując o tym, jakie formy społecznej aktywności i działalności wyłączyć spod zakazu zgromadzeń publicznych władza nie może dyskryminująco zakładać, że praktyki religijne są czymś drugorzędnym i mało pilnym, tym bardziej jeśli ta sama władza za istotną (essential) czy pierwszej potrzeby (life sustaining) uznaje działalność np. sklepów monopolowych bądź centrów handlowych.   
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.