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EN
The paper points to the validity of the question indicated in its title and concerning the nature of human rights. The issue presented in the paper tries to answer the question concerning the normativity of these rights. For this purpose, the paper raises a number of fundamental problems, such as constantly controversial relationship between law and morality, formulation in a controversial way of rules and standards so-called positive law and the alleged hard choice between the parallel situated – the legal system and the natural law. In addition, also an important topic of coexistence of different anthropological concepts as different points of view on valuation and understanding of the law is emphasized. For this purpose author describes the transition from an individualistic anthropology through collectivism, to anthropology involving the legal regulation of social relations, which is related to the consecutive generations of human rights. Subsequently, the subject of consideration is the legal order. Namely, the author wonders whether it can be considered as composed only of norms or it includes also the rules, the same, or, more normative and significant than the norms. Author also leans over the controversial problem indicating that the empowerment of liberty and equality, which may serve as the basis of rights is in the law of nature, as well as over the lack of existence of unlimited rights, so that he eventually comes to the conclusion that, although there are no right before law, there are laws that overtake the state.
EN
A distinctive trend developed in 19th and 20th century Europe, which saw the universalisation of principles of state political systems. This tendency expressed itself in proclaiming in the constitutions of individual states and in the practical application by European democracies of the political principles inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment. Over a period of over two centuries, the constitutions of many countries developed with a similar catalogue of principles of government, in a similar legal form. These principles express the same ideas and political values and aim at developing an identical model of government structure based on liberal-democratic ideals. It is characteristic that during the last decade of the 20th century there was a sudden increase in this tendency and the spreading of those principles to over twenty countries.
EN
For over one-hundred and fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has been the most powerful judicial body in the world with life-tenured judges consistently invalidating state and federal laws without clear support in constitutional text or history. This paper focuses on what should be the appropriate role of life-tenured, unelected federal judges in the American system of separation of powers. The tension is between wanting judges to enforce the supreme law of the Constitution while at the same time keeping judges within their assigned roles of enforcing not making the law. Much of constitutional scholarship in the United States is devoted to resolving this tension. This article argues that the Court should take a set back and defer more to elected leaders and voters. Although structural reform might help, most needed changes would require a constitutional amendment and are therefore unlikely to occur. The Justices should take it upon themselves to act with more humility and modesty and only overturn laws where there is strong evidence of clear constitutional error.
EN
The question of the public servants responsibility is a very multifaceted issue. The problem touches not only the area of the constitutional law but also the civil law. Art. 77 paragraph 1 of the Polish Constitution is the base of the public servant responsibility as this article establishes the fundamental postulates of the public authority liability. This constitutional rule creates the right to compensation for any harm which has been done because of the public authority illegal action. The “reflection” of the constitutional norm is included in the art. 417 of the civil code, which states the rules of the State liability in the case of damages made by the public servant. Art. 77 paragraph 1 of the Constitution creates the grounds of the public servants responsibility while art. 417 of the civil code is the concretization of the mentioned constitutional rule. The issue of the public servant liability is composed by the elements which have been the subject of Constitutional Tribunal Jurisprudence interests. That is why the article refers to the questions such as the direct applicability of the art. 77 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, the essence of the compensative responsibility as well as to the entities whose liability is based on the mentioned constitutional rule. The paper concerns also the matter of the damage, including the problem of the compensation range, which can be determined on the base of art. 77 paragraph 1 of the Constitution. It should be stressed that the Constitutional Tribunal jurisprudence do not give the categorical answer to the questions mentioned above. However, the role of the Constitutional Tribunal must be emphasized especially approaching the public servants liability question. Constitutional Tribunal has changed the model of the servant liability because of its judgment passed in 2001. Currently, the illegality of the public servant behavior is the sufficient prerequisite of his liability without the necessity of indicating the public servant guilt.
EN
The idea of human rights is one of the great issues of our time. It is both an expression of a spiritually, moralistic argument and a coping with a concrete contemporary historical concern. Human rights become an issue where they are violated, where the freedom of the individuals in his or her state is threatened. The struggle for the recognition of human and fundamental rights, the effort to permanently protect elementary human rights are in permanent confrontation with political and intellectual forces that do not shy away from violating human rights in the implementation of their political ideological goals or in the maintenance of existing power structures. This serious question addressed the relationship between the state and the individual by determining the innate, inalienable and pre-state rights of the human being and leading them to realisation.
PL
Ustawa Zasadnicza Węgier weszła w życie 1 stycznia 2012 r. Ustawa Zasadnicza w warstwie aksjologicznej jest konstytucją konserwatywną, zawierającą również elementy chrześcijańskie, która teraz po raz pierwszy zawiera Narodowe wyznanie wiary (kredo). Pierwsza z sześciu części Ustawy Zasadniczej nosi tytuł Narodowe wyznanie wiary, zawarte w niej przepisy można dosłownie uznać za kredo, samostanowienie (samookreślenie) państwa. W stosunku do poprzedniej konstytucji, obecna zawiera wiele nowatorskich rozwiązań, które należy ocenić pozytywnie.
EN
The Fundamental Law of Hungary came into force on 1st January 2012. In its mentality it is a conservative, christian constitution having National avowal for the first time. From the six parts of the Fundamental Law of Hungary the title of the first one is the National avowal, the regulations involved can be regarded as an avowal, the self-definition of the state. In the structural and content renewal of the Fundamental Law of Hungary several positive statements can be read compared to the previous ones.
PL
Do ius commune (droit commun) odwołują się reguły prawa i interpretacje prawne dotyczące wszystkich gałęzi prawa, nawet prawa konstytucyjnego. W związku z tym warto zastanowić się, jak w tym kontekście interpretować prawo językowe w odniesieniu do mniejszości żyjącej w większej, federalnej strukturze państwowej, dla której ochrona własnego języka to żywotny problem. Autor twierdzi, że Sąd Najwyższy Kanady mógł zaniedbać te kwestie w Quebecu, unieważniając duże fragmenty Karty języka francuskiego dotyczące oficjalnego języka ustawodawstwa i sądownictwa w sprawie Blaikie z 1979 roku, w której narzucił francuskojęzycznej enklawie konstytucyjną dwujęzyczność w sprawach legislacji i sądownictwa. Być może słuszność tej decyzji powina być poddana ponownej ocenie.
FR
The jus commune (droit commun) is the intellectual canvas upon which any rule of law is built upon within a given society, that must be integrated in any interpretation or construction process in any field of law, even constitutionnal law. As the jus commune bears a series of structural values, one ponders as to the correct construction of linguistic law to be held in that regard within a minority society entrenched inside a greater federal superstructure, where linguistic preservation is a collective existential matter. The author submits that the Supreme Court of Canada may have neglected to consider this important factor in Quebec when striking down large sections of the Charter of the French Language pertaining to the official language of law and judicial decisions in the 1979 Blaikie case, in which it imposed official constitutional bilingualism in matters of legislation and judicial decisions to the enclaved French-speaking province. Perhaps the appropriateness of this decision should be revisited.
EN
 Le droit commun (jus commune) est la toile de fond intellectuelle sur laquelle toute normativité juridique se construit au sein d'une société et dont tout droit, même constitutionnel, ne peut faire l'économie au moment de son interprétation. Le droit commun emportant une série de valeurs structurantes, il convient de s'interroger sur l'interprétation à donner au droit linguistique d'une société minorisée, pour laquelle la préservation linguistique est un enjeu littéralement existentiel au sein d'un cadre constitutionnel fédéral plus grand, à la lumière de son droit commun. L'auteur avance que la Cour suprême du Canada n'aurait peut-être pas adéquatement tenu compte de cette donnée importante au Québec au moment d'invalider les pans de la Charte de la langue française traitant de la langue officielle de la législation et de la justice au Québec dans le cadre de l'affaire Blaikie en 1979, par laquelle elle imposait à la province francophone enclavée un bilinguisme législatif et judiciaire obligatoire, et qu'il conviendrait de réévaluer la justesse en droit de cette décision.
EN
The article presents the results of a quantitative and qualitative comparative study of the presence of direct references to God in the constitutions of modern states. References to God appearing in the fundamental laws of nearly two-thirds of the countries of the world differ in their linguistic forms and functions they perform. Most often, they take the form of an invocatio or nominatio Dei in  preambles and appear in oaths of office, while they are less frequently included in other constitutional provisions such as those defining official state symbols – national flags, national anthems or emblems. References to God in the fundamental laws do not have a theological dimension, but they are a manifestation of legislators’ responsiveness to the convictions and beliefs of citizens about God. In the author’s opinion, the decision to include, not include or remove a reference to God in a constitution should follow from the evolving importance of the sphere of sacrum for the society of a given state as a political sovereign.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono rezultaty ilościowo-jakościowego komparatystycznego studium konstytucji państw współczesnych pod kątem obecności w nich bezpośrednich odniesień do Boga. Odwołania do Boga występujące w ustawach zasadniczych blisko 2/3 państw globu posiadają różną postać językową i pełnią kilka funkcji. Najczęściej przybierają formę invocatio lub nominatio Dei w preambułach oraz pojawiają się w rotach przysięgi funkcjonariuszy publicznych, rzadziej są natomiast udziałem innych postanowień konstytucji, np. tych określających oficjalne symbole państwowe, jak flaga, hymn czy godło. Odwołania do Boga w ustawach zasadniczych nie mają wymiaru teologicznego, lecz stanowią przejaw responsywności ustrojodawcy wobec przekonań i wierzeń obywateli o Bogu. W ocenie autora, decyzja o zamieszczeniu, niezamieszczeniu lub usunięciu odniesienia do Boga w konstytucji powinna stanowić wypadkową ewoluującej doniosłości sfery sacrum dla społeczeństwa danego państwa jako politycznego suwerena.
EN
The aim of this paper is to analyze the provisions of the “draft Constitution of the Polish State” of July 1917 – an original achevement of the Polish doctrine of state law. In the opinion of the majority of contemporary representatives of Polish constitutional law, the activities of the Provisional Council of State of the Kingdom of Poland, as well as the Regency Council – bodies composed of Poles, but appointed by the German occupation authorities in 1916–1917, were meaningless, and the bodies themselves were imposed from outside and pursuing foreign interests. As a consequence, the value of the systemic achievements of these bodies and its meaning is denied. However, the analyzed document developed under the auspices of the Provisional Council of State of the Kingdom of Poland was chronologically the first full draft constitution for Poland after the state regained its independence. It is an interesting and original testimony to the high substantive level of Polish science of constitutional law developing in the absence of Polish statehood. It is also a proof that a mixed (constitutional) monarchy was considered to be the optimal political system for rebuilding statehood after more than 120 years of non-existence. The fact of fully Polish authorship of the project (mainly in the persons of prominent professors of law) may be a counter-argument against the thesis that the idea of a monarchical system for the Polish state reactivated in 1918 was completely foreign and imposed from the outside. Although the Polish political elites in 1918 ultimately gave up the idea of introduction of a constitutional monarchy in Poland, some of the solutions contained in the 1917 draft constitution became an inspiration for later systemic projects, both submitted during the work on the first full constitution of an independent Polish state enacted in 1921 as well as during the subsequent discussions on its revision.
PL
Celem niniejszego opracowania jest omówienie założeń Projektu Konstytucji Państwa Polskiego z lipca 1917 r. – prawie nieobecnego w literaturze naukowej z zakresu prawa konstytucyjnego dokumentu stanowiącego oryginalny element dorobku polskiej doktryny prawa państwowego. W opinii większości przedstawicieli polskiej nauki prawa konstytucyjnego działalność Tymczasowej Rady Stanu Królestwa Polskiego i Rady Regencyjnej – ciał złożonych z Polaków, ale powołanych przez okupacyjne władze niemieckie w latach 1916–1917 była pozbawiona znaczenia, a same organy narzucone z zewnątrz i realizujące obce interesy. W konsekwencji odmawia się znaczenia i neguje wartość dorobku ustrojowego tych ciał. Tymczasem, projekt z 1917 r. firmowany przez Tymczasową Radę Stanu Królestwa Polskiego był chronologicznie pierwszym, pełnym projektem konstytucji dla Polski po odzyskaniu przez nią niepodległości. Jest on ciekawym i oryginalnym świadectwem wysokiego poziomu polskiej nauki prawa konstytucyjnego rozwijającej się w warunkach braku własnej państwowości. Jest także dowodem na uznanie ustroju monarchii mieszanej (konstytucyjnej) za optymalny dla odbudowy państwowości po ponad 120 latach podziału terytorium i narodu na trzy części i ich pozostawania pod obcymi wpływami. Całkowicie polskie autorstwo projektu może stanowić kontrargument wobec tezy o całkowicie obcej i narzuconej z zewnątrz idei ustroju monarchicznego dla reaktywowanego w 1918 r. państwa polskiego. Chociaż ostatecznie polskie elity zrezygnowały z wprowadzenia w Polsce ustroju monarchii konstytucyjnej, część rozwiązań zawartych w projekcie konstytucji z 1917 r. stała się inspiracją dla późniejszych projektów ustrojowych, zarówno zgłaszanych w czasie prac nad pierwszą po zaborach, pełną konstytucją niepodległego państwa polskiego uchwaloną w 1921 r. jak również w czasie dyskusji nad jej rewizją.
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