This paper not only summarizes Hempel`s analysis of the D-N model that shows how it is possible for the covering-law model to provide both a causal account of particular facts and a non-casual one, but also offers four prominent examples of non-causal explanation. Subsequently a detailed analysis of the examples shows that there is a common denominator between these examples: the presence of a law that describes an empirical system in its atemporal state. But the paper also shows what differences are there in the applicability of the laws in the given explanations. Finally, it reviews the evolution of the conception of non-causal explanation with respect to the discussed examples.
The paper tries to provide an alternative to C. G. Hempel's approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel's approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. The paper makes an attempt to provide a new approach to the scientific laws and scientific explanations. The author gives a brief overview of Hempel's approach to the scientific laws and scientific explanation, as well as of its failures and paradoxes. As a way out, the author analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, he provides a differentiated typology of the scientific laws and scientific explanations.
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