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1

IMPOSSIBILISTS’S PARADISE ON THE CHEAP?

100%
Vacek M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 3
283 – 301
EN
The aim of the paper is to discuss the ersatz theory of Lewis’s impossible worlds, point out its undeniable benefits and demonstrate its costs. Firstly, the author presents two approaches to Lewis’s impossible worlds taken as constructions out of possibilia. Secondly, he evaluates the proposals using the Lewisian criteria of success concerning the well-defined conception of analysis. Although appealing, he does not find the proposals fully persuasive. Thirdly, the author discusses the objection from an ad hoc distinction between possible and impossible worlds. He concludes that the objection does not present a special problem for the Lewisian theory. Finally, he motivates a theory of extended modal realism, to wit, modal realism enriched with concrete impossibilia.
2

LEWISIAN-STYLE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION: A NEW SOLUTION TO THE OVERDETERMINATION PROBLEM

88%
Goswick D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2010
|
vol. 17
|
issue 4
461-476
EN
Causal overdetermination - i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z - has been long considered as a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination ought to be left as 'spoils to the victor'. The author shows how, if we modify Lewis' account of events slightly, we can bring counterfactual analysis in line with our intuitions about overdetermination.
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