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EN
In this paper we revisit Pavel Tichý’s novel distinction between one-dimensional and two-dimensional conception of inference, which he presented in his book Foundations of Frege’s Logic (1988), and later in On Inference (1999), which was prepared from his manuscript by his co-author Jindra Tichý. We shall focus our inquiry not only on the motivation behind the introduction of this non-classical concept of inference, but also on further inspection of selected Tichý’s arguments, which we see as the most compelling or simply most effective in providing support for his two-dimensional account of inference. Main attention will be given to exposing the failure of one-dimensional theory of inference in its explanation of indirect (reductio ad absurdum) proofs. Lastly, we discuss shortly the link between two-dimensional inference and deduction apparatus of Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 8
616 – 631
EN
Differentiating between formal positions condition and the conditioned (i.e. if-vector) as well as between the content’s exemplars (occurring in these positions, i.e. vector of relevance) and a direction of grammatical tenses (i.e. time vector) enables us to de-fine two types of reasoning, based on the cause/effect relationship: deductive prediction and retrodiction (positive time direction) and abductive prediction and retrodiction (negative time direction). Although these predictions and retrodictions are formulated in form of conditionals, they are in fact elided expressions for reasons. A producer of deductive predictions and retrodictions picks up from a complex set of effects producing conditions one main condition, which, as a cause, is indicated in the antecedent. At the same time it is supposed that the effect indicated in the consequent is implied deductively. However, this holds only if the ceteris paribus principle (other things being equal), as well as the tacit set of true statements (the majority of which the producer need not know) are true.
EN
This paper focuses on the theory of deduction, developed by the Czech logician Pavel Tichý. Research on deduction in Tichý’s logic is still not very advanced. Tichý’s own deduction system is a generalization of Gentzen’s natural deduction and although it is an interesting topic in itself, I’d rather focus on the theory or philosophy of deduction that motivates Tichý’s choice of deduction system. Some of Tichý’s expressions suggest that in the question of the status of the theory of deduction in logic he held the prevailing modern approach, but this contradicts the fact that most of his writings concern selected problems of logical semantics. Having introduced Tichý’s original conception of deduction, I pay attention to the so called object-conception of logic, which explains the special position of the theory of deduction in his conception.
EN
The author analyses five complex sentences of causal-semantic type in order to distinguish between an argument and an explanation in such structurally similar complex sentences. In accord with American philosopher G. R. Mayes (2000), he recognizes differences between them. The presence of epistemic modality in the main clause of a complex sentence can be seen as one of the basic distinctive linguistic signals that differentiates an argument from an explanation. From the pragmatic point of view, an explanation describes causal relations in the real world (speech sphere included), as opposed to an argument, which makes acceptable 'causal relations' in the world of speech. The hierarchy of the argument and the explanation is also the object of scrutiny. Here an argument is understood as a superstructural, additional function that a sentential segment (e.g. an explanation as well) can receive in discourse for various strategic reasons. Finally, the author analyses an eventual correlation of the distinction between an argument and an explanation and inductive and deductive reasoning.
EN
The paper deals with the usefulness of Pavel Tichý’s concept of match between two (or more) constructions for the deduction and inference considerations. Tichý’s preference of the two-dimensional view on inference instead of the one-dimensional view is criticized. The reasons for the implementation of the match concept are elucidated. The logical expressiveness of the match concept is demonstrated through its implementation to the Natural Deduction System explicated in the hyper-intensional framework of Transparent Intensional Logic.
EN
In the first part of the paper, the author argues that explicating systems which fall under the simple theory of types are limited in explicating our conceptual scheme. Such limitation is avoided if one utilizes, instead, a ramified type theory, especially the one developed by Pavel Tichý. In the third part of the paper, the author explains the role of so-called constructions and derivation systems within such a framework, elucidating how deduction demonstrates properties of objects.
EN
This article shows theoretical and practical implications of a research style called Grounded Theory. The paper documents the process of generating theory from qualitative data. The emphasis is put on diverse levels of abstraction experienced by a researcher while analyzing data. An everyday item has been used to help to demonstrate the steps of reflection while executing qualitative analysis. The item is a cemetery bag - an old fashioned brownish bag containing things that attach significance. Therefore, it becomes a signifier for ageing, heterosexuality and gender roles. The bag and the thoughts it triggers help researchers to reflect on their hidden coding mechanisms, which play a vital part in qualitative research. The article concludes with showing several steps in the coding process of Grounded Theory, along with how categories find their way into a paradigmatic model.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 4
295 – 306
EN
Charles Sanders Peirce plays a unique role in the history of modern American philosophy. The paper’s focus is on scientific discovery and explanation, i.e. two important issues of Peirce’s thinking. Many types of scientific reasoning have long been identified as supplying important methodologies for discovery and explanation in science, but a lot of questions regarding their logical properties still remain open in the contemporary investigations in philosophy of science, methodology and logic. These styles of reasoning include induction, abduction, deduction, explanation or confirmation. The article offers a logical, or more exactly, metodeutical analysis of a particular type of scientific reasoning, namely abduction, i.e. is, reasoning from an observation to its possible explanations. There is no single logical method in scientific practice in general, and with respect to abduction in particular. Abduction is not a new form of inference, but belongs to the most important ways leading to scientific discovery.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 1
36 – 50
EN
The paper proposes a solution to the problem of counterfactuals building on both Rescher’s epistemic and Tichy’s semantic approaches. The core of the latter is the thesis that a speaker when expressing a true counterfactual assumes a set of background indicative premises as an implicit parameter. When added tacitly to an unreal antecedent, these premises entail the consequent logically or analytically. We argue against Pollock’s impossibility objection concerning revision of the producer’s beliefs. In accordance with the linguistic solution we distinguish between a relative and an absolute unreality of a course of events described in the consequent. Likewise, we draw a distinction between a potentially unreal and an absolutely unreal condition expressed in the antecedent. Drawing on our previous paper, Deductive and abductive retro dictions and predictions, we take counterfactuals with a positive time vector and an absolute unreal condition to be elided deductive judgements, i.e. deductive retro dictions, without any appeal to a special non-classical logic. Similarly, we consider counterfactuals with a positive time vector and a potentially unreal condition to be elided deductive predictions.
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