Search results

1

ON THE POWER AND GLORY OF DEDUCTIVISM

100%

Marciszewski W.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

|

2009

|

issue 16(29)

353-355

EN

This comment is meant as a couple of glosses on the margin of Dale Jacquette'e contribution (this issue) 'Deductivism in Formal and Informal Logic'.

2

DEDUCTIVISM IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL LOGIC

63%

Jacquette D.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

|

2009

|

issue 16(29)

189-216

EN

Deductivism is explained and defended. The thesis holds that logic generally, both formal and informal, is primarily concerned with the normative distinction between good and bad reasoning, and interprets good reasoning as minimally deductively valid inference. If deductivism is true, then it follows that all fallacies of reasoning, including the so-called informal or rhetorical fallacies, are deductively invalid. Deductivism as an ideology nevertheless cuts across the distinction between formal and informal logic. To defend deductivism against potential counterexamples, it is necessary to show that common fallacies are reconstructible as deductively invalid inferences. The present essay undertakes the groundwork of such a defense by arguing that even inductive argumentation, including inductive fallacies, along with circular reasoning, can be interpreted deductively. A large selection of other informal fallacies are also reconstructed as explicit deductive invalidities following a pattern that can be used to bring other fallacies under the deductivist umbrella.

3

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE INFORMAL LOGIC INITIATIVE

63%

Johnson R. H.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

|

2009

|

issue 16(29)

17-46

EN

In this paper, I undertake to present clearly just what informal logic ('logika nieformalna') is and how it relates to formal logic, and to logic as such. To do that, I start by explaining how the Informal Logic Initiative (ILI) began in North America in the 70s. That will lead to a discussion of what is meant by 'informal logic' and how it stands related to cognates such as formal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation. In Section 3, I discuss what I take to be basic theses about argumentation that have emerged from the informal logic perspective. In Section 4, I discuss some achievements of informal logic, and in Section 5, I discuss several interesting recent developments and in Section 6, I discuss the possible future developments. I conclude with some remarks on the importance of the Informal Logic Initiative in Section 7.

4

ARGUMENTATION THEORY AND THE CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

63%

Bermejo-Luque L.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

|

2009

|

issue 16(29)

285-303

EN

I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin's work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin's model of argument.

Refine search results

4 Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

1 Bermejo-Luque L.

1 Jacquette D.

1 Johnson R. H.

1 Marciszewski W.

4 2009

ON THE POWER AND GLORY OF DEDUCTIVISM

DEDUCTIVISM IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL LOGIC

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE INFORMAL LOGIC INITIATIVE

ARGUMENTATION THEORY AND THE CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION