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FACTUALISM AND ANTI-DESCRIPTIVISM: A CHALLENGE TO THE MATERIALIST CRITERION OF FUNDAMENTALITY

100%
Fernández Castro V.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2022
|
vol. 29
|
issue 1
109 - 127
EN
Inspired by the work of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buonomo (2021) I have argued that we can evaluate our metaphysical proposals on fundamental categories in terms of their capacity for reconciling the scientific and the manifest image of the world. This criterion of fundamentality would allow us to settle the question of which categories among those proposed in the debate—e.g., substance, structure or facts—have a better explanatory value. The aim of this essay is to argue against a central assumption of the criterion: semantic descriptivism. Specifically, I aim at showing that the criterion rests on the idea that the manifest picture is mostly a description of the world, and thus, it commits us with certain realism. Instead, I argue that at least some of the vocabulary we use to construct our manifest picture of the world, mental vocabulary, is evaluative rather than descriptive and thus creates problems in reconcile the manifest picture with scientific psychology and neurosciences. I conclude with some remarks on alternatives that could provide a way out of the fundamentality criterion.
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DESCRIPTIVISM IN META-ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC: A PLEA FOR REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

100%
Giombini L.
ESPES
|
2019
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vol. 8
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issue 2
59 – 73
EN
In this paper, I investigate one popular view in current methodological debate about musical ontology, namely, descriptivism. According to descriptivism, the task of musical ontology is to offer a description of the ‘structure of our thought’ (Kania 2008: 437) about musical works, as it manifests itself in actual musical practices. In this regard, descriptivists often appeal to our pre-theoretical intuitions to ground ontological theories of musical works. This method, however, is worrisome, as such intuitions are unstable and contradictory. For example, there is a broad variety of intuitions in our musical practice concerning what counts as an authentic performance of a musical work. All such intuitions reflect at least a part of actual practice; however, they are in conflict with each other. This raises a problem, for how can they thus represent a reliable basis for our ontology? A further worry for descriptivism concerns the triviality of the knowledge it gives us access to. If, according to descriptivism, the task of musical ontologists is simply to codify the regularities found in our intuitive thought or discourse about practice, then how can the resulting theories be informative at all with regard to the object of their concern?
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