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1

TOWARD A DEMARCATION OF FORMS OF DETERMINISM

100%
Marko V.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2017
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vol. 24
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issue 1
54 – 84
EN
In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.
2

Determinism and Contemporary Science

80%
Werszowiec P. J., Suwara M.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2007
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vol. 16
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issue 3(63)
165-179
EN
In the paper the role of causal relations in science is analyzed. On the basis of philosophical positions on determinism it is shown that the discussion between teleological and deterministic views in science is contemporarily at least equally essential as at the beginning of modern philosophy, though the latter is more complex than the former one. A description in categories of choices and goals is necessary for an insight into intentional subject activity. It is also required by phenomena of establishing the so-called attractors discovered in natural sciences. However, independently of the essence of the contemporary dispute on fatalism the human tendency to grasp the world by causal relations is, according to the authors, conditioned biologically.
3

SOME SKETCHY NOTES ON THE REAPER ARGUMENT

80%
Marko V.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2012
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vol. 19
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issue 3
361 – 387
EN
The paper deals with the possible readings of The Reaper Argument premises. Some conjectures related to the Stoics’ alleged proof of the argument are discussed.
4

Philosophical Consequences of the Principle of Causality

80%
Lemanska A.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2007
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vol. 16
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issue 3(63)
155-163
EN
The principle claiming that nothing occurs without a cause expresses a universal human desire to give causes the role of an order generating factor that makes the world comprehensible and susceptible to explanation. Another epistemic consequence of that approach is the possibility to reconstruct past events and forecast the future by arranging successive facts in causal chains. There is also an ontological consequence. Causality entails the thesis of the necessity of the existence of a self-supporting being which exists entirely due to its own nature. In a different text the authoress tried to show that this being is identical with God.
5

How is Freedom Possible? An Answer from Chrysippus of Soloi

80%
Jarzebiak J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2005
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vol. 14
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issue 2(54)
67-83
EN
The question of freedom was first raised in the Hellenistic times by the Stoics, or more specifically by Chrysippus, the well-known teacher and the creator of the school. He faced the question: How is it possible for a man to be free in the world which is fully determined and which is made up of things and events that were anticipated and included in an everlasting plan called Fate? Chrysippus' solution to the problem is based on the logical distinction between the necessary and the possible and results in the assertion that freedom means being able to express positively individual attitude towards the things and events taking place in the world. The key-term is 'synkatathesis' (the characteristics of human beings only) which is the act of approving or disapproving of the events occurring in our life and by means of which we exercise our freedom.
6
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IS FREEDOM WITHOUT FREE WILL POSSIBLE? (Czy mozliwa jest wolnosc bez wolnej woli?)

80%
Gut P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2008
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issue 8
345-47
EN
The main aim of this presents paper is to critically explore the view according to which an understanding and grasping of freedom is possible in the absence of free will. In the first part the author puts forward crucial reasons on which the tendency to postulate freedom of man without free will is based. In the second part the links existing between notions of freedom and knowledge are considered. The third part of this paper deals with the difficulties that the theory of freedom without free will faces in confronted with.
7
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THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN FREEDOM ACCORDING TO LEIBNIZ

80%
Gut P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2005
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issue 2
53-72
EN
The article concerns the fundamental metaphysical problem of human freedom as it is discussed in Leibniz's philosophy. The essence of it can be expressed as follows: in what way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of human freedom in action? The article is divided into two parts. The first part contains analysis of Leibniz's theses encapsulating his determinism and those concerning his concept of freedom. The second part points to some major difficulties resulting from Leibniz's view. Leibniz starts with the conviction that there is no contradiction between the two following theses: 1) at least some human actions are performed freely (i.e. the agent might have done otherwise than in fact he did) ; and 2) each action has a reason which is known beforehand and this is the reason why the action is undertaken rather than not. This view was justified by Leibniz by means of (1) introducing divisions and distinctions between modalities, (2) by laying the stress on teleological determinism, and (3) by arguments in favour of the thesis that the world exists contingently. The analysis carried out in the second part demonstrates that Leibniz's view leads to some difficulties. Two of them are of great significance: a) the relationship between freedom and Inter-World Identity of the agent, and b) seemingly unavoidable link between freedom and indeterminism. Both these problems result from the fact that Leibniz's idea of freedom was based on his strong concept of individuality, and from universal analyticity of truth.
8

PRINCIPLE OF THE CAUSAL OPENNESS OF THE PHYSICAL

80%
Von Wachter D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2019
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vol. 26
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issue 1
40 – 61
EN
The argument from causal closure for physicalism requires the principle that a physical event can only occur through being necessitated by antecedent physical events. This article proposes a view of the causal structure of the world that claims not only that an event need not be necessitated by antecedent events, but that an event cannot be necessitated by antecedent events. All events are open to counteraction. In order to spell out various kinds of counteraction I introduce the idea of ‘directedness.’
9

PÔVOD POJMU SLOBODNEJ VÔLE V ANTICKOM MYSLENÍ

70%
Labuda P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
928 – 934
EN
The paper deals with free will as discussed in the recent book of Michael Frede A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. Besides a close view on the structure of Fredes’s main ideas and arguments, the paper aims to provide a critical discussion of Frede’s view of St. Augustine’s contribution to the development of the notion of free will. This would enable us to explore and re-think the historical and philosophical conditions of the rise of the notion of free will in ancient thought.
10
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IS NATURALISTIC ETHICS POSSIBLE? (Czy naturalistyczna etyka jest mozliwa?)

70%
Szutta A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2010
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issue 12
69-90
EN
The paper concerns the possibility of naturalistic ethics. It seems that ethics properly understood must be described as a discipline necessarily focused on evaluation of human action, analyzed in the light of its moral value. Such evaluation, in turn, presupposes an agent who is responsible for his or her actions. So understood agent seems impossible without agent's being capable of self-determination in action. According to the naturalistic thesis, however, such freedom is impossible; all human action is causally determined, with no place for 'sui generis' causation, and such a thesis must be interpreted as excluding the possibility of responsibility for one's action. If so, then the concept of naturalistic ethics seems contradictory. Nonetheless, some authors (ex. Frankfurt and Dennett) try to show that the concept of moral responsibility (so crucial to ethics) does not necessarily entail freedom understood as 'sui generis' causation, and therefore it is compatible with determinism. In this paper I analyze their argumentation with the purpose to assess its conclusiveness. The conclusion I reach is that responsibility postulated by Frankfurt or Dennett is to be understood as merely epiphenomenal, as such it must be treated more like an illusion than a real property of human beings. Therefore, the thesis that naturalistic ethics is a contradictory concept seems to maintain its soundness.
11

SVĚT A VĚDA U LUDWIGA VON MISESE. ESEJ O MISESOVSKÉ METAFYZICE

70%
Špecián P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 4
335 – 346
EN
The paper deals with von Mises’ metaphysics and argues that his methodological dualism concerns only his epistemology. The framework of Mises´s ontology is materialistic monism. Although Mises strongly criticizes materialism, his critique does not concern metaphysical ontological materialism as long as it does not try to eliminate the specific method of the social sciences. In this sense Mises’ metaphysics is fully naturalistic – it does not include any “spiritual” agents and postulates a world consisting exclusively of elementary physical particles. The study illustrates this point on Mises’ determinism and his rejection of the free will as well as on his Darwinian account of the evolution of human mind. The specific method of the social sciences which makes use of the category of finality serves merely as an efficient heuristics and is based on a pragmatic view of science. It allows us to describe the irreducible complexity of social phenomena that cannot (at least not yet) be grasped by the physical vocabulary alone. Thus the argument of complexity is seen as a cornerstone of Misesian methodological dualism.
12

WHY DETERMINISM IN PHYSICS HAS NO IMPLICATIONS FOR FREE WILL

70%
Esfeld M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2019
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vol. 26
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issue 1
62 – 85
EN
This paper argues for the following three theses: (1) There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are maximally rich in information and usually also maximally simple. (2) There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific system we can reasonably expect under ignorance of its exact initial conditions. This procedure works in the same manner for both classical and quantum physics. (3) There is no cogent reason to take the parameters that enter into the (deterministic) dynamical equations of physics to refer to properties of the physical systems. Granting an ontological status to parameters such as mass, charge, wave functions and the like does not lead to a gain in explanation, but only to artificial problems. Against this background, I argue that there is no conflict be-tween determinism in physics and free will (on whatever conception of free will), and, in general, point out the limits of science when it comes to the central metaphysical issues.
13

HIGHLIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TENSE-LOGIC

70%
Øhrstrøm P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
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vol. 30
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issue 1
5 - 31
EN
For the first time Arthur Norman Prior presented his ideas of tense-logic1 on the 27th August in 1954. He developed the field further in many publications until his death in 1969. His books Time and Modality (1957a), Past, Present and Future (1967), and Papers on Time and Tense (1968) were clearly vital milestones. Much of Prior’s personal motivation had to do with his struggle with the logical tension between the theological doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. It turned out that tense-logic gave rise to a powerful tool for dealing with this and similar problems. Furthermore, important highlights in Prior’s tense-logic were the development of branching time and the introduction of instant propositions (leading to what has later been called ‘hybrid logic’). Since Prior’s death, many further developments of formal tense logic and its semantics have been presented and carefully investigated. In philosophical logic, many researchers have focused on discussions regarding ‘the true future’ and the notion of ‘the thin red line’.
14
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Kuszenie i wolna wola. O pewnym rozwiązaniu problemu natury relacji między ludzką wolnością a wszechwiedzą Boga

61%
Judycki S.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 4(19)
21-36
EN
The article aims to show that none of the today discussed positions concerning the relationship between human free will and God’s omniscience—determinism, compatibilism, molinism and libertarianian revisionism—is an adequate solution and proposes a position to some extent resembling Kant’s solution to his Third Antinomy, where he made the distinction between subject as causa phenomenon and subject as causa noumenon. God possesses not only an absolute knowledge concerning all processes and events in the world, but He also has a full knowledge concerning what all human subjects will decide to do. Nevertheless, His absolute knowledge in this sense is compatible with human freedom, because ‘real freedom’ is ‘located’—as a causality of freedom—in individual human natures which already exist in eternity and of which our actual inner experience gives us only a ‘sensual scheme’ (Kant). Human persons are tempted by different life experiences which they receive, i.e. they are tested by God and it cannot be excluded that some of these personal essences will turn out to be only illusory and in this sense will be condemned. For all other persons worldly experience was planned by God as a necessary element of their future eternal life.
15

PŘIPOMÍNKY THOMASE REIDA PROTI MATERIALISMU JOSEPHA PRIESTLEYHO

61%
Peterková E.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 4
294 – 308
EN
The paper deals with Thomas Reid’s comments against Joseph Priestley’s materialism. Priestley’s mechanical materialism is based on the philosophy of Isaac Newton, especially Newton’s rules of reasoning. Priestley rejected substantive dualism and arguments in favour of a single material substance on the basis of these rules. The paper first presents the form of Priestley’s materialism and then analyses the individual remarks of Reid. The emphasis is on the notions of truth and causality, which both philosophers interpret differently. The last part of the article analyses whether Reid’s remarks are relevant or not.
16
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On the Limits and Possibilities of Causal Explanation with Game Theoretical Models: The Case of Two Party Competition

61%
Mueller G. P.
ASK. Research and Methods
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2012
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vol. 21
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issue 1
69-85
EN
Regression-based path- and structural equation-models have two major drawbacks, if they are used for the causal explanation of social phenomena: they are too deterministic and neglect the intentions of the concerned actors as a central driving force of the analysed processes. In order to explain the distribution-effects of two party competition, this article proposes an alternative modelling approach, which is based on the mathematical theory of repeated games. The article explores the limits and possibilities of this approach with regard to the causal explanation of social phenomena and compares the results with the capabilities of the regression approach. It turns out that game theoretical models are especially useful for explaining the non-presence of social phenomena under given causal conditions.
17

PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF THOMAS HOBBES

61%
Piotrowski R.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2009
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issue 15(28)
189-197
EN
The construction of Hobbesian anthropology is sketched with emphasis on these points of his philosophy which seem inconclusive. We focus on: determinism, the notion of conatus/endeavour (which in turn splits into a purely mechanic kind, and a biological one), and on the duality of an-thropological description in Hobbes. In fact, the philosopher attempted to portray human beings both from inside and from outside. The 'inside' view equals to a physics of passions which are in turn rooted in biological conatus (De Corpore, Ch. IV.25.), the 'outside' view is the grim landscape of the state of nature and then the famous 'deduction' of the need of absolute power (Leviathan, Ch. XII). In fact there is no other man than the natural born egoist, as the Hobbesian citizen is simply a tamed beast.
18
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Determinizm a odpowiedzialność

61%
Smakulska J.
Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej
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2013
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vol. 14
109-125
EN
The aim of the article is to discuss the possibility of keeping the notion of responsibility valid, despite the inborn determinism of a human being. In the context of responsibility, the incompatibility of free will and determinism, is one of the most complex and difficult philosophical issues. B. Wolniewicz and S. Pinker are both the supporters of genetic determinism, however they do not negate responsibility. They claim that the idea of justice, or natural law, is deeply rooted in human nature. The main reason why people demand punishment for criminals is due to the fact that criminals contravene the moral order. Progress which is taking place in biological sciences might be perceived as a threat to the idea of justice, because some discoveries in this field may be used by lawyers for justifying criminal deeds by evolutionary reasons and eventually proving their innocence. In fact, there is no such a danger, as explaining someone’s conduct is not the same as justifying it. Understanding does not mean forgiving. Biological sciences might be helpful in more profound understanding of the problem.
19

THE PROBLEM OF MEANING AND ITS MAIN TRANSFORMATIONS IN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY OF THE SECOND HALF OF 20TH CENTURY (Problema sensu ta yii holovni transformatsii u frantsuz'kii filosofii druhoi polovyny XX stolittia)

61%
Yosipenko O.
Філософська Думка
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2009
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issue 4
57-66
EN
The author investigates the main stages in the development of the concept of Meaning in French philosophy of the second half of 20th century. The first stage is identification of the problem of Meaning in the phenomenology of . Merleau-Ponty, who connected this problem with his task to develop the concept of 'extended, cultural-historical mind'. The second - structuralism - stage connects Mind with the concept of social mind, shifting its investigation from the sensual domain into the domain of logic of social connections. The third stage consists in criticism of the structuralism's philosophical program. Structuralism's concepts of Meaning and Mind are criticized for their formalism and causality. Meanwhile, the development of analytical philosophy of language and philosophy of mind has transferred these concepts into the domain of the rule of later L. Wittgenstein: Meaning has possessed a status of a 'regulative principle' of social life, which represents a normative system, or in the terms of V. Descombes, a social institution. The authoress demonstrates various ways of exploring the concepts of Meaning and Mind, and proves that, by ignoring an opportunity of methodological reflection upon these concepts, any humanitarian or philosophical investigation will easily shift into determinism, individualism, or subjectivism.
20

JE NEDOROZUMENIE MEDZI KOMPATIBILISTAMI A INKOMPATIBILISTAMI LEN VERBÁLNE?

61%
Kollárik T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 9
768 – 784
EN
The goal of this paper is to show that disagreement between compatibilists and in-compatibilists about compatibility of free will with determinism is merely verbal, since although one side of the dispute claims that free will is compatible with determinism, whereas the other side denies it, they in fact ascribe to the expression „free will“ a different meaning. One can thus accept both the compatibilist thesis as well as the in-compatibilist thesis, as these two do not constitute a contradictory pair. My method consists in analysing the meaning of the phrase being an ability to do other-wise as a property of abilities and the meaning of the phrase having an ability to do otherwise as a property of agents. The outcome of conducted analysis enables me to make an unbiased comparison of necessary conditions which compatibilists and in-compatibilists expect to hold if agents are to have the ability to do otherwise. It is shown, as expected, that these conditions are not the same.
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