Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  DISAGREEMENT
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT CONTEXTUALISM

100%
Davies A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2021
|
vol. 28
|
issue 3
557 – 580
EN
It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.
2

DRUHY NEZHODY A ICH (SEMI)FORMÁLNA REKONŠTRUKCIA

100%
Bielik L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 9
690 – 704
EN
The phenomenon of doxastic (epistemic) disagreement pertains to contemporary discussions in epistemology. Moreover, a related notion of the difference of opinion (or standpoints) is at the centre of the theory of argumentation (cf. van Eemeren et al. 2014). In this paper, we propose a broader definition of argument which seems to serve a fruitful theoretical function in classifying different kinds of disagreement (difference of opinion). In particular, along with the well-known categories of rebutting and undercutting arguments (cf. Pollock 1995; Besnard – Hunter 2008), we distinguish among various further kinds of disagreement which may be reconstructed by a (semi-)formal apparatus as competing arguments. As a result, we are able to represent not only competing justificatory arguments, but also arguments which underlie competing predictions and explanations. Hence, considerations on disagreement extend beyond the classical cases of counterarguments which have been analysed in the theory of argumentation.
3

DOES DEEP MORAL DISAGREEMENT EXIST IN REAL LIFE?

100%
Kiš S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
|
vol. 30
|
issue 3
255 – 277
EN
The existence of deep moral disagreement is used in support of views ranging from moral relativism to the impossibility of moral expertise. This is done despite the fact that it is not at all clear whether deep moral disagreements actually occur, as the usually given examples are never of real life situations, but of some generalized debates on controversial issues. The paper will try to remedy this, as any strength of arguments appealing to deep moral disagreement is partly depended on the fact the disagreement exists. This will be done by showing that some real life conflicts that are intractable, i.e. notoriously difficult to resolve, share some important features with deep moral disagreement. The article also deals with the objection that the mere conceptual possibility renders illustrations of actually happening deep moral disagreements unnecessary. The problem with such objection is that it depends on theoretical assumptions that are not uncontroversial. Instead, the article claims we need not only suppose deep moral disagreements exist because they actually occur when some intractable conflicts occur. Thus, in so far as to the deep moral disagreement’s existence, the arguments appealing to it are safe. But as intractable conflicts can be resolved, by seeing deep moral disagreements as constitutive part of them, we might have to consider whether deep moral disagreements are resolvable too. A brief suggestion of how that might look like is given in the end of the paper.
4

SELF-DISAGREEMENT AS FEATURE OF ADULTHOOD. ANDRAGOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF KAZIMIERZ DABROWSKI'S THEORY OF POSITIVE DISINTEGRATION (Niezgoda na siebie jako cecha doroslosci...odczytanie koncepcji dezintegracji pozytywnej Kazimierza Dabrowskiego)

100%
Sokolowicz N.
Dyskursy Młodych Andragogów / Adult Education Discourses
|
2009
|
vol. 10
55-68
EN
The principal aim of the paper is to analyze one of the crucial notions for andragogy, namely adulthood. Taking as a point of departure the anthropological conception of adulthood by Ryszard Urbanski-Korz, which places emphasis on not submitting to social conventions, the authoress of the paper enquires about the following: what does it mean that an adult disagrees with himself, social expectations and the role assigned by society; and does it all result in self-disagreement? In seeking an answer, she refers to the conception of positive disintegration by Kazimierz Dabrowski, and analyzes the psychological mechanisms responsible for passing through successive stages of development. The most important mechanisms in Dabrowski's conception are the ones responsible for conflicts, both inner and interpersonal, and for loosening the structure of psyche. Next, the authoress refers to the moment in psychological development, conspicuously omitted by Dabrowski, when a human being is, for some reason, not able to reach the last stage of development - namely the stage of reintegration. The authoress discusses threats and risks in development of those who endlessly express their disagreement with themselves. In order to illustrate the problem, she presents literary and philosophical interpretations of the following characters: Antigone (Magdalena Sroda), Rahel Varnhagen (Hannah Arendt), and one of the characters from the novel by Sandor Marai 'The Miracle Blood of Saint Januarius'.
5

EVIDENCE VS. VIRTUES IN EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT

88%
Bakalova M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2016
|
vol. 23
|
issue 1
72 – 82
EN
In situations of peer disagreement there are two kinds of factors that matter. These are the factors internal to the discussion, such as evidence exposed and arguments presented by both sides and there are also factors external to the discussion, also called “independent factors”. The external factors include mainly virtues and competences of the participants. There are two main theories about epistemic disagreement, “the stead-fast view” and “the conciliationism”, and each of them stresses the importance of one group of these factors over the other. This paper is a defence of the greater epistemic significance of independent factors over internal factors. However, it is not a defence of the conciliationism which takes independent factors to be systematically the ultimate arbiter in situations of peer disagreement. The argument in the paper goes like this. Although the steadfast view receives strong intuitive support from two cases presented by Thomas Kelly: “Right and Wrong” and “Wrong and Wronger”. The author argues that the view is undermined by Timothy Williamson’s recent “Very Improbable Knowing” argument. This argument shows that for some basic type of evidence E when S uses it in favour of p, it is very improbable that S knows that S knows that p. Therefore, in situations of peer disagreement, S is unjustified to push her evidence in support of her side. There are arguably some exceptions, e.g. when one claims to have knowledge based on a priori evidence and on holistic evidence, but these are not sufficient to save the day for the steadfast view. In contrast to that, the reflective knowledge of one’s first order competences and virtues (i.e. external factors) is not vulnerable by Williamson’s argument. One reason for that is because we know about independent factors on the basis of holistic evidence. The author claims that our epistemic goal in the face of peer disagreement is to end up on the side that is non-accidentally closer to truth. In accordance with achieving this goal, it is safer to stick to independent factors in resolving peer disagreement situations than to follow one’s nose concerning first-order evidence disclosed by the opponents. This might seem a counterintuitive result, which makes it worthy of further discussion.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.