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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 7
518 – 530
EN
The question whether mathematical objects are things to be discovered or rather invented belonged for a long time among the most discussed issues in philosophy of mathematics. The answers range from strictly Platonist approaches to radical constructivism and even fictionalism. The paper is an attempt to bring this philosophical question down to earth before we set out to search for highly sophisticated but controversial explanations. The methods we employ are inspired by those implemented in philosophical remarks of the later Wittgenstein. The main goal of the paper is to strip the question of its reputed philosophical depth by means of paying closer attention to what its meaning could intelligibly be in the first place.
EN
The history of expeditions to and discoveries of Arctic and Antarctic regions is shown by means of detailed accounts about the core events, such as the expedition of J.Cook (1772-1775), F.Bellinsgauzen and M.Lazarev (1819-1820), R.Amundsen (1911) and R.Scott (1901-1904); internationalization of research in Arctic and the arrangement of the First International Polar Year in 1882-1883. Organization of polar research in Russia at the beginning of XX century is shown, with emphasis on the role of the S.-Petersburg Academy of Sciences where the standing interdisciplinary Polar Commission was founded apart from the existing Hydrographic Expedition of the Arctic Ocean, organized by the government's Chief Hydrographic Department. The Commission had a broad range of objectives, including investigations of all the polar countries, accurate accounting for everything done, organization of expeditions, planning of systematic works in Arctic, elaboration of legal rules for international cooperation etc.
EN
The paper discusses Toulmin's substantial (jurisprudential) model of argument, as set out in The Uses of Argument (1958), in juxtaposition with his considerations concerning scientific discovery and scientific arguments, as presented in The Philosophy of Science (1953). The author finds Toulmin's search for understanding the nature of science to be a forerunner of his later concep- tion of argument. In addition, he claims that the latter displays much more accurately the 'logic' of both scientific discovery and the arguments in science than the patterns of formal (both inductive and deductive) logic. For actually, in Toulmin's view, no logic in the traditional, formal sense can be ascribed to discovery and scientific arguments - despite all the mathematical techniques they employ. Thus neither the neo-positivistic account nor even the Popperian one can do justice to their specific character. Although the Toulminian model of argument cannot be treated, in a strict sense, as a methodological instruction, it plays an explicatory role, throwing some light on our understanding of scientific enterprises and their rationality. In fact, the author finds Toulmin's concept of argument to be the core of his overall conception of rationality, and the considerations about science to be one aspect of this conception.
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