The author compares individual republic forms of government and examines the position of President of the Slovak Republic within a parliamentary form of government. He points out to amendments of the constitution since its adoption in 1992, which seem to be adequate in a parliamentary form of government. The author´s criticism aims at the provisions of Article 115 of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitutional Act 356/2011. This amendment has affected the dualism of executive power which is typical for a parliamentary form of government. It constitutes an excessive limitation of powers of the government in case of loss of trust, expression of distrust. Moreover, certain acts of the government are made conditional upon previous approval of the President. Suggestions de lege constitutione for amendment of competences of the President as neutral constitutional actor are made. The author points out to the problems in the application of acts of the creative right of the President, which enter the division of power. Long-term constitutional customs, which supplement the constitutional practice in accordance with a parliamentary form of government, also play an important role in the exercise of powers by the President and other constitutional bodies.
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