The paper deals with the very idea of distinction between analytical and continental philosophy, so it is primarily methodological. The aim is to criticize this division. Criticism is conducted from the point of view of analytical philosophy. The arguments are of three kinds: a) factual – evidence from the history of contemporary philosophy, pointing to analytical philosophers working on the continent (Frege, Carnap, etc.) and at the same time to non-analytical philosophers outside the continent (American pragmatism, etc.); b) methodological – it is a division of contemporary philosophy, is it complete, exclusive, what is the criterion of division? It is divided according to both geographical and systematic criteria. This will point out the illogicality of the division itself; c) power – the division is conducted by analytical philosophy as a manifestation of its hegemony, it is actually a division of analytical vs. non-analytical philosophies. Thus, in conclusion, I will focus on the possibility and necessity of dividing philosophy, such as movements, disciplines, philosophers, as well as the purposes – educational, research, etc. The division of philosophy according to problem areas is considered less misleading.
In his On the Very Analytic-Continental Division in Philosophy, Šebela presents three objections against dividing contemporary philosophy into analytic and continental. He calls them a factual objection, a methodological objection, and a power objection. In this paper, I will scrutinize the three objections and show that each of them ultimately fails. My motivation is to clear the theoretical path for those who wish to explore and reflect on the fascinating methodological presuppositions that constitute the division of contemporary philosophy into analytic and continental.
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