The proposed analysis of Kant's system of aesthetic judgements builds upon the metaphor of play, based on the binary opposition of laws and freedom. Drawing upon the dualism of human actions, reflected in the tendency to develop both open and closed systems, Kant's analysis of the faculty of judgment focuses on the opposition of two pervading elements: freedom and order. Aesthetic and moral judgments are represented by the play model, which is a system based on arbitrary decisions, limited, however, by a superior network of rules. Therefore, the play is a system in which the duty to obey the rules coexists with the necessity to freely choose the strategy of one's decisions. The category of the play is further employed to reflect upon Kantian notions of the genius, the sublime, and the work of art that induce the free play of the cognitive faculties.
This article raises the issue of the religious doctrine which developed at the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th centuries in one of the Italian Cathar Churches in Concorezzo, near Milan. This original doctrinal conception, concerning the question of the origin of evil, constituted a combination of moderate with radical dualism; it assumed that, other than the good principle - of God the creator - there is also an evil principle - an eternal four-faced spirit which does not have the power to create and is therefore not a god. A radical dualism of two principles not previously encountered therefore results, which attempts to remain moderate by force through retaining the idea of one God. Although this doctrine has been known to scholars since the 1940s, nobody has previously conducted a careful analysis of it. This article therefore attempts to explain the origin of this conception in the light of the events of the early history of Italian Catharism, separating the inspirations of the former dualistic doctrines from the original input of the Italian perfecti, to understand the motives of its creation and also to establish its place among the forms of dualism which we know.
What exactly is the substance of the Person – the substantial element of thinking about the Person? According to the possibilities of uncovering the Person by the emotional reduction, thinking about the Person is thinking about whom? It seems, that it is very difficult, maybe impossible, to get rid of the structural idealization of the substance, because even the pure comprehension of the person has its own, idealized structure. The empirical substance – anatomical body, and metaphysical spiritus movens – soul are the creators of typical dualism, where the Person is a connection of these two aspects from completely different worlds. But dualism is not enough, because in that meaning even soul has substantial structure, and dualistic project changes into materialism or spiritualism – depends what is taken as an idea of the Person. But phenomenology is still showing a different solution of this paradox. Relation between the empirical substance and mental sphere is not so simply, as it was presented by the dualistic vision. This relation is mediated by the intentionality. This substantial effort expressing emotions is realizing themselves in the Dialogue with the Others. Intentionality separates empirical substance – the anatomical body, which appears now as the symbol of the Person in Dialogue, and meta-level – the astral substance understood as the most sacred sphere of the Person, where access is possible only by the emotional reduction. That is the astral substance, possible to be presented as an idea of the Person – but this sentence is mistake, because astral substance is not possible to define. Thinking of the Person in Dialogue is thinking of the astral substance.
The paper sheds light on the idea of uploading persons. Trans-humanists defend the possibility of uploading persons. However, this might lead to substantial dualism of a person and its substrate. Dualism contradicts other trans-humanist philosophical presuppositions so, the trans-humanist theory as a whole could be contradictory. The problem of dualism can be eliminated by introducing the concept of emulation. Thus the concept of emulation could resolve the aforementioned contradiction in the trans-humanist theory. On the other hand, the drawback of the concept of emulation could be a threat to personal identity. Hence, the main task of transhumanism is not to tackle the problem of person but rather that of personal identity.
In chapter 3 of 'Individuals', entitled 'Persons', Strawson argues against dualism and the no-ownership theory, and proposes instead that our concept of a person is a primitive concept. In this paper, it is argued that the basic questions that frame Strawson's discussion, and some of his main arguments and claims, are dubious. A general diagnosis of the source of these problems is proposed. It is argued that despite these problems Strawson gives an accurate and very insightful description of the way we think about ourselves, which should form the starting point for more speculative accounts of ourselves.
Market economy is a system that consists of inter-related individual elements such as private economic agents, private-public partnerships, state corporations and state institutions. Such a system possesses individual features of each element as well as systemic features. This is what is called economic dualism in this paper. This interpretation of economic dualism is compared to its traditional interpretation. Basic characteristics of the systems view on market economy are discussed. Some illustrations of a system organization of economy, specifically network organization, are presented. Major conclusion that comes out of this approach is: Systems view on market economy requires its regulation on the basis of a systems approach to correct for market failures and systemic risk. The paper explains what it means from an economic standpoint.
This article addresses the relationship of myth and music, taking the example of musical ballads by the Slovak composer Tadeáš Salva (1937 – 1995). The early 20th century saw the appearance of a new phenomenon in art: the renaissance of myth. The problem of myth became the foundation of works by many researchers in a variety of scholarly disciplines. Claude Lévi-Strauss was the first who addressed this question in relation to music. For him, the essential methodological point of departure in the examination of myth is binary oppositions. In essence these correlate with the dualism which, according to Tadeáš Salva, is the basic characteristic of the ballad. Analysis of the balladic principle in the work of this composer consists of a description of the contrasting elements in a number of musical parameters. On this basis, an attempt is made to show the renaissance of myth in Salva’s music via the musical ballads, which in varying instrumentation represent the core of his original music.
The paper deals with von Mises’ metaphysics and argues that his methodological dualism concerns only his epistemology. The framework of Mises´s ontology is materialistic monism. Although Mises strongly criticizes materialism, his critique does not concern metaphysical ontological materialism as long as it does not try to eliminate the specific method of the social sciences. In this sense Mises’ metaphysics is fully naturalistic – it does not include any “spiritual” agents and postulates a world consisting exclusively of elementary physical particles. The study illustrates this point on Mises’ determinism and his rejection of the free will as well as on his Darwinian account of the evolution of human mind. The specific method of the social sciences which makes use of the category of finality serves merely as an efficient heuristics and is based on a pragmatic view of science. It allows us to describe the irreducible complexity of social phenomena that cannot (at least not yet) be grasped by the physical vocabulary alone. Thus the argument of complexity is seen as a cornerstone of Misesian methodological dualism.
The most common catchphrase of physicalism is: “everything is physical”. According to Hempel’s Dilemma, however, physicalism is an ill-formed thesis because it can offer no account of the physics to which it refers: current physics will definitely be revised in the future, and we do not yet know the nature of future physics. The dilemma arises due to our difficulty to set the boundaries of the concept ‘physical.’ In order to confront the dilemma, a physicalist must ensure that physics is not going to broaden itself artificially (or in some trivial way) to become complete—perhaps by adding non-reductive mental entities to elementary physical theory, making it impossible to distinguish physicalism from dualism. I offer a solution to the dilemma which is a version of the ‘via negativa’ (standardly taken to be a stipulation that the physical not include the mental), albeit one that is specified and worked out in a distinctive way. My suggested formulation of the physicalist hypothesis allows us to establish a refutation condition of physicalism. The refutation condition is general and not only dualistic. Consequently, the physicalist can choose the second horn of the dilemma, and hold that physicalism is indeed refutable (and not a trivial thesis).
First sections of the article present the historical background of the twentieth century philosophy of the human body. Then the author analyzes main elements of Husserlian theory of the constitution of the body: constitution of visual, tactual and kinesthetic body, constitution of the body of the will (Willensleib) and intersubjective constitution of objective body. Husserl's theory of living body is then compared with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body. In the last section the author presents analysis which aims to show how from the dualistic point of view conscious subject (soul) gets its most fundamental embodiment.
Drafting and adopting the Hungarian Civil Code was the greatest challenge in the so-called Transleithanian area during the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Despite the dilligent work of the main government body involved in the legislative works, the Ministry of Justice, the draft of the Civil Code (1900) was brought only for public discussion until the end of the 19th century. In the centre of the author's attention is a brief insight into the commencement of the codification process during the dualist era which started right after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, by the decision of the Ministry of Justice to swiftly initiate the civil substantial law codification in 1869. The readers will get acquainted with the historical and processual side of the works on the Civil Code Draft of 1900 which, even after hundred years, is still an interesting object of studies for its originality, legal creativity, and European nature which reflected the fact that the Hungarian civilists and lawmakers were well-established in the European community of lawyers.
The paper deals with the fundamental problems of Juraj Ciger's philosophical and ethical thinking. Its focus is on Ciger's understanding and explaining of the legacy of the R. Descartes founder of modern philosophy as an enigmatic philosopher. In this context it shows that Descartes was the clue philosopher for Ciger and that in a sense Ciger himself can be seen as an enigmatic philosopher. The author offers an analysis of Ciger's interpretation of Descartes' philosophical conception, which on his opinion was not dualistic, but rather trialistic. The impact of Ciger's thinking on the theoretical and practical (medical) ethics is shown as well.
The Thomistic proof of the immateriality of human reason consists in the argument from the fact that intellection has as its object not empirical particulars but abstract universals. A standard objection against dualism plays up the problem with the causal influence of the soul on the body (psychophysical problem). The Thomistic solution depends on the hylemorphic conception of the soul as a substantial form of body, i.e. on the view that the human soul is (also) that in virtue of which a human body has those essential properties which it has.
The essay presents short stories of the significant structural changes of the Hungarian Governments. It is made up of two larger parts. The first part deals with some of the more important historical periods (Dualism, Horthy-era and the era of state socialism). The second part focuses on the government (in legislative terms) after the change of the system. The study concentrates on the organisation of ministries as the result of the structural changes of the Governments. It is important to pay attention not only to the significant historic eras but to the changes of the transition periods, revolutions, etc., as well. The aim of the present paper is to find out whether there is an ideological connection between the structural differences of the different political terms and historical periods, or whether there are other correspondences instead.
The leading idea of the article is defined by a quotation from Fichte concerning the opposition between idealism and 'dogmatism', or naturalism. That opposition is interpreted as a result of two alternative 'reductions of consciousness': according to the first, or the idealistic one, it is possible to reduce the world to consciousness (or to its 'constituted correlate', to a pure phenomenon), while according to the second, the naturalistic one, it is possible to reduce consciousness to the world conceived as a material whole of particles and physical laws. The logics of the idealistic reduction is developed on the example of Husserlian 'pure phenomenology'; this of the naturalistic one is illustrated by the proposals of Paul Churchland and John Searle. The reconstruction of the two alternative modes of reductions aims at revealing their symmetry and, also, the insufficiency of either of them. In the last paragraph, the possibility of a 'third way' between idealism and naturalism is briefly examined (on the examples of several, both classical and contemporary, 'continental' and 'analytical' ideas), but the conclusions are skeptical.
This paper argues for the thesis that the reality of mind is a necessary as well as sufficient condition for a diachronic identity of human person. The impossibility of elimination of qualia and intentionality and thus the impossibility of eliminative materialism was proved here. An impossibility of the theory of identity of types and individuals, together with the impossibility of functionalism as one of the versions of eliminative materialism was proven through a careful consideration of Libet's experiments. Subsequently, dualism surfaced as further option. The views of interactive dualism of Popper and Eccles and that of pragmatic dualism of Carrier and Mittelstrass turned out to be unsuitable in some of their consequences. Hylemorphic dualism turned out to be the best explanation from the sorts of dualism discussed in this paper. Through its understanding of mind as a form, hylemorphic dualism enables us to explain causality as formal and final and thus to separate it form the efficient causality of empirical objects. By this, it also explains the diachronic identity of human person possible.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.