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1

It Is About Protection. Defence in Finland's Steps to NATO

100%

Nokkala A.

Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs

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2022

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vol. 26

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issue 4

39-72

EN

After Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland quickly applied for NATO membership. This step is not necessarily that drastic should Finland's security policy development in the long term be examined with one's focus set on a gradually-developed defence policy. It represents an important continuity in security policy, but also played a central role in advancing Finland's steps to becoming NATO members. On the basis of different studies and accounts, the following points seem to be critical in constructing a preliminary narrative about Finland's road to the Alliance. After the Second World War, Finland's western relations became dependent on its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Finland was aware that it could not expect any support from the West as regards its security. Despite a security policy based on recognising facts, and the FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union, the eastern neighbour was seen as the main, and, later on, the only military threat on the basis of history and Finland's vulnerable geopolitical position. The threat, however, was concealed by so-called “doubletalk” in security policy discourse until the 2010s. In this context, state defence was developed to be an independent and modern territorial defence, ultimately there to defend against a large-scale invasion. Finland's defence enjoyed high legitimacy and confidence in society, especially from the 1970s. Security policy was raised above normal politics to be a kind of super-politics with a strong political consensus. When the Cold War ended and Finland joined the European Union, defence policy and the defence establishment got a leading role in working an approaching NATO. Finland's opportunities to conduct stabilisation policy in its close neighbourhood were seen as being limited, especially after Russia adopted a self-asserting foreign and security policy towards the West after 2007. At the same time, the subsequently increased cooperation, networking, and integration stimulated perceptions about western defence dependence. This increased emphasis on defence actually turned people’s attention to the extra security that NATO membership might provide. Applying for NATO, however, required the shock of a Russian invasion of Ukraine before the Finnish public was ready to see the risks of NATO membership as being less than that of its benefits.

2

Strategie bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej

86%

Dziewulska A.

Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs

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2016

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vol. 4

27-50

EN

The 2016 faces the adoption of the new security strategy of the European Union – the second in the Union’s history. Although the Common Security and Defence Policy is one of the youngest of the EU policies, its role rapidly intensifi es in the world of growing political and social instability in the EU’s neighbourhood. How does the EU defi ne the threats to its security and is it capable of preventing them? The European Security Strategy of 2003 both describes the threats and recommends the principles that should be implemented in the EU’s policies in order to raise their effectiveness. Thirteen years after the publication of the first security strategy and shortly before the second one is announced it is interesting to check, how much the fi rst strategy inspired the changes in the way of thinking about the European security and the economisation of the European defences. In the article, there are analysed both the political milestones leading to the establishment of the defence policy of the EU and the provisions of the new Global Strategy of the Union. What can be anticipated from the new strategy given the experience with the realisation of the previous one? Does the new security strategy fit well into the reality of the contemporary international relations? Is the new strategy possible to implement?

3

The Capability-Expectations Gap in a Time of War

86%

Hill C.

Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs

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2025

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vol. 29

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issue 1

21-38

EN

The concept of the capability-expectations gap (CEG) which I originated in 1993 arose out of the debate about the Maastricht Treaty. Hopes, ambitions and predictions had been proliferating about the possibility of a genuinely common European foreign policy developing in the new post-Soviet international order. My view was more sceptical, even though positive about the idea in principle, on the grounds that the EU was still a long way from making the sovereignty derogations in in foreign policy which had been made in commercial policy. My argument was therefore that a gap was likely to open up between the expectations of progress towards European foreign policy and the ability to deliver it in practice. This could only be closed by either lowering expectations or increasing capabilities. In a further article in 1998 I showed that the gap had closed somewhat because of the disillusion which had set in through the EU’s poor performance in the Balkans crisis. The current article is the ﬁrst time I have returned to the question of the CEG since then and it therefore takes the long perspective of 30 years. It concludes that the gap is now certainly narrower than in the optimistic early days. Realism about decision-making, resources and instruments has prevailed amongst most EU Member States even if the momentum for progress is not wholly stalled – foreign policy has not been “re-nationalised”. Still, the problems caused by populist souverainisme mean that truly uniﬁed positions among the 27 are the exceptions more than the rule.

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3 Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs

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It Is About Protection. Defence in Finland's Steps to NATO

Strategie bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej

The Capability-Expectations Gap in a Time of War