It is trite law and a common cliché reiterated in the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the economic situation of a consumer subjected to a purportedly unfair consumer contract clause is generally impertinent. This general tenet of the European regulation of unfair terms in consumer contractsis borne out particularly by Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, under which assessment of the unfair nature of a term shall not encompass an inquiry into the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goodssupplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language. Despite this seemingly bold orientation towards the formal side of the unfairness assessment, efforts have been made to inject into the judicial exercise of discretion a degree of consideration of the economic standing and interests of both the consumer and the trader involved in the particular dispute at hand. This has been done primarily by reference to the “significant imbalance” requirement pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Directive. The paper reviews an extensive crosssection of judgments handed down in Polish courts based upon the Polish transposition of the Unfair Terms Directive to show that the courts have on numerous occasions ventured outside the boundaries delineated by traditional legal analysis (even beyond the flexible bounds of purposive interpretation) to scrutinize the size and gravity of the economic burden the term under scrutiny is liable to impose upon the consumer relative to its economic strength on the market.
Significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to a consumer contract term is, together with good faith, a fundamental pillar of substantive protection against unfair terms. It is the primary tool provided by Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts with a view to mitigating differences in bargaining power between professional traders and consumer on the ever-expanding capitalistic market within the EU. The paper comprehensively reviews the meaning of the “significant imbalance” element by reference to a cross-section of judgments handed by the CJEU and Polish courts. Generally, albeit with a few notable exceptions, the former court has engaged in a subjective-objective exercise aimed at discovering what the balance of rights and obligations would have been between the parties in the particular dispute at hand had it not been for the purportedly unfair clause. Besides that, the requirement has been utilized to impose ad bolster a host of information duties levied on traders so that protection is extended to cases where the consumer is unaware of their rights or are deterred from enforcing them due to procedural obstacles or prohibitive costs of judicial or administrative proceedings. The requirement of significant balance, rooted in the idea that the disproportion of market power between the parties to a disputed term necessitates government or judicial intervention to achieve or restore contractual equilibrium, is shown from a plethora of angles: its ideological foundations, practical connotations, its emphasis on consumer vulnerability and approach to economic power. Assistance and inspiration re gleaned from Polish jurisprudence where numerous questions either unanswered by the CJEU or left to the consideration of national courts, particularly the relation between reasonableness, on the one hand, and significant imbalance and good faith on the other, as well as between significant imbalance and good faith, have been tackled.
W niniejszej glosie komentowany jest wyrok Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 12 lutego 2014 r. (sygn. III SK. 18/13), w którym to odniósł się do problemu rozszerzonej skuteczności wyroków SOKiK uznających postanowienia wzorca umowy za niedozwolone. Sąd Najwyższy opowiedział się za stanowiskiem, zgodnie z którym wyrok stwierdzający abuzywność danej klauzuli, na podstawie którego wpisywana jest ona do rejestru prowadzonego przez Prezesa UOKiK, nie wiąże przedsiębiorcy, który nie brał udziału w postępowaniu przed SOKiK. Autorzy glosy podjęli próbę krytycznej analizy wskazanego rozstrzygnięcia. W glosie wskazano argumenty znajdujące podstawę zarówno w prawie unijnym, jak i krajowym, które przemawiają za koniecznością stosowania szerokiej wykładni pojęcia rozszerzonej skuteczności wyroków SOKiK
EN
In this case note we comment the Polish Supreme Court’s judgment issued on 12 February 2014 which deals with an issue of extended effect of judgments by District Court of Warsaw – Court for Competition and Consumer Protection (hereinafter: District Court). In these judgments contract terms used by entrepreneurs may be declared unfair and abusive. The Supreme Court supported the view, according to which a judgment declaring unfairness of a contract term – on the basis of which this term is entered into a register of unfair contract terms – does not bind entrepreneur who was not a party to proceedings in the District Court. The authors of this contribution disapprove of such approach. In this case note we provide arguments, deriving both from EU and Polish law, that support the necessity of adopting a wide approach towards interpretation of an issue of extended effect of judgments of the District Court.
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