The aim of my article is to show that accepting the context principle (CP) almost inevitably leads to a rejection of the project of giving a completely general explanation of linguistic meaning. I will argue that it is difficult to reconcile CP with any version of the project of giving such an explanation of meaning that does not appeal to semantic terms. I will begin with a short characterization of CP. I will outline the reading of CP which I myself embrace. Then I will briefly characterize the difference between the idea of explaining the meanings of linguistic expressions from outside of any language, and that of doing so from inside of a language. Then I will move on to the main point of my article, arguing that it is difficult to render the consequences of CP compatible with the idea of an explanation of meaning external to all linguistic content.
The subject of this article is the nature of linguistic competence. My consideration starts with the question whether a competence in our native language should be conceived as a kind of knowledge. The answer is positive, and the main reason is the fact that while describing linguistic competence we use the words “to know”, “knowledge”. Looking at the problem in this way leads to the next question: what is the nature of this kind of knowledge? More precisely, the problem which I consider concerns the nature of cognitive relation between a speaker and his or her mother tongue, or rather one of its aspects, namely the meaning. My discussion of this question begins with the criticism of the conception which treats the knowledge of our native tongue as the knowledge of a theory of meaning of this language. After that, I examine the possibility of using the distinction between know that and know how to investigate and solve that problem. I indicate that linguistic knowledge is neither classically or narrowly conceived knowledge that (a collection of true and justified beliefs), nor such a practical skill like the ability to swim. On the other hand, in the first place, a knowledge of a language satisfies grammatical criteria of knowledge that, however, a content of that knowledge is not beliefs, but rather rules – rules which are constitutive not regulative. From that I draw the conclusion that a linguistic competence cannot be explained from outside of any language. Secondly, one cannot deny that knowledge of a language is a practical ability, but it is a capacity of a very special kind. One of essential features of linguistic knowledge, which I emphasize, is its ostensive character. It is revealed, among other things, in the fact that learning our native language and the world constitute one process.It is worth stressing that the discussed question has a great significance to analytic philosophy. Many adherents of this trend claim that philosophical knowledge, if it exists at all, is knowledge about meanings of expressions which are considered fundamental from philosophical point of view, and about relations between them. So, without determining the nature of linguistic competence it is impossible to understand the essence of philosophical activity.
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