The principle of nullum crimen sine lege expresses an old idea that only the law can prescribe a particular act as punishable. It is commonly understood as a requirement of sufficient definiteness of an offence, in particular – of a statutory description of an offence before it has been committed (lex scripta, lex praevia), and of clarity and precision in criminal provisions so as to enable an individual to conform with them (lex certa), as well as their strict interpretation (lex stricta). Nowadays the principle is an internationally recognized human right to foreseeable criminalization, guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the European Court of Human Rights seems to formulate two slightly different requirements on its basis, namely that the application of criminal law must be foreseeable for an individual and coherent with the “essence of an offence”. One may question whether this can serve as an adequate “shield” from arbitrariness on the part of State authorities. Nevertheless, the core aim of such a flexible approach is not to promote legal security for potential perpetrators, but to achieve better protection of human rights in general.
The article demonstrates how references to Nazi and Soviet past are perceived and evaluated by the European Court of Human Rights. Individual cases concerning Holocaust and Nazism, which the Court has examined so far, are compared here to judgments rendered with regard to Communist regime. The article proves that the Court treats more leniently state interference with freedom of expression when memory about Nazism and Holocaust is protected than when a post–Communist state wants to preserve a critical memory about the regime. The authors of the article agree with the attitude of the Court which offers a wide margin of appreciation to states restrictively treating references to Nazism and Holocaust, including comparisons to the Holocaust, Nazism or fascism used as rhetorical devices. At the same time they postulate that other totalitarian systems should be treated by the Court equally.
All judicial proceedings are inevitably based on the formalized procedures. Procedural provisions pursue many important objectives, such ensuring the effectiveness of proceedings or protecting legal certainty by regulating the competences of procedural bodies and the rights and duties of parties. At the same time, excessive procedural formalism may disproportionately limit the right to court, making access to court illusory. Within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, the permissible limits of procedural formalism are set by Article 6(1). The European Court of Human Rights, assessing whether excessive formalism has occurred in a given case, examines whether relevant formal requirements served a legitimate purpose, in particular legal certainty and proper administration of justice, and did not lead to a disproportionate restriction of the right of access to court. This assessment is made on the basis of all relevant circumstances of the case, such as the stage at which the proceedings were terminated, the type of proceedings, the party’s due diligence, the existence of circumstances justifying failure to comply with a formal requirement or the fact that the party was represented by a professional representative. Therefore, not only the content of national provisions is important, but also the manner of their application by courts.
There is neither consensus whether the category of linguistic rights shall be distinguished, nor international agreement on the catalogue of such rights. Nevertheless, access to education in mother tongue constitutes a core element of most of the international and national frameworks of minority protection. Academic and legal disputes are particularly absorbing in Europe, where linguistic policies frequently intertwine with politics (e.g. Cyprus, Moldova, Ukraine). Thus, it is essential to pose the question, whether the right to education in mother tongue is always granted the equal scope of protection or is such protection differentiated by any additional criteria. Most of all, it shall be considered whether the analyzed right has an independent character or its protection is associated with perception of other fundamental rights and freedoms. This paper investigates the scope of the protection of this right within the framework of the Council of Europe.
The purpose of the presented article is to resolve the issue of the existence of the common European standard regarding the blasphemous speeches and examine its efficiency for possible mechanisms of resolving the collussion between freedom of expression and freedom of religion. The presented analysis will be commenced with reference to the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the tension between freedom of expression and freedom of religion with addition to blasphemy. Through the prism of such analysis the author formulates hypothesis of the wide diversity between the States of the Council of Europe towards granting priority for one of the aforesaid freedoms in case of blasphemy. Secondary question refers to the influence of such diversity for the efficiency of protection of both: freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Subsequently the author will analyse the domestic regulations of Italy, Ireland and Austria to illustrate the occurring differences as well as search for optimal model of protection. The author will also refer to the statement of selected representatives of human rights doctrine. The conclusion part will focus on formulating recommendations for amplifying the efficiency of the common European standard regarding the presented issue. The author will rely mainly on legal dogmatic methodology with reference to the literal resonance of the legal regulations as well as judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights as well as comparative analysis to unveil similarities and differences within presented States legal systems.
The author analyzes the problem of the implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In light of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a special role in its control mechanism is played by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Despite the measures taken, there have been delays in the execution of judgments or the lack of their implementation for years. The author analyzed this problem in light of the latest reports of the Committee of Ministers and the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly. He pointed to the need for greater activity in this process of other bodies of the Council of Europe, including: the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Venice Commission, the CPT, the ECRI as well as institutions of the civil society. In the last decade, the interest of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in this matter has clearly increased. The author postulates that parliamentarians sitting in this body should be more active in this regard in their countries. They have instruments of control on the executive power, which could be used to increase the effectiveness of the execution of the ECtHR’s judgements.
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeprowadzenie analizy dotyczącej wpływu doktryny marginesu uznania na rozwiązywanie kolizji dwóch fundamentalnych praw i wolności jednostki, tj. wolności wypowiedzi oraz wolności sumienia i wyznania na gruncie systemu strasburskiego. Podstawowym pytaniem badawczym jest zatem kwestia, czy doktryna marginesu swobodnej oceny w taki sam sposób oddziałuje na obie powyższe wolności. Niniejszy artykuł został przygotowany w oparciu o dogmatyczno-prawną analizę wybranych rozstrzygnięć Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka (ETPC). Pomocniczo została także wykorzystana metoda historyczna. Główną tezą wspomnianej analizy jest przyznanie prymatu wolności sumienia i wyznania, co prowadzi do nieusprawiedliwionego ograniczania wolności wypowiedzi ze względu na brak jednolitego konsensusu dotyczącego kwalifikacji prawnej wypowiedzi bluźnierczych, co stwarza zagrożenie dla pewności prawa.
EN
The aim of the paper hereto is to conduct analysis regarding the influence of the margin of appreciation doctrine on the solution of the collision between the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion within the Strasbourg system of human rights protection. The main research question focuses on the issue whether the margin of discretion equally affects both considered freedoms and how it impacts their conflict. The paper will rely on dogmatic analysis of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and selected judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the collision of the aforesaid freedoms. In this article, the author will also implement the historic method. The main thesis of the article is the primacy of the freedom of religion which causes illegitimate limitation of the freedom of expression due to lack of uniform European consensus regarding the qualification of the blasphemous speeches which constitutes a threat for legal certainty.
This article provides an overview of “memory laws” in Europe, reflecting upon what may be called the “asymmetry” of such laws. It then looks at the special case of Poland and its troubled experience with memory laws; it considers the question of whether, in the eyes of the law – genocide, and in particular the Holocaust – is so “special” that its public denials warrant legal intervention. It also looks at the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its (not necessarily coherent) “doctrine” on memory laws and their consistency, or otherwise, with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (and in particular with freedom of expression as laid down in Art. 10). The article concludes by asserting that even if we take the law as an indicator of European public memory, there is no consensus on the past, except perhaps for the special case of the Holocaust. The main challenge lies in determining whether memory laws, defined by some as social engineering and the imposition of “imperative” versions of memory, are consistent with the principles inherent in open, democratic and free societies in Europe. This challenge remains unmet.
The aim of this article is to resolve an issue whether the Article 17 of the European Con- vention on Human Rights (further referred to as ECHR) contradicts the principle of le- gality within the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights (referred to as ECtHR). The significance of the presented topic does not lie solely within the sphere of academic considerations, but remains of great value for ensuring an adequate level of protection within the Strasbourg system. Moreover, the establishment of the boundar- ies of implementation of Article 17 ECHR is crucial for providence of legal certainty for all its addressees: individuals, states and the groups of persons. The author of present- ed paper poses the hypothesis that the manner of practical usage of Article 17 ECHR leads to contradiction of the principle of legality which remains the core for the rule of law concept. The article relies on the legal dogmatic method as well as elements of his- toric and comparative analysis.
PL
Celem tego artykułu jest rozstrzygnięcie kwestii, czy art. 17 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka (dalej zwanej: EKPC) zaprzecza zasadzie legalizmu w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka (dalej zwanego: ETPC). Znaczenie tego tematu nie leży jedynie w sferze akademickich rozważań, ale ma dużą wartość dla zapewnienia odpowiedniego poziomu ochrony w ramach systemu strasburskiego. Ponadto, wyznaczenie granic zastosowania art. 17 EKPC jest kluczowe dla osiągnię- cia pewności prawa w stosunku do wszystkich jego adresatów: jednostek, państw oraz grup osób. Autorka artykułu wysuwa hipotezę, że współczesna praktyka orzecznicza ETPC prowadzi do podważenia zasady legalności, stanowiącej rdzeń koncepcji rule of law. Artykuł został przygotowany w oparciu o metodę dogmatyczno-prawną, z ele- mentami analizy historycznej i porównawczej.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that freedom of expression includes the right to receive information and ideas. But it is unclear if that freedom also involves the right to seek information and the right to have access to public information, first of all stored in registers controlled or administered by the State. The first drafts of the European Convention secured a broader right to seek information but that provision has not been enacted in the final version of the Convention. In its case law, the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights understood the right to receive information as basically corollary of the right to communicate information, i.e. an accompanying entitlement of the receiver to get information from someone else, in principle the media, which already communicates or is going to communicate. Although the Strasbourg Court did not exclude that there might exist, under some circumstances, a right to have access to registers, neither the nature nor the scope of that right have been specified. While rejecting a broader concept of freedom of information as being a part of freedom of expression, at the same time the Court was ready to accept a right of access within the framework of other Convention provisions, first of all that on the protection of private and family right (Article 8). Such an approach was confirmed by the Grand Chamber judgment rendered in 1998 in the Guerra and Others against Italy case. But since 2009 in a series of judgments the Court has started accepting, having identified some specific normative contexts and followed by the ensuing distinctions, that the right of access exists as an aspect of freedom of expression. The Court combined that right of access with the fulfilment of the public watchdog function by the media and non-governmental organisations (access to information is needed for them to be public watchdogs). In another case access to information was made part and parcel of the research activity. That quiet shift, even a revolution, in the Court's approach had given rise to two reactions among judges as expressed in separate opinions (concurring or dissenting) appended to the judgments. Some judges invited the Court to accept a general right of access for all individuals; such a step would correspond with the contemporary trends and understanding of democratic society. Other judges vehemently opposed the Court's activism as demonstrated in the recent case law and persistently insisted that the Court adhere to the restrictive reading of the right to receive information under Article 10. Mindful of the intensifying controversy, the Court decided to hear a new case on access to information as a Grand Chamber panel composed of 17 judges. The upcoming judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság against Hungary, expected in 2016, should clarify what the relevant Convention standard now looks like.
The aim of the paper hereto is to conduct analysis regarding the influence of the margin of appreciation doctrine on the solution of the collision between the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion within the Strasbourg system of human rights protection. The main research question focuses on the issue whether the margin of discretion equally affects both considered freedoms and how it impacts their conflict. The paper will rely on dogmatic analysis of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and selected judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the collision of the aforesaid freedoms. In this article, the author will also implement the historic method. The main thesis of the article is the primacy of the freedom of religion which causes illegitimate limitation of the freedom of expression due to lack of uniform European consensus regarding the qualification of the blasphemous speeches which constitutes a threat for legal certainty. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeprowadzenie analizy dotyczącej wpływu doktryny marginesu uznania na rozwiązywanie kolizji dwóch fundamentalnych praw i wolności jednostki, tj. wolności wypowiedzi oraz wolności sumienia i wyznania na gruncie systemu strasburskiego. Podstawowym pytaniem badawczym jest zatem kwestia, czy doktryna marginesu swobodnej oceny w taki sam sposób oddziałuje na obie powyższe wolności. Niniejszy artykuł został przygotowany w oparciu o dogmatyczno-prawną analizę wybranych rozstrzygnięć Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka (ETPC). Pomocniczo została także wykorzystana metoda historyczna. Główną tezą wspomnianej analizy jest przyznanie prymatu wolności sumienia i wyznania, co prowadzi do nieusprawiedliwionego ograniczania wolności wypowiedzi ze względu na brak jednolitego konsensusu dotyczącego kwalifikacji prawnej wypowiedzi bluźnierczych, co stwarza zagrożenie dla pewności prawa.
More and more Member States of the Council of Europe are becoming interested in drone technology. Currently, a number of them either possess or wish to obtain unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with missiles. Due to the increased number of targeted killing operations committed with the use of drones by countries such as the United States or Israel, there is a probability that Member States might also use them for such operations, especially if their forces will be subject to joint command. Although the issue of targeted killings with the use of drones has not yet been subject to the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights, there are two main reasons why this may change in the near future. First, the Court has already ruled on the extraterritorial applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights, and second, the Convention places strict limits on any attempts to carry out targeted killings and leaves only a limited space for their use, even in the context of warfare. In this article we assess whether the Member States of the Council of Europe might be ever justified under the European Convention on Human Rights to carry out targeted killing operations using drones.
The purpose of this article is to examine conflict between the rights of victims of crimes and the rights of defendants under the German and Polish justice system in the context of the case-law of European courts. The analysis covers two possible occurrences of this conflict: 1) in the cognitive sphere, including proving the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and 2) in the decision-making sphere, including initiation of a criminal applying preventive measures, and sentencing. The main thesis of the article is that in the Polish and German criminal process granting the injured parties not only protective rights, but also the status of an active trial party, the risk of this conflict in both of the above-mentioned spheres of the criminal trial is greater than, e.g., in the Anglo-Saxon process where the victim of the crime acts only as a witness. However, the research cited in the article indicates that the extensive codex procedural rights of injured parties as procedural parties (law in books) are not accompanied by their effective use in procedural practice (law in action). Therefore, the protective rights of alleged vulnerable victims, particularly victims of sexual offences, pose a greater threat to the rights of a defendant which constitute the principle of fair trial in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Considerations of this article confirm also the thesis that procedural rights of defendants still have priority over victims’ rights, which of course results from the inclusion of the former in the human rights catalog contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.
PL
Celem artykułu jest zbadanie konfliktu między prawami pokrzywdzonych i oskarżonych w niemieckim i polskim systemie wymiaru sprawiedliwości na tle orzecznictwa trybunałów europejskich. Analizą objęto dwie możliwości zaistnienia powyższego konfliktu w procesie karnym: 1) w sferze poznawczej, obejmujące udowadnianie winy bądź niewinności oskarżonego, oraz 2) w sferze decyzyjnej, obejmującej wszczęcie postępowania karnego, stosowanie środków zapobiegawczych i wyrokowanie. Główna teza artykułu głosi, że przyznanie pokrzywdzonemu w polskim i niemieckim systemie wymiaru sprawiedliwości nie tylko praw ochronnych, lecz także statusu aktywnej strony procesowej, rodzi w obu wyżej wskazanych sferach procesu karnego większe ryzyko takiego konfliktu niż np. w systemie anglosaskim, gdzie ofiara przestępstwa występuje tylko jako świadek. Jednakże badania przytoczone w opracowaniu wskazują, że rozbudowanym kodeksowym uprawnieniom proceduralnym pokrzywdzonych jako stron procesowych (law in books) nie towarzyszy ich efektywne wykorzystywanie w praktyce procesowej (law in action). Dlatego też większe niebezpieczeństwo dla praw oskarżonego, składających się na zasadę rzetelnego procesu z art. 6 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, stwarzają prawa ochronne domniemanych ofiar wrażliwych na pokrzywdzenie, szczególnie ofiar przestępstw seksualnych. Rozważania w niniejszym artykule potwierdzają także tezę, że nadal pierwszeństwo przed prawami ofiar mają prawa procesowe oskarżonych, co oczywiście wynika z wpisania tych ostatnich do katalogu praw człowieka zawartego w Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka.
Artykuł analizuje utrwalenie normatywne zasady dobra dziecka w aktach międzynarodowych i ustawodawstwie Ukrainy. W artykule położono nacisk na stosowanie zasady najlepiej pojętego interesu człowieka w praktyce ETPC. Wyjaśniono, w jaki sposób jego orzecznictwo wpłynęło na orzecznictwo ukraińskich sądów. Podkreślono kategorie spraw, w których ETPC stosuje zasadę dobra dziecka. Zbadano specyfikę stosowania zasady dobra dziecka w czasie wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej. Udowodniono, że stan wojenny nie jest powodem do ograniczania zasady dobra dziecka.
EN
The article analyzes the normative consolidation of the principle of the best interests of the child in international acts and legislation of Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on the application of the principle of the best interests of man in the practice of the ECtHR, it is clarified how the case law has influenced the decisions of Ukrainian courts. The categories of cases in which the ECtHR applies the principle of the best interests of the child are highlighted. The peculiarities of the application of the principle of the best interests of the child during the war between Russia and Ukraine have been studied. It is proved that martial law is not a reason to limit the principle of the best interests of the child.
Artykuł analizuje dopuszczalność wygaszenia kadencji obecnych członków sędziowskich Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa bez zapewnienia im drogi sądowej z perspektywy orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka. Za punkt wyjścia przyjęto wyrok ETPC w sprawie Grzęda p. Polsce, w którym stwierdzono, że wygaszenie ex lege kadencji członków KRS w 2018 r. naruszało art. 6 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. Interpretacja EKPC nie może jednak abstrahować od szczególnego kontekstu związanego z brakiem niezależności obecnej KRS oraz jej negatywnym wpływem na prawidłowość procesu powołań sędziowskich. Te wyjątkowe okoliczności mogą uzasadniać tezę, że art. 6 EKPC nie chroniłby obecnych członków KRS przed wygaszeniem ich kadencji z wyłączeniem drogi sądowej.
EN
The article analyzes the permissibility of terminating the terms of office of current members of the National Judiciary Council without providing them with access to court from the perspective of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The starting point is the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of Grzęda v. Poland, in which it was found that the ex lege termination of the terms of office of the NCJ members in 2018 violated Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the interpretation of the ECHR cannot disregard the specific context related to the lack of independence of the current NCJ and its negative impact on the integrity of the judicial appointment process. These circumstances justify the conclusion that Art. 6 ECHR would not protect the current members of the NCJ from the termination of their terms of office.
The research goal is to reconstruct selected aspects of the legal position of the religious minister on the basis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The analysis includes 33 judgments and decisions on the admissibility of complaints made by the bodies of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1976-2017. Based on them, it can be concluded that the ECtHR case law in this area is grounded in many years of practice. The religious minister as such has no guarantees other than those of any other person professing religious beliefs, but he benefits from the indirect strengthening of this protection by virtue of the guarantees of corporate freedom of conscience and religion. It is the autonomy of a religious organization that differentiates his position in both positive and negative respects. The autonomy of a religious organization is, in the light of ECtHR jurisprudence, an important component of pluralism in democratic societies, and it also includes determining the requirements for the religious minister. For this reason, the religious minister obtains strong protection against the interference of state power in matters relating to his appointment and removal from the office. The cost of obtaining this protection is a significant limitation of his personal freedom of conscience and religion, and indirectly also other rights while in the office of a priest, in relation to a religious organization. However, it should be remembered that the assessment of matters related to the performance of the office of a priest depends on the formal relations between a religious organization and the state. In the case of state churches, it is possible, for example, to submit certain church matters to state jurisprudence, and a religious organization can perform its self-limitation by shaping relations with the religious minister on the basis of a regular employment contract. As a rule, however, the ECtHR clearly indicated that matters concerning the religious minister lie outside the jurisdiction of the state and its organs. Nevertheless, the controversy surrounding the ruling in Károly Nagy v. Hungary indicates that the religious minister’s status may undergo some changes in the future.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zrekonstruowanie wybranych aspektów pozycji prawnej duchownego na gruncie orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka. Analizie poddano 33 wyroki i decyzje w przedmiocie dopuszczalności skargi podjęte przez organy Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka w latach 1976-2017. Na ich podstawie można stwierdzić, że orzecznictwo ETPCz jest w tym zakresie ugruntowane wieloletnią praktyką. Duchowny jako taki nie posiada gwarancji innych niż przysługujące każdej innej osobie wyznającej przekonania religijne, ale korzysta z pośredniego wzmocnienia tej ochrony dzięki gwarancjom korporacyjnej wolności sumienia i wyznania. To właśnie autonomia związku wyznaniowego dokonuje różnicowania jego pozycji tak pozytywnie, jak i negatywnie dla niego samego. Autonomia związku wyznaniowego jest bowiem w świetle orzecznictwa ETPCz istotnym komponentem pluralizmu w społeczeństwach demokratycznych, a należy do niej także określanie wymagań względem duchownych. Z tego powodu duchowny uzyskuje silną ochronę przed ingerencją władzy państwowej w sprawy dotyczące jego powołania i usunięcia z urzędu. Kosztem uzyskania tej ochrony jest istotne ograniczenie jego osobistej wolności sumienia i wyznania, a pośrednio także innych praw w czasie pełnienia urzędu duchownego, w stosunku do związku wyznaniowego. Należy jednak pamiętać, że ocena spraw związanych z pełnieniem urzędu duchownego jest zależna od relacji ustrojowych między związkiem wyznaniowym i państwem. W przypadku kościołów państwowych możliwe jest np. poddanie pewnych spraw kościelnych orzecznictwu państwowemu, a związek wyznaniowy może dokonać swojego samoograniczenia kształtując relacje z duchownym na podstawie zwykłej umowy o pracę. Co do zasady jednak ETPCz w sposób jasny wskazywał, że sprawy duchownych leżą poza jurysdykcją państwa i jego organów. Niemniej kontrowersje związane z orzekaniem w sprawie Károly Nagy v. Hungary wskazują, że status duchownego może ulegać pewnym zmianom w przyszłości.
Przesłanką właściwej aplikacji prawa jest pewne zdefiniowanie używanych w nim pojęć. Zmienność takich definicji pozostaje w sprzeczności z wymogiem pewności prawa, a nazbyt wąskie lub nazbyt szerokie zdefiniowanie danego pojęcia (w zestawieniu z powszechnym postrzeganiem jego treści) może prowadzić do wątpliwości co do słuszności regulacji prawnej. Chociaż pojęcie religii używane jest w systemach prawnych relatywnie często, nie jest w nich ono zwykle definiowane expressis verbis. W większości przypadków nie powoduje to problemów, ponieważ nie ma racjonalnych wątpliwości co do tego, czy w danym przypadku mamy do czynienia z elementem religijnym. Jednak w trudniejszych sprawach istnieje konieczność podjęcia decyzji dotyczącej przeprowadzenia granicy pomiędzy religią i innymi typami przekonań. Alternatywą jest zaprzestanie dokonywania pomiędzy nimi rozróżnień, a więc pozbawienie specjalnego statusu tego, co religijne. W naukach społecznych wyróżnia się cztery zasadnicze podejścia do definiowania zjawiska religijnego. Definicje substancjalne starają się uchwycić, jakie treści mają być uwzględnione w danym zespole przekonań, aby mógł on zostać uznany za religijny. W podejściu esencjalistycznym podkreśla się znaczenie doświadczenia religijnego osób wierzących. Definicje funkcjonalne koncentrują się na funkcji, jaką religia pełni w życiu wyznawców. Natomiast podejście oparte na analogii nie dąży do uchwycenia istoty religii, lecz raczej skupia się na jej przejawach oraz na cechach wspólnych różnych religii. Niniejszy artykuł omawia przykłady aplikacji tych teoretycznych ujęć w praktyce orzeczniczej. Autor dochodzi do wniosku, że sądy podchodzą do pojęcia religii w sposób elastyczny i nierzadko przypisują mu różną treść, w zależności od kontekstu analizowanej sprawy.
EN
A prerequisite for the proper application of the law is a certain definition of the terms used in the law. A variable definition of a concept undermines the requirement of legal certainty, and an overly narrow or broad definition of a concept (compared with the general idea of its content) may lead to doubts about the fairness of legal regulation. Although the legal system uses the term “religion” relatively frequently, it does not generally define it explicitly. In most cases, this does not cause problems because there is no reasonable doubt as to whether we are dealing with a religious element. In hard cases, however, there is no choice but to decide where to draw the line between religion and other types of beliefs. The alternative is to stop distinguishing between them, thus depriving the religious element of its special legal status. The social sciences distinguish four basic approaches to the definition of a religious phenomenon. The substantive definition seeks to capture the content that a particular belief must satisfy in order to be labelled religious. The essentialist approach emphasises the experience of the believer. The functionalist definition notes the function that religion serves in the life of the believer. The analogical approach does not seek to capture the essence of religion but rather notes its manifestations and what different religions have in common. This article offers examples of the application of these theoretical approaches in jurisprudential practice. It also highlights the fact that courts work flexibly with the concept of religion and often give it a different content depending on the context under consideration.
According to the Polish regulations, a person, who entered into marriage abroad, may request that it be transcribed – i.e. revealed in the Polish civil status records. Nevertheless such a transcription may not be demanded by all those, who entered into marriage abroad, even if all of the foreign legal requirements of marriage were realized. Among others, it is impossible to transcribe to the Polish civil status records a gay marriage, concluded abroad. In the present article, the author will attempt to answer, whether current Polish legal regulations, according to which a marriage successfully concluded abroad, does not enjoy any legal recognition, and by extension – protection, complies with the minimal standards of human right protection, as envisaged by the European Convention on Human Rights and jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg.
PL
Zgodnie z polskim prawem, osoba, która za granicą zawarła związek małżeński, może domagać się jego transkrypcji - tj. przeniesienia do rejestru stanu cywilnego. To uprawnienie nie przysługuje jednak wszystkim osobom, które zawarły związek małżeński zgodnie z prawem obowiązującym za granicą. Niemożliwym w Polsce jest, między innymi, przeniesienie do polskiego rejestru aktów stanu cywilnego, małżeństwa homoseksualnego zawartego w innym kraju. W niniejszym artykule autor postara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy stan prawny, gdzie małżeństwo skutecznie zawarte poza granicami Polski, w Polsce nie podlega prawnemu uznaniu, a w konsekwencji nie podlega żadnej ochronie prawnej, jest zgodny z minimalnymi standardami ochrony praw człowieka wytyczanymi Europejską Konwencją o Ochronie Praw Człowieka oraz orzecznictwem Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w Strasburgu.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.