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1

AGAINST NORMATIVE JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM

100%

Del Corral M.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

567 – 587

EN

Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent's intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not to enter into conflict with our judgements.

2

IS THE ENKRATIC PRINCIPLE A REQUIREMENT OF RATIONALITY?

100%

Reisner A.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

437 – 463

EN

In this paper the author argues that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. He also considers the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.

3

ENKRASIA

88%

Broome J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

425 – 436

EN

Rationality requires you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. This is a rough formulation of the requirement the author calls ‘Enkrasia’. This article presents a precise formulation. It turns out to be complicated, and the article also explains the need for each complication.

4

UNDERSTANDING ENKRATIC REASONING

88%

Gjelsvik O.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

464 – 483

EN

Beginning from John Broome’s approach to Enkrasia, the paper quickly moves to giving a condensed presentation of an approach to practical reasoning motivated by a Fregean approach to inference (in theoretical reasoning). The suggested account of practical reasoning avoids using rationality requirements to do explanatory work when accounting for correct reasoning, and thus avoids lots of problems. It is strictly conservative in its approach, and no new inference rules are required for moving from the theoretical to the practical case. It is suggested that we can stick to deductive reasoning when accounting for practical proper; the crucial premise from theoretical reasoning about practical matters cannot normally be established this way. The paper moves on to tackle counterarguments to the effect that there will simply be too little correct practical reasoning on the present (deductive) approach. The simple account of correct reasoning has too high a cost, it is argued. The paper meets this objection when it argues that much reasoning is enthymematic or incomplete reasoning. By making specific claims about how there may be practical premises to which we do not attend even when there are, in some sense, before the mind, the approach is defended.

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4 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 Broome J.

1 Del Corral M.

1 Gjelsvik O.

1 Reisner A.

4 2013

AGAINST NORMATIVE JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM

IS THE ENKRATIC PRINCIPLE A REQUIREMENT OF RATIONALITY?

ENKRASIA

UNDERSTANDING ENKRATIC REASONING