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HORWICH ON THE VALUE OF TRUTH

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Lee D. B.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2020

vol. 27

issue 2

263 – 279

On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed in this norm is a moral value. I accept a deflationary theory of truth, according to which truth is too thin a concept to be constituted by any substantial norms. Thus I agree that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. In this paper, however, I argue that the alleged value of true beliefs can be better explained in terms of epistemic normativity rather than moral normativity.

The Game Called Science

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Such J.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2007

vol. 16

issue 3(63)

17-30

Referring to the accepted model of science the author questions the fundamental thesis of current pragmatism, namely the claim that the privileged epistemic status of scientific and philosophical knowledge has to be abandoned. This claim puts on the same footing all types of human knowledge and treats them as linguistic games without hierarchy with regard to epistemic values. By application of such standards science becomes a matter of opinion.

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1 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

1 Lee D. B.

1 Such J.

1 2020

1 2007

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HORWICH ON THE VALUE OF TRUTH

The Game Called Science