The paper provides an overview of various perspectives as well as analysis and expectations concerning the concept of 'immature sciences' suggested by I. Hacking in the context of the Michel Foucault's archeology of knowledge. In this context archeology of knowledge is a kind of epistemology situated beyond standard approaches to the sciences, epistemology, whose main question is: 'How is it possible and how should we examine immature sciences?' The main Foucauldian presumption of this question is: 'But what if empirical knowledge, at a given time and in a given culture, did possess a well-defined regularity? If errors and (truths), the practice of old beliefs, including not only genuine discoveries, but also most naive notions, obeyed, at a given moment, the laws of a certain code of knowledge?' Human sciences are the primary field for such an investigations, because of its peculiar history and specific conceptualizations. What is special in their history? Do this notion (immature sciences) suggest that human sciences are immature by their nature, or in the same manner as bygone forms natural sciences. How can these issues be approached in the archeology? What is capacity of archeology of knowledge to answer this questions?
Stanislaus Ossowski, a Polish philosopher and sociologist and a member of the so-called 'Lwowsko-Warszawska Szkola Filozoficzna' (The Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School) published several papers on science, especially on social sciences. The authoress presents his analysis of the plurality of scientific views that is triggered by the multiplicity of aspects of studied phenomena and the diversity of issues that can be approached by scientists. Plurality of aspects, issues and descriptions leads - unavoidably - to multiplicity of scientific schools and to arguments among them. There are practical disputes referring to hypotheses and explanations that can be settled with the help of rational arguments and empirical data. Finally, there are fundamental divergencies, which seem insoluble because both sides absolutize their views, or indeed are insoluble when participants represent different political aspirations and programs.
In the paper, the author presents phenomenological ideas of corporeality by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre showing, how living body is experienced and involved in human world. The bounding between body and its environment, as well as its role in creation of intentions and formation of our understanding of the world are of exceptional significance. He shows, what implication such an understanding of the body has for popular in contemporary cognitive science concept of 'representation' as well as for propositional of knowledge . Finally, he tries to show, to what extend phenomenological concept of corporeality of mind is parallel to pragmatists concept of action.
This article analyses the recurring topics in the epistemology of the leading 20th-century French sociologist and political theorist Raymond Aron, drawing on his doctoral dissertation 'Introduction a la philosophie de l'histoire' (1938) and on a range of works he published in his later years. The author first discusses six different reasons for Aron's conspicuous absence from many contemporary handbooks on the social sciences: his deliberate avoidance of developing a system in his work, his disinclination towards abstract theoretising, his lack of interest in empirical research, and his refusal to specialise in one field, and also the changes that occurred in the social scientific context in which his work was received and changes in the surrounding political and social circumstances, most notably the collapse of the communist regimes. The author notes that a major feature in Aron's epistemological thought was his neo-Kantian awareness of the limits of strictly scientific knowledge, which he identified with the domain of causal analysis. The second crucial theme, recurring throughout Aron's work, is the indispensability of philosophy for providing the foundations for social scientific analysis, always in need of being positioned with respect to values. His enduring interest in international relations and contemporary history is taken as an indication of the third basic element of his epistemology: a passion for the analysis of singular events. The author concludes that, given his preoccupation with the singular and the particular, the key, albeit somehow implicit, aspect of his epistemology is the capacity for judgment in the Kantian sense.
Barry Allen postulates that the unit of knowledge is artifact and rejects traditional idea that knowledge consists of true, justified beliefs. Analysis of Allen's concept of knowledge, being a restrictive form of pragmatism, shows that the epistemological change proposed by him is radical to a great degree. Allen neglects all important epistemological distinctions and categories. The concept is rooted in a different culture, activist and one-sidedly pragmatic, far from this one ( which emerged from the ancient Greek ideas) that constitutes a basis for all traditional epistemological models of knowledge.
Article responds to post Džačár, L., Foldes, R. Precautionary measures in the new civil trial - selected issues. The article essentially focused on the nature of the Institute’s approach and urgent security measures, with particular emphasis on precautionary measures. Prior to the analysis clarifies the meaning and purpose of recasting, as specific institutes, although well-known civil trial until 30.06.2016 also found in contentious civil right, does not mean that their meaning and function are the same. This stems from the system settings of Civil Procedure within the purview of civil contentious procedure as process modern and dynamic, particularly in contentious proceedings roofed principle of procedural accountability litigants. The essence of this paper is that, among other things, to refute the misconception that urgent measures are provisional measures, and that the precautionary measure is inappropriate institute, incremental and redundant. It is not just a theoretical conclusion, even without a professional basis, cannot access any deeper analysis, and even clues practical issues. Understanding the institute precautionary measure and its meaning so can be themselves (individually), but in the context of the entire recasting whose purpose is not to look back, the team behind what has been, on the contrary adjust account the new Civil Procedure.
The article refers to the concept of circulating reference, previously presented in 'Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa'. The main question is then: what happens when there is more than one network of circulating reference? Traditionally, philosophy explained such a situation in terms of multiple competing pictures (representations) of a single object. It is offered then an epistemological perspectivism as a plausible explanation. Following the works of a Dutch philosopher, Annemarie Mol, the authors argue that the very problem should be posed as an ontological one, and not as epistemological, since what is crucial here are practices and material interventions in the 'pieces of the world' instead of just cognitive representations. The argument is build around the case of atherosclerosis of lower limbs. Multiplied atherosclerosis should be then viewed as an 'object' which is more than one, and less than many. To grasp this unclear situation, one may speak, referring to John Law, about an object and its fractions.
Adam Smith’s epistemology, described primarily in the essay Of the External Senses, was strongly inspired by George Berkeley’s thought expressed in his New Theory of Vision (1709). Both philosophers distinguished between the Objects of Sight and the Objects of Touch and analyzed the perception of distance between objects and size of objects (Berkeley’s thorough analysis was limited to the sense of sight, whereas Smith described also the features of other senses.). They also noticed the observer’s role in the process. Both philosophers made a parallel between their epistemology and moral/ social theories. However, their conclusions turned out to be quite different, despite some similarities in their views on the problem of external senses. Smith focused on the issue of sympathy and the Impartial Spectator, and underlined the fact that our moral judgements are strongly altered by our relation to those who are judged and that we learn how to give opinions on the basis of how others judge our behaviour. Berkeley, on the other hand, focused on the role of laws and reason in both epistemological and moral judgements.
In this article we try to show the Galen’s perspective on the epistemological status of medicine, in particular starting from the conceptual category of τέχνη στοχαστική. Even though the qualification of τέχνη στοχαστική attributed to medicine does not have an explicitly negative connotation in Galen’s Corpus, it does occupy a subordinate position compared with the solidity furnished by the more geometrico method, and is almost a necessary evil that Galen introduces to justify that fallibility of medicine, which at the same time he himself tries in every way to minimize.
The problem of rationality of science has been explored by many philosophical and methodological schools in the 20th century. In 'The Rationality of Science. Problems, Conceptions and Arguments' Monika Walczak examines two models of rationality: Classical Concepts of the Rationality of Science (CCRS) and Non-classical Concepts of the Rationality of Science (NCRS). According to the adherents of CCRS (e.g. logical empiricism and the Lvov - Warsaw School), rationality of science is characterized by: demarcationism, the idea of scientific theories as deductive structure, scientific realism, objectivism, reconstructionistic strategy, epistemological fundamentalism, the maximalistic idea of logical consistency and universalistic understanding of this criteria. For the adherents of NCRS, in contrast to CCRS, rationality of science is characterized by: anti-demarcationism, pluralistic vision of the bearers of scientific rationality, scientific antirealism, anti-objectivism, descriptionistic strategy, epistemological anti-fundamentalism, the minimalistic idea of logical consistency and pluralistic understanding of the criteria of rationality. Rationality of Science. Problems, Conception and Arguments is clear, informed, stimulating discussion that will be interesting to a wide range of philosophers, methodologist, scientist and others concerned with the status of rationality of science.
This article deals with Walter Burley’s (1275 – 1344) propositional semantics. Its aim is to examine his notion known as propositio in re (i.e. real proposition). All his relevant texts written between 1297 and 1337 are taken into account, first of all his commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation and Posterior Analytics. This study is divided into three parts: in the first one an old controversy concerning the subject of logic is mentioned, as well as Burley’s own answer to it; the second part sheds light on Burley’s early articulation of his propositional theory; the final part focuses on the definitive explanation and justification of this theory from his last commentary on the Ars vetus from 1337.
The article surveys the ways science was thematized as a sociological subject. It starts with the reflections on knowledge and science in the Enlightenment, further reviews the main contributions of Comtean philosophy and sociology of science, stresses Merton's role in making the traditional sociology of knowledge open to empirical research, and traces the subsequent development of the field: the progress of quantitative analyses and ethnographic researches of science, the Kuhnian turn towards historicizing and Foucaultian turn towards the politics of science, the evolution of cognitive sociology of science, as well as the inspirations drawn from works of Bloor, Barnes, and Latour.
Based especially on 'The Elementary Forms of Religious Life' (1912) the text tries to delimitate contours of 'Durkheim's epistemology' (i. e. relatively coherent group of assertions). It argues that the deep 'objective' of this connection is to ensure autonomy and specific field for the new-born scientific province, sociology, through the claim that this contribution can solve and actually does solve (from the French sociologist's point of view) 'traditional epistemological hardships' into which philosophical empiricism and rationalism fall. Durkheim's sociological deduction of categories (instead of transcendental deduction), as Ernst Cassirer calls it, is presented in contrast to the 'holy positivists interpretations' of his writing, exclusively intentional conceptualizations of action and notion formation, and correspondence theory of truth. The text concludes that despite noticeable inconsistencies Durkheim's suggestions provide inspiring material even for today's sociological production in this field.
Although Srzednicki accepts Wittgenstein's critical conclusion concerning traditional epistemology, he claims that Wittgenstein 'failed to identify the reason for this difficulty, and consequently was unable to proceed further'. A completely new perspective is needed to meet his challenge. However, we have to abandon the idea that there is only one single move to do so or that there is a linear (systematic) way of building such a strategy. By building a complex multilevel architecture of reasoning Srzednicki proves that it is possible to deliver a positive answer to the Kantian question : 'how knowledge is possible at all', if and only if we liberate ourselves from traditional unidimensional way of seeing things. The epistemic questions are 'complex' and cannot be answered 'directly' - they require many subtle logical distinctions and 'indirect' treatment.
The problems connected with the issue of valuation in selected sections of philosophical logic were presented and the substantial elements of those sections of logic, which are taking a related view of valuation, were included as well. These problems should be preceded with remarks, which constitute the draft of the theory of valuation and values in science. In this preparatory framework the evaluative character of R. Carnap's, K.R. Popper's, and Th. S. Kuhn's methodology is stressed. These methodological theories report the process of valuation, which is present in science, and the methods of determination of the epistemic usefulness. The primary and the secondary values of science and the pluralistic conception of values should also be discussed. In this context, current discussions on the well-known thesis of axiological neutrality of science (M. Weber) should also be taken into consideration. A few essential axiological problems formulated in the perspective of philosophical logic have been considered and presented. Among them are: 1. Involved in that set of problems three sections of non-classical ( philosophical) logic; 2. The logic of absolute and comparative valuation; 3. The logical structure of valuation - four elements are distinguished here; 4. The opposition between the description and the valuation from semiotic point of view; 5. The valuation as one of the epistemic categories; 6. Formal and substantial or material conditions of the rationality of such conceptions.
Epistemology, confronted with a rapid development of individual branches of science, has been pressed to establish its own status and position as well as to define its relation with science. The multiple perspectives on this issue can be grouped into two major positions: integralism (postulates a close co-existence between epistemology and science) and separatism (argues in favour of a full independence of science and epistemology). In the paper, the authoress analyses the two views and tries to prove that the debate between integralism and separatism cannot be resolved, as the two approaches belong to different and incompatible philosophical traditions: analytical and transcendental. In the article, these issues are examined, and arguments in favour of the separatist view are offered. It is argued for clear separation of epistemology from science.
The article, being part of the debate on cognitive assumptions of the nonfiction literature is a polemic with the theses of Paweł Zajas’s work Jak świat prawdziwy stał się bajką: O literaturze niefikcjonalnej. (How the real world has become a fable. On nonfiction literature), questioning, in reference to Lejeune’s referential pact, the epistemological dimension of a part of modern reportage literature.
In various accounts of contemporary and recent philosophy W.V.O. Quine is presented as a towering figure which to a large extent shaped the philosophical landscape of the second half of the twentieth century, at least as far as the Anglo-American philosophy goes. There are, however, two different, and to some extent incompatible, ways of construing his thought in the historical perspective. The prevailing view is that although he was highly critical of logical positivism, and even brought this powerful philosophical movement to an end, he should be seen as a pupil and follower of Rudolf Carnap. Nevertheless taking into account his Harvard milieu, and the concluding paragraph of his famous 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', where Quine declared that by washing out the boundary between the analytic and the synthetic he put forward a more thorough pragmatism, he is quite often portrayed as a characteristically pragmatist thinker. In his later writings Quine distanced himself from the latter construal, insisting that it is not clear to him what it takes to be a pragmatist. He also admitted that his knowledge of classical pragmatism was limited: 'I must say that I have not read widely in it. Some of it came through in a modified form from C. I. Lewis, who taught me during one of my two years of graduate study'. The auyhor thinks that this passing remark is a useful historical hint that can shed a new light on Quine's pragmatism by construing it almost exclusively in the context of Lewis' philosophy, and its distinctively pragmatic features.
In the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. The authoress argues that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliable frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify it. Naturalists, on the other hand, are not those who need such a method; yet they can better accommodate it within their view.
The paper deals with the understanding of proper names. Though the theme goes across various disciplines - e.g. semantics, epistemology, psychology - the paper examines only selected semantic and cognitive aspects of the problem. The question runs: How should we comprehend the thesis of understanding a proper name as knowing what the name refers to? What kind of knowledge is involved here? The question is posed within the direct reference theory framework enriched by the notion of singular proposition and the compositionality principle. The distinction between an expression and an utterance of it is accepted and the original question is split up accordingly. As for expressions (as ideal signs), to understand a proper name is to grasp a meaning axiom along the lines of D. Davidson and J. McDowell. As for utterances of expressions, to understand an utterance of a proper name is to know a piece of information concerning the referent of the name; ideally, it is a fact that can be expressed by an identity statement claiming that the referent of the name under discussion is identical with the individual about which the speaker has a mental file at her disposal.
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