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EN
In this note we present a complete characterization of the equilibria of a game modelling the 'Tragedy of the commons' externality.
EN
The present article aims to show that price agreements are more unstable if their companies use debt as a financing instrument. Moreover, the higher the number of companies (that use debt) in a price agreement, the more instable the price agreement will be. Even when companies compete a la Bertrand and if debt financing is high, the duopoly of price agreement will be instable. When debt financing is present, we found there is a higher number of sub-game perfect equilibrium, in a posteriorly a la Cournot competition, then when debt financing is not present and that this (possible) existence of sub-game perfect equilibrium increases as the debt level of financing increases.
EN
The developed economies of the European Union are generally characterized by relatively low and safe deficits in current accounts, while countries of East-Central Europe experience difficulties in coping with the ensuing gaps. The operation of market-based stabilization mechanisms is not adequately efficient in economies undergoing transformation. The remedy can be seen in the active government policies which may periodically introduce corrective measures. The success of interventionist policies in safeguarding equilibrium of payment balances and enhancing economic growth depends on the correct definition of the objectives of such policies, i.e. on the formulation of acceptable ceilings for the deficit in the medium term.
EN
The paper describes three solutions to the closed (homogenous) dynamic model, all leading to an identical growth rate and the same price and quantitative proportions. However, the different operations performed with the data for the current and capital-outlay coefficients mean that the three versions produce dissimilar matrices. Three disparate, but not mutually contradictory economic and theoretical interpretations are possible. It also emerges that calculation of the equilibrium position does not rest on maximization in the case of any of the methods. Efforts to maximize profits or growth depart from the equilibrium path instead of approaching it. For this reason, disproportionate capacities accumulate.
EN
The central question with sustainable economic growth is what rate can be achieved in the long term alongside internal and external equilibrium and without irreparable harm to the natural environment. At a given employment level, the growth rate is ultimately determined by technical development, but the rate is not irrespective of the proportion of investment. But a reverse relation applies here. Rather than the rate being arrived at from the investment ratio, but it determines the proportion of investment to GDP - through the general and marginal levels of capital efficiency. This brings to the fore the questions of investment funds and domestic savings, the external sources. Countries catching up with the developed economies usually suffer from a funding shortage, due to a number of factors, which gives special importance to investment efficiency and factors that increase internal sources and improve efficiency. A salutary role in these is played by reforming the system of institutions and developing human capital. The links make clear that the growth rate can be understood from the system of internal and external conditions - growth is endogenous in nature. The study underlines theoretical connections that help to determine the growth potential of the Hungarian economy.
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