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EN
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced numerous changes to the shape and role of the Council Presidency. However, it seems that the actual effect of those changes is not so big as might appear from the text of the Treaty. While a legal and institu¬tional analysis of the Presidency on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon gives a clear picture of the significantly changed role, quantitative and qualitative empirical research conducted by the author among officials involved in the Presidencies of Spain and Belgium do not fully confirm this picture. This article aims at analysing the reasons and manifestations of certain discrepancies between the planned shape and powers of the Council Presidency in the Treaty of Lisbon and its actual role in practice.
EN
Generally, it is widely recognised that the Danish EU Presidency was pro-fessional and executed in the spirit of an honest broker.1 At the level of the officials involved, the Danish Presidency was viewed as well-organised and result-oriented. At the same time, the Danish Presidency in 2012 was in a way disadvantaged by the fact that there was not any single big issue to be solved, as was the case in its previous Presidency in 2002, when the forthcoming enlargement was the biggest issue. This situation was taken into account in the process of formatting the Presidency in a such way that it was defined as a low-ambition leadership insofar as Denmark’s own pri¬orities and the far-reaching goals of the Presidency were concerned. Some argue that nothing more was to be expected from a historically EU-sceptic small country. Instead of an ambitious agenda, a number of issues were brought forward to the EU decision-making process which were a logical follow-up of the EU agenda. At the same time the Presidency was visibly silent on EU external policies and was discernibly dis¬turbed at least twice: on the low carbon road map (unexpectedly vetoed by Poland) and on the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, which led the Presidency into an unfore¬seen heated dispute with the European Parliament at the end of its term in office. Overall however, it is fair to say that the Danish Presidency eventually managed to fit the brand of an ‘honest broker’ or ‘bridge over troubled waters’ Presidency, with a touch of sustainability and green colour as its ‘brand’.
EN
The Lisbon Treaty introduced important changes that deeply affect the EU’s institutional balance with regard to the nature and political relevance of the Council Presidency. Formal competences of the Presidency, especially with regard to the European Council and Foreign Affairs Council, have been greatly reduced. In addition to the treaty changes, the impact of the Presidency can be further constrained by the political realities and challenges facing the Union. However, there is still room for the rotating Presidency to exert informal influence based on various resources at the disposal of the Member State exercising the function. The growing fragmentation, and the emergence of the hybrid ‘presidency network’ are analysed in this article pri¬marily on the basis of the Polish experience in 2011.
EN
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has brought about significant changes in the institutional system and decision-making process of the European Union, which have had an essential impact on the method and effects of holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU. The changes include, first of all, the institutionalisation of the European Council and the procedure for appointing the President of the European Council; the establishment of the institution of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; and changes in the scope and course of the ordinary legislative procedure, which is the most frequently used procedure in the EU’s legislative work. The role of the Presidency in shaping European policies, as broadly understood, has signif-icantly decreased in favour of the European Council. The appointment of the High Rep-resentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the strengthening of the Euro Group’s power have also weakened the position of the country holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU. It should be emphasised, however, that owing to new and ever more frequently used legislative paths (e.g. informal trilogue with the European Parlia-ment and the Commission), the importance of the actions taken by the rotating Presi-dency in the EU’s decision-making process is growing.
EN
Three years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 1st Decem¬ber 2009, Europe is slowly emerging from an unprecedented crisis in its history. Reforms in response to the financial and then economic crisis affecting the European Union (EU) and the euro area since 2008 have transformed the European institu¬tional landscape considerably. By tracing the trends towards more differentiated forms of European integration back to a number of innovative instruments introduced over the past years, this paper outlines some of the major determinants of today’s evolving role of the rotating Presidency, which we define as the ‘stability role’.
EN
The aim of this paper is to present the preliminary findings of the interna¬tional comparative study on the media coverage of the 2011 Polish Presidency of the EU Council. The study was conducted in nine countries: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Estonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. In addition, the content of the television news station Euronews was analysed. The findings showed that the EU Presidency does not guarantee a high level of media interest everywhere. Neverthe¬less, it still may be perceived as an important factor in media coverage overall, as well as an opportunity for the country holding the Presidency to enhance its image.
EN
The article focuses on the analysis of the achievements and failures of the Belgian presidency, particularly from the perspective of practical verification of the regulations of the Lisbon Treaty of 13th December 2007. The author presents the limitations of EU presidency that follow from the regulations of the Lisbon Treaty and discusses the major functions of the presidency: mediation, coordination, planning, administration and representation. The priorities and limitations of the Belgian presidency held from 1st July to 31st December 2010 are highlighted and their balance is drawn up. Its major achievements include: compromise concerning the EU budget for 2011, measures aimed at increasing financial stability, improvement of public finances and coordination of the economic policies of member states; integrated directives for job and economic policies of member states; resumption of discussion on deepening of the internal market; further progress in implementation of the enlargement strategy; continuation of work on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty; activity in external spheres and new initiatives in the sphere of freedom, security and justice. The major failures of the Belgian presidency consist in its inability to realize the following tasks: improved coordination of cooperation in fighting illegal immigration and organized crime or terrorist threats, enhancement of social security of EU citizens and raising the standards of health care, completion of accession negotiations with Croatia and strengthening cooperation between the EU and the countries of Africa and Asia.
EN
Poland will be the fourth Member State to hold the Presidency under the new Lisbon Treaty, following the Spanish, Belgian, and Hungarian Presidencies. The selection of Polish priorities has to be made consciously, taking into account the subjects of real political interest, level of ambitions, achievements already made, strengths, and also those subjects important for Polish society, in order to generate public interest and social support for the Presidency agenda. The success of the Polish Presidency will be determined by an uncounted number of bigger and smaller elements, from the ability to conclude a constructive debate on crucial issues to good preparation of meeting venues, expertise on detailed subjects, knowledge of foreign languages, attractiveness of cultural offerings and the creation of a friendly atmosphere.
EN
Poland decided to freshen up the discussion on the internal market and its consequences for employees, consumers and entrepreneurs. One should positively judge this action which became part of a new initiative of the European Commission: the Single Market Act. From the point of view of politics, Poland presented to the European Council a report which was the basis for a discussion of the Heads of State or Government summed up in the European Council conclusions. Owing to this, the internal market has become the instrument of finding a way out of the financial and economic crisis and the EU 2020 strategy tool. Moreover, it should be underlined that the first Single Market Forum, organised by the Polish presidency in Cracow, constituted the practical implementation of the idea of moving the internal market closer to employees, consumers and entrepreneurs. On the basis of the Cracow Declaration, the Polish presidency worked out the conclusions adopted by the Competitive-ness Council in an undoubtedly, professional and truly European way. Many opinions and remarks presented in that declaration were reflected in the political council conclusions as recommendations for the European Commission and the Member States.
EN
In this article the formal negotiations of a legislative package for the cohe¬sion policy 2014-2020, which were launched and advanced during the Polish-Dan¬ish-Cypriot Trio Presidencies, serve as an example of the Trio cooperation. The arti¬cle’s aim is to give a behind-the-scenes look at the European negotiations from the participants’ point of view as regards the joint Trio work, both before and during the negotiations. This analysis leads up to some general reflections on the Trio for¬mula and its effectiveness.
EN
The main aim of this article is to show how the Cyprus dispute affected the preparations and achievements of the Republic of Cyprus’s Presidency of the Council of the EU, and to present its implications with respect to relations between Turkey and the European Union. The author discusses the essence of the Cyprus dispute, namely the occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkish armed forces. Further, he describes the influence of Cyprus’s integration with the EU on the EU-Turkey rela¬tions in the pre-Presidency period. The main part of the article focuses on the Cypriot Presidency, during which Cyprus did not entangle the other Member States in the problems of the divided island, but acted in the best interest of the entire EU. The reaction of the Turkish government, which boycotted the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus, is also characterized.
EN
The seventh Danish EU Presidency of 2012 was inevitably oriented towards the imminent economic challenges faced by the EU. Although the Eurozone crisis remained the most urgent issue facing the EU, the Danish Presidency, maintained its focus on other important policy areas as well. The four key words of the Danish EU presidency, reflecting its priorities, were to make the EU more (1) Responsible (2) Dynamic (3) Green and (4) Safe. In this article we discuss to what extent and in what ways the Danish Presidency fulfilled its ambitions concerning these four focal points. In order to evaluate and understand the performance of the Presidency, we discuss the new role of the Council Presidency introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the implications of the specific domestic context of Danish politics, and the sta¬tus of Denmark as a ’small and reluctant Member State’. We postulate that the Danish Presidency of 2012 was particularly successful in performing the role as mediator in important inter-institutional negotiations. Yet in terms of shaping the EU political agenda, the achievements were less significant.
EN
The article is a review of member states’ information policy on the European Union. It analyses situations when information activities are conducted with increasing intensity. It examines information campaigns before the European Union referendums, awareness campaigns relating to euro changeover and to the European Parliament elections. It also analyses information strategies relating to the presidency of the Council of the European Union and information activities carried out according to the European Commission regulation on the structural funds. The findings of this research proves that member states’ information policy cannot be described in one template. It depends on a level of government involvement and the objectivity of conveyed information, on relations with the European Commission and on conformity with European Union interests.
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