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Czy potrzebna nam jest filozofia eksperymentalna?

100%
Jastrzębski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2013
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vol. 41
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issue 2
117 -133
EN
The term „experimental philosophy" refers to a new movement in philosophy which promotes systematic psychological research into common-sense beliefs. This work has yielded interesting results in the field of human intuitions; nonetheless, there are doubts regarding its value for philosophy as such. The aim of experimental philosophy is not so much discover and analyze the latest problems, but to help answer classical questions in the philosophical tradition. Work in this field tends to be an interdisciplinary effort of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientist, which is certainly praiseworthy. In this paper we explore experimental philosophy in its various currents, consider its critics in the analytic tradition, and, finally, evaluate it with a view to its possible significance for the future of philosophy.
2

HIGH STANDARD EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE APPEAL TO INTUITION

100%
Gasparatou R.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 7
680-692
EN
In the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. The authoress argues that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliable frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify it. Naturalists, on the other hand, are not those who need such a method; yet they can better accommodate it within their view.
3

KNOWING OUR OWN CONCEPTS: THE ROLE OF INTUITIUONS IN PHILOSOPHY

75%
Hartl P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2011
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vol. 18
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issue 4
488 – 498
EN
Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticizing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is an intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? The author presents and examines the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claims that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. His argument will utilize Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable (though not infallible) evidence about a person’s Concepts, and this knowledge is valuable for further philosophical research as well. The author will argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, denying self-knowledge about his internal mental states is disputable – as he will show – both from a philosophical and a scientific point of view.
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