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  1. 1 Filozofia (Philosophy)

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  1. 1 Zámečník L.

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  1. 1 2022

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EXPLANAČNÍ MONISMUS U NEKAUZÁLNÍCH VYSVĚTLENÍ

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Zámečník L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2022
|
vol. 77
|
issue 8
590 – 607
EN
The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of noncausal explanations.
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