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SUBJEKTIVITA V SÚČASNEJ FRANCÚZSKEJ FENOMENOLÓGII

100%
Sebbah F. D. w. k. s. s. f. d. f. p.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
|
issue 5
365-377
EN
The paper deals with what could be seen as 'a new origin' (rather as a comeback) of the subjectivity in contemporary French philosophy. The author believes, that a piece of this 'different' subjectivity appears already with Husserl; it is something irreducible to the idealistic subject matter in transcendental egology, something similar to feeling, which endures giving. In his view in contemporary French phenomenology there are two different 'families': the first one is led by its radicalism to the original anonymity (Merleau-Ponty and to some extent also J. Garelli and M. Richir); the other is led by the same radicalism to Self-feeling. This second family is discussed in more details: it is the extreme phenomenology, which endures the excesses of destruction and hurting; it becomes sensible to subjectivity as an irremovable feeling, to which a man is bound: a man is this feeling. It is the Self induced by and delayed in relation to that, of which it is a feeling; it is the Self deprived of this feeling, the Self, which can not constitute this feeling as its own experience actively. Nevertheless this Self is entirely this feeling. We can find this in the works of M. Henry and E. Levinas as well as in those of Derrida (what is embarrassing only at first sight and does not undermine at all the radicalism of Derridaian deconstruction of the subject).
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