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1

Lawfulness of the EU Economic Governance According to National and Supranational Case Law

100%

JędrzejowskA-Schiffauer I.

Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne

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2016

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vol. CI

53-69

EN

This contribution focuses on the legal narrative of the EU/EMU crisis management providing an outlook on the new EU economic governance framework from the perspective of national and supranational (Court of Justice of the EU, CJEU) case law. The author first briefly outlines the major developments in the EU economic and fiscal governance vis-à-vis the financial and sovereign debt crises, followed by the analysis of legal questions central to ESM emergency fund (Pringle Case) and OMT bond-buying programme (Gauweiler). The author contends that the discussed economic and monetary policy measures, although subjected to heated political, economic and most notably legal polemics, have not only gone relatively smoothly through the legality review at the supranational level, but also – as was to be expected – have come out intact and lawful in the national case law. The discussed new mode of governance, to the ipso iure institutionalisation of which the European courts contribute, will constitute a complex legacy of the financial and euro-crises, the historic and democratic legitimacy of which remains, so far, an open question.

PL

Niniejszy artykuł przybliża prawne zagadnienia dotyczące zarządzania gospodarczego w UE i strefie euro w dobie kryzysu finansowego i gospodarczego. Omówiono nowe unijne ramy zarządzania gospodarczego z punktu widzenia orzecznictwa krajowego i ponadnarodowego (Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej, TSUE). W artykule przedstawiono najważniejsze instrumenty zarządzania gospodarczego stosowane w sytuacji kryzysu finansowego i zadłużeniowego. Następnie poddano analizie zagadnienia prawne kluczowe dla Europejskiego Mechanizmu Stabilności, EMS (orzecznictwo w sprawie Pringle) oraz bezwarunkowych transakcji monetarnych Eurosystemu na wtórnych rynkach obligacji skarbowych, OMT (orzecznictwo w sprawie Gauweiler). Omawiane instrumenty polityki gospodarczej i pieniężnej, choć stanowiące przedmiot intensywnej dyskusji na płaszczyźnie politycznej, gospodarczej oraz, co najważniejsze, prawnej nie tylko stosunkowo gładko przeszły przez kontrolę legalności na szczeblu ponadnarodowym, lecz także – jak można było zakładać na podstawie dotychczasowej praktyki orzeczniczej – ich wykładnia przez sądy krajowe, gdzie sprawy były zawisłe, była również przychylna. Omawiany nowy sposób zarządzania gospodarczego, w którego instytucjonalizacji ipso iure europejskie sady maja swój udział, będzie stanowił skomplikowaną spuściznę kryzysu finansowego i gospodarczego, a jego legitymacja demokratyczna i dziejowa pozostaje na chwilę obecną otwarta.

2

Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States

100%

Blazsek V.

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

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2016

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vol. 9(14)

145-158

EN

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the long-run however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.

FR

Les sauvetages bancaires consécutifs à la crise financière mondiale de 2008 ont été soumis à l'approbation préalable de la Commission européenne (CE), l'autorité de la concurrence de l'Union européenne. Les CE étaient réticentes à rejeter les efforts de sauvetage dirigés contre les banques défaillantes et ont donc approuvé de manière cohérente toutes les demandes présentées par les États membres. Sur les vingt premières banques européennes, la CE a autorisé des aides d'État au moins douze entités. Dans ce contexte le document souligne l'évolution progressive de l'interprétation des règles de l'UE en matière d'aides d'État, les « règles temporaires et extraordinaires » introduites à partir de la fin de 2008 et l'extension de la catégorie « sans aides d’État ». Les changements susmentionnés montrent que la CE elle-même a dévié des lois pertinentes de l'UE afin de sauver systématiquement d'importantes banques en Europe et de rétablir leur stabilité financière. L'article soutient que les plans de sauvetage bancaire et les plans de sauvetage bancaire de l'État ont eu des effets différents sur les structures du marché et sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans les zones de la zone euro et hors zone euro, principalement dans les segments orientaux de l'Union européenne. En tant que tel, il est soutenu qu'ils sont incompatibles avec le marché commun européen. Bien que les CE aient essayé de minimiser les distorsions de concurrence créées par la jurisprudence susmentionnée, principalement par l'application du principe d'exception et des mesures de compensation différentes, ces efforts ont été au moins partiellement infructueux. Les paquets massifs d'aides d'État, le traitement préférentiel des banques les plus importantes ou systématiquement importantes par le biais des mécanismes d'aide de l'UE - presque aucun d'Europe centrale et orientale (CEE) - ont entraîné une distorsion de concurrence sur le marché commun. Cela est dû principalement à la priorité accordée à la stabilité du secteur financier et de l'euro. Le document fait valoir que les aides d'État pour les banques en faillite peuvent avoir eu des effets positifs importants à court terme, comme la promotion de la stabilité du système bancaire et de l'euro. Toutefois, à long terme, elle a contribué à l'endettement souverain sans précédent en Europe et a contribué à accroître l'instabilité économique et politique de l'UE, en particulier dans son segment d'Europe centrale et orientale le plus vulnérable.

3

European Harmonization Versus National Constitutional Sovereignity – On the Example of the Measures to Contain the Crisis of the Common European Currency

80%

Becker R. J.

Creative and Knowledge Society

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2015

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vol. 5

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issue 1

66-82

EN

The Eurozone Crisis is not just a monetary and economic challenge. It is as well the first tremendous challenge of the European Community and as well the national institutions and constitutions of the member states not only within the Eurozone. On one side the European Commission, the European Parliament and the ECB with its endeavours to safeguard and stabilize the single currency EURO within the Eurozone, to support the suffering countries in the south (PIIGS) with its struggle against speculative hedge funds, to render financial relief measures to those countries and its financial industry. Irrespective the fact governments and citizens within that countries, less appear to appreciate or honor that measures (Troika, Financial checks and budgetary control) as efficient help to stabilize but condemn as form of European paternalism and patronage. On the other hand the countries and its citizenship especially in the north of the Eurozone to set a stop sign to the EU and the ECB. Therefore they stress the Maastricht criteria and cite the Art 125 of the TEU, which prohibits one nation to stand for or to be liable for the Government debts of another nation (no bail out). Especially in the German perspective the demarcation line appears to run along between the European Commission, European Central Bank and European Court on the European side and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Bundesbank on the national German side. Each of the institutions feels to be bound to its origin functions and principles and save the respective constitution and the task rendered by that constitution. For a better understanding it is essential to get aware of and to reinforce the constitutional role which the Grundgesetz awarded to the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesbank and the German citizenship placing their confidence in these institutions. Es soll konkret das Verhältnis zur Nichtbeistandsklausel No-Bail-out Klausel Art 125 AEUVertrag, den Europäischen Fiskalpakt / dem ESFS, ESM / dem OMT-Programm der EZB, möglichen Entwicklung des EU zur Haftungs- und Transferunion mit einem zukünftigen Haftungsautomatismus der Mitglieder, der Unterscheidung von gemeinsamer Währungspolitik und nationaler Wirtschaftspolitik, der drohenden Vergemeinschaftung von Staatsschulden einzelner EU-Länder, die Budgethoheit des nationalen Parlaments als freie Entscheidung über die Verwendung des nationalen Haushaltes untersucht werden. Mit allen diesen Fragen mussten sich das höchste Deutsche und Europäische Gericht in jüngster Vergangenheit intensiv beschäftigen.

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1 Creative and Knowledge Society

1 Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne

1 Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

1 Becker R. J.

1 Blazsek V.

1 JędrzejowskA-Schiffauer I.

2 2016

1 2015

Lawfulness of the EU Economic Governance According to National and Supranational Case Law

Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States

European Harmonization Versus National Constitutional Sovereignity – On the Example of the Measures to Contain the Crisis of the Common European Currency