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Studia Psychologica
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2022
|
vol. 64
|
issue 3
283 – 294
EN
This study examined false memories, which occur when people falsely recognize words on the test phase that are not presented to them during the study phase, along with cognitive flexibility, which is thought to be related to metacognitive processes such as attention, reasoning, and decision making. Performance in recognizing the critical words of the DRM lists of the high and low scoring groups of subjects, who had used the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (Dennis & Vander, 2010), was compared. The data of 58 undergraduate students who volunteered for the study were analysed. Subjects were asked to complete a remember/know assessment of their responses so that recognition memory processes could be examined. Due to the nature of cognitive flexibility, which involves selecting and using appropriate information and relation with metacognitive processes, people with high cognitive flexibility were expected to show fewer memory errors. The results showed that while there was no significant difference in revealing more false memories compared to low or high cognitive flexibility, there were significant differences in the remember/know assessment. Individuals with high cognitive flexibility were more likely to remember their correct answers than those with low cognitive flexibility. On the other hand, the low cognitive flexibility group reported more know responses about their correct answers. These results show that there may be a relationship between subjective consciousness processes and cognitive flexibility in retrieving information in recognition memory.
EN
Two effects that can influence the creation of false memories were investigated. First, the classic effect of imagination inflation was investigated. Second, the effect of exposure to modified premature cognitive commitment procedure, in which subjects apply bias correction in order to be opposed to suggested information. 24 subjects were asked to perform, imagine or hear simple action statements. Then half of the subjects imagined performing some other actions. One week later half of the subjects were exposed to false information that they have the tendency to underestimate the quantity of many occurrences in everyday life. The surprising finding was that imagination inflation effect had not emerged. Nevertheless, the exposure to information about fictitious deficit led to bias correction and to source monitoring errors in which actions that had not been presented were recollected as having been imagined or heard.
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