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EN
The paper deals with what could be seen as 'a new origin' (rather as a comeback) of the subjectivity in contemporary French philosophy. The author believes, that a piece of this 'different' subjectivity appears already with Husserl; it is something irreducible to the idealistic subject matter in transcendental egology, something similar to feeling, which endures giving. In his view in contemporary French phenomenology there are two different 'families': the first one is led by its radicalism to the original anonymity (Merleau-Ponty and to some extent also J. Garelli and M. Richir); the other is led by the same radicalism to Self-feeling. This second family is discussed in more details: it is the extreme phenomenology, which endures the excesses of destruction and hurting; it becomes sensible to subjectivity as an irremovable feeling, to which a man is bound: a man is this feeling. It is the Self induced by and delayed in relation to that, of which it is a feeling; it is the Self deprived of this feeling, the Self, which can not constitute this feeling as its own experience actively. Nevertheless this Self is entirely this feeling. We can find this in the works of M. Henry and E. Levinas as well as in those of Derrida (what is embarrassing only at first sight and does not undermine at all the radicalism of Derridaian deconstruction of the subject).
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 5
371 – 379
EN
The paper describes different ways in which emotions are felt by the body based on phenomenological philosophy, an inactive approach in the cognitive sciences, and contemporary psychology, the article puts forward three arguments for the corporeality of emotion. Emotion is bodily because: 1. bodily sensations provide context to an emotional situation; 2. the basic form of expression of emotion is the bodily readiness to act; 3. the full form of expression of emotion is either bodily movement or is based on a movement. The common element of these arguments is a conception of the sensing and moving body, which cannot be reduced either to a physiological machine or a bodily localized sensation in the focus of attention. The article is framed by a critique of the sharp cognitivist distinction between the nature and expression of emotion, which it replaces with the concept of mutual sense-bestowal between behaviour and experience on the one hand and situation on the other.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
|
issue 3
179 – 190
EN
Hegel’s criticism of Schleiermacher represents an important episode in his general critical campaign against Romanticism. In this article the author explores his objections to Schleiermacher’s theory of faith as the feeling of absolute dependency. The different statements of Schleiermacher’s view in On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers and The Christian Faith are outlined. Then an account is given of Hegel’s various criticisms of this view. The author wishes to argue that what is ultimately at stake in the discussion is not just the nature of faith and knowing, but something more fundamental: philosophical anthropology. By focusing on intuition and immediate feeling as the locus for religious faith, Schleiermacher, according to Hegel, reduces the human to the subhuman. For Hegel, by contrast, the faculty of religious faith should not be the lowest but the highest, which in his view means speculative reason.
ARS
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2009
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vol. 42
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issue 1
115-127
EN
The article addresses the reception of the work of Aby M. Warburg in social and cultural sciences in relation to two thematic scopes. The first wave of the reception of Warburg - originating already in his time and then intensifying mainly during the 1970s - was oriented at his works on the conception of a symbol, respectively on the iconological tradition. The second wave of the reception, which has started to dominate especially in the last years, is related to the conception of a man in Warburg's works, which states a mutual intersection of rationality and emotionality.
Filo-Sofija
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2009
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vol. 9
|
issue 9
99-113
EN
This paper presents the critical theory of Rudolf Steiner’s cognition. His early philosophical works were inspired by Kant’s philosophy. At that time, he attempted to find a synthesis between the sensory world and the mental/spiritual one. Steiner’s early thought represented the epistemological position characteristic of Kantian bio-philosophy. It was an influential current of gnoseology in the 19th-century. The author presents main notions of Steiner’s philosophical positions such as: perceiving, image, feeling and thinking.
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