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1

CONCILIATIONISM AND FICTIONALISM

100%
Hunt M. W.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2018
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vol. 25
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issue 4
456 – 472
EN
This paper offers fictionalism as a new approach to the problem of reasonable disagreement discussed in social epistemology. The conciliationist approach to reasonable disagreement is defined, and three problems with it are posed: that it is destructive of inquiry, self-defeating, and unacceptably revisionary. Hans Vaihinger’s account of fictions is explained, and it is shown that if the intellectual commitments that are the subject of reasonable disagreements are treated as fictions rather than as beliefs, the three noted problems are avoided. Whereas beliefs have a “rivalrous” relation to the source of their justification (evidence), fictions have a non-rivalrous relation to the source of their justification (expediency), meaning that disagreement over which fictions to employ is not problematic in the way that disagreement over what to believe is. Some objections to the fictionalist approach to reasonable disagreement are answered.
2

FICTION OF FICTIONALISM

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 8
603 – 615
EN
Fictionalism about fictional entities is an antirealist approach. It suggests that statements of literary criticism are to be understood in the same way as are fictional statements. The latter are naturally understood as being uttered in a pretend mode, i.e. not seriously. Fictionalism has it that the same holds for the former. It is sometimes argued that this is unfaithful to our actual linguistic practice with critical statements. The author ś aim is to strengthen this objection by pointing to some unwelcome consequences of the fictionalise position. It seems plausible that our practice with critical statements allows us: a) to supplement their utterances by remarks such as “And I mean it” or “What I have just said is true”; b) to report on their utterances by using statements such as ‘X asserted that C’ (where X is a speaker and C is a proposition expressed by a critical statement); c) to ask for arguments that would support the truth of critical statements; d) to agree or disagree with other speakers over the truth of critical statements. If fictionalism were correct, our practice with critical statements would not permit moves of these kinds.
3

MODAL FICTIONALISM AND MODAL INSTRUMENTALISM

100%
Ardis A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2015
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vol. 22
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issue 4
439 – 460
EN
Fictionalism is a strategy for retaining a theory without committing to its truth. This paper considers two kinds of fictionalism about possible worlds: modal fictionalism or “story operator” fictionalism, and modal instrumentalism. Difficulties for modal fictionalism are used to motivate endorsing modal instrumentalism.
4

FICTIONAL NAMES AND FICTIONAL CONCEPTS: A MODERATE FICTIONALIST ACCOUNT

88%
Orlando E.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 1
107 – 134
EN
I want to defend in this essay that the main thesis is that a fictional name refers to an individual concept, understood as a mental file that stores information, in the form of different descriptive concepts, about a purported individual. Given there is no material particular a fictional name could be referring to, it will be construed as referring to the concept of a particular, with which many descriptive concepts are associated, in the context of the set of thoughts constitutive of a fictional narrative. A fictional narrative will be thus characterised as a conceptual world, namely, a set of sentence-types semantically correlated with a set of thought-types.
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