The paper deals with the understanding of the concept of natural and moral goodness / evil according to Philippa Foot. The aim of the paper is to analyse and reconstruct the main line of her argument in the work Natural Goodness. Special attention is paid to her understanding of moral goodness / evil as a natural quality / defect, which allows her to avoid the dichotomy between facts and values. The author tries to incorporate Foot’s understanding of natural and moral goodness / evil into the framework of virtue ethics. The virtue of love is presented as the main feature of a good person and as a virtue which is in a way present in other moral virtues and which connects practical rationality and sensitivity to basic human needs. In conclusion, the author summarizes and briefly responds to the main criticisms of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism and the particular ethical project of Philippa Foot.
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