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OPPOSITION'S TOOLS FOR CONTROLLING THE GOVERNMENT (Instrumenty kontroli nad rzadem opozycji parlamentarnej)

100%
Bartoszewicz M.
|
2011
|
vol. 56
|
issue 6(341)
18-38
EN
In democratic countries, opposition is defined in various ways, depending on the binding party system, the legal status of parties in the Parliament and the practice developed. But undoubtedly, without opposition, control over the government would be usually only formal. The article presents a selection of the most important tools that the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) has at its disposal to control the Council of Ministers and the government administration, which are mainly used by opposing parliamentary groupings and circles. The author also attempts to assess how the opposition in the previous Parliament fulfilled this task.
2

NON-LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE

72%
Hitchcock D.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2009
|
issue 16(29)
137-158
EN
Contemporary philosophers generally conceive of consequence as necessary truth-preservation. They generally construe this necessity as logical, and operationalize it in substitutional, formal or model-theoretic terms as the absence of a counter-example. A minority tradition allows for grounding truth-preservation also on non-logical necessities, especially on the semantics of extra-logical constants. The present article reviews and updates the author's previous proposals to modify the received conception of consequence so as to require truth-preservation to be non-trivial (i.e. not a mere consequence of a necessarily true implicatum or a necessarily untrue implicans) and to allow variants of the substitutional, formal and model-theoretic realizations of the received conception where the condition underwriting truth-preservation is not purely formal. Indeed, the condition may be contingent rather than necessary. Allowing contingent non-trivial truth-preservation as a consequence relation fits our inferential practices, but turns out to be subject to counter-examples. We are left with an unhappy choice between an overly strict requirement that non-trivial truth-preservation be underwritten by a necessary truth and an overly loose recognition of non-trivial truth-preservation wherever some truth underwrites it. We need to look for a principled intermediate position between these alternatives.
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