Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  FREGE GOTTLOB
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

A REFLECTION ON FREGE'S DEFINITION OF THE NUMBER (Zamysleni nad Fregovou definici cisla)

100%
Vlasakova M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2010
|
vol. 17
|
issue 3
339-353
EN
In his treatise Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Gottlob Frege tries to find a definition of a number. First, he rejects the idea that the number could be a property of external (empirical) objects. Then he comes with a suggestion that a numerical statement expresses a property of a concept, namely it indicates how many objects fall under the concept. Subsequently Frege rejects, or at least essentially modifies, also this definition, because in his view a number cannot be a property - it should be an object. The article tries to show that Frege's first definition of number seems to be, despite his own opinion, much more promising than he supposed. It also argues that Frege's argumentation against the (possibly) empirical character of number is by no means convincing.
2

THOUGHTS IN EXCHANGE: A NOTE ON FREGE’S TRACTATUS LETTERS

86%
Dožudić D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 7
531 – 541
EN
In 1919, when his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), was finished but still unpublished, Wittgenstein sent the manuscript to Frege, and, as a consequence of that, they exchanged several fairly polemic letters in 1919 – 1920. Only Frege’s letters were preserved. The letters are highly compressed in content, and offer an interesting insight in how, mostly critically, one of the authors of whom Wittgenstein held highest esteem, thought about the content, style, and organisation of the manuscript. At the same time, we can get some impression from Frege’s letters how Wittgenstein reacted to his initial letter addressing the Tractatus, and how the subsequent exchange went. In this paper, I offer several observations concerning their exchange, and I compare it to the parallel exchange on the same matter between Wittgenstein and Russell.
3

NATURE OF ASSERTORY FORCE AND THE TRUTH IN LOGIC: AN ELUCIDATION OF FREGEAN TRUTH IN THE LIGHT OF HUSSERL’S THEORY OF DOXIC-MODIFICATION

86%
Song G.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2011
|
vol. 18
|
issue 4
423 – 446
EN
The unique relation between logic and truth (proto-relation) is crucial for understanding Fregean conception of logic. Frege has an insight that the nature of logic resides in the “truth“, which he finally locates in the assertory force of a sentence. Though Frege admits that assertory force is ineffable in ordinary language, he coins in his conceptual notation for such a force a much-disputed sign, i.e., judgment-stroke. In this paper, author will try to demonstrate that judgment-stroke is not adequate for the task its inventor has assigned to it. Accordingly, it is misconceived and inconducive to clarify Frege’s vague insight into the proto-relation. The mistake of judgment-stroke for the sign of assertory force has its root in Frege’s ignorance of the significant difference between “judgment” and “assertion”, which will be elucidated at length in the light of Husserl’s theory of “doxic-modification“. In the end, based on a further elucidation of the activity of assertion, he will advance a tentative interpretation of the vague insight Frege has concerning the proto-relation.
4

LOWE ON LOCKE'S AND FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBER

72%
Arrieta-Urtizberea A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2010
|
vol. 17
|
issue 1
39-52
EN
In his last book on Locke's philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege's arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative 'reading' of Frege's arguments throws light on Frege's and Lowe's different 'agendas'. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege's and Lowe's views are confronted with it.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.