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PL
Dynamiczne zmiany zachodzące w handlu światowym w ostatnich latach stanowiły ważny impuls dla Unii Europejskiej do modyfikacji swojej polityki handlowej i dążenia do umacniania stosunków o charakterze dwustronnym, także poprzez negocjacje porozumień handlowych. Zakończenie negocjacji porozumienia z Mercosur stanowi istotny element tych działań. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wyników badań dotyczących analizy stosunków handlowych UE-Mercosur oraz wskazanie perspektyw negocjowanego porozumienia. Z przeprowadzonej w opracowaniu analizy można wnioskować, że mimo zaledwie 2% udziału w handlu UE ogółem ugrupowanie Mercosur jest ważnym dla UE partnerem, a możliwości rozwoju wzajemnej współpracy są znaczące. Przemawia za tym nie tylko niewykorzystany potencjał we wzajemnych stosunkach handlowych dający spore szanse na osiągnięcie istotnych oszczędności po wdrożeniu porozumienia, ale także zewnętrzne determinanty, które stanowią dodatkowy, ważny bodziec do umacniania unijnej pozycji w tym regionie. Dla realizacji celów opracowania zastosowana została głównie metoda analityczno-opisowa. Rozważania oparte zostały głównie na materiałach źródłowych oraz opracowaniach naukowych dotyczących unijnej polityki handlowej, a także danych z raportów organizacji międzynarodowych.
EN
Dynamic changes in world trade in recent years have provided an important impetus for the European Union to modify its trade policy and seek to strengthen bilateral relations, including through the negotiation of trade agreements. The completion of negotiations for an agreement with Mercosur is an important part of this effort. The aim of the paper is to present the results of research concerning the analysis of the EU-Mercosur trade relations and to indicate the perspectives of the negotiated deal. From the analysis carried out in the paper, it can be concluded that despite a mere 2% share of total EU trade, the Mercosur group is an important partner for the EU, and the opportunities for developing mutual cooperation are significant. This is supported not only by the untapped potential in mutual trade relations giving considerable chances to achieve significant savings after the implementation of the agreement, but also by external determinants that provide an additional significant incentive to strengthen the EU position in the region. To achieve the objectives of the study, the analytical and descriptive method was mainly used. The considerations were based mainly on original materials and scientific papers on EU trade policy, as well as data from reports of international organizations.
EN
Faced with a visible stagnation in negotiations within the WTO, the EU prioritized bilateral trade agreements. In the EU’s newly-developed trade and investment strategy from 2015 named “Trade for All”, Australia’s significance as Europe’s close partner sharing European values and playing an important role both in the Pacific region and multilateral forums was clearly emphasized. The main assumptions of this strategy have become the starting point for taking more specific actions in the field of regulating trade relations between the EU and Australia in the form of the forthcoming “comprehensive and high-quality FTA.” Moreover, the current climate in the world trade (connected with e.g. American protectionism) is the cause of the EU’s interest in developing partnership with other, more predictable trade partners. Hence, the agreement planned by the EU would contribute to the stimulation of reciprocal exchange, which is of great importance bearing in mind Australia’s successfully signed FTAs with other countries, including those with EU’s key partners. Finally, the question of Brexit is not without significance in this context.
PL
Wobec zastoju negocjacji na forum WTO priorytetem dla UE stały się dwustronne umowy handlowe. W przedstawionej w 2015 r. nowej strategii handlowej i inwestycyjnej EU “Trade for All” wyraźnie podkreślono znaczenie Australii jako bliskiego partnera Europy, podzielającego europejskie wartości oraz odgrywającego ważną rolę zarówno w regionie Azji Pacyfiku, jak i na forach wielostronnych. Zapisy tej strategii stały się punktem wyjścia do podjęcia konkretnych działań w zakresie pełniejszego uregulowania stosunków handlowych EU z Australią w postaci przyszłej wszechstronnej FTA. Ponadto, bieżąca sytuacja w handlu światowym (związana m.in. z amerykańskim protekcjonizmem) powoduje, że UE dąży do pogłębiania współpracy z innymi, bardziej przewidywalnymi partnerami handlowymi. Planowana umowa przyczyni się zatem do pobudzenia wzajemnej wymiany, co jest szczególnie ważne w świetle podpisanych już przez Australię umów FTA z innymi państwami, w tym także kluczowymi partnerami UE. Nie bez znaczenia pozostaje również kwestia Brexit’u.
EN
In 2007 the EU and ASEAN launched negotiations on a free trade agreement between the regions. However, 2 years later, the inter-regional negotiations were paused due to the slow progress . As an alternative the EC started individual negotiations with those countries that wished to sign a bilateral FTA. Firstly, it initiated talks with Singapore in 2010 which was then followed by Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. By the half of 2017 the EU concluded the FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam which are yet to be ratified. Four other countries negotiate the agreements with many challenges and issues to be addressed in bilateral talks. Although official declarations say about replacing those individual agreements by one EU-ASEAN FTA in future, it will be difficult to achieve due to differences in economic interest among ASEAN members, differential progress within the ongoing negotiations and even the reluctance of some countries to join the FTA with the EU.
EN
The changes in the structure of the world economy related to the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) are reflected in activities undertaken by the EU, which, due to the crisis of multilateral negotiations, seeks alternative forms of gaining access to other markets. Thus, it concludes new-generation trade agreements with its partners as they entail broader and more comprehensive liberalization of trade than that within the WTO. Among them, the agreement which deserves a closer scrutiny is the very first agreement of this kind, signed with an Asian country in 2011, which marked the beginning of a new era in EU-Korean trade relations. An analysis of the volume and dynamics of trade between the two partners indicates good results, particularly for the EU, which has changed its role from a net importer to a net exporter and strengthened its position as one of the key trade partners of South Korea.
EN
The purpose of this article is to analyze the dominant role of transactional drivers in India’s foreign policy towards the European Union (EU). The article hypothesizes that India is trying to use its relationship with the EU in primarily transactional ways to achieve its own foreign and economic policy goals rather than to advance shared norms and values as democratic powers. Those goals include (i) leveraging its global image and reputation as a trusted and credible international partner, (ii) gaining greater regional and global influence, (iii) attracting foreign investment and boosting Indian exports. The article begins by explaining the concept of transactionalism in foreign policies. Secondly, it identifies the main drivers of India-EU relations with a special focus on (i) the concept of non-alignment and strategic autonomy in India’s foreign policy, (ii) common norms and values shared by India and the EU, (iii) economic cooperation between India and the EU. Thirdly, it assesses the transactional dimensions of the drivers of Indian foreign policy toward the EU discussed in the preceding sections. Finally, it evaluates the significance of India’s attempts to use its relations with the EU to achieve its own foreign and economic policy goals, including with respect to the implications for the EU’s efforts to project itself as a normative power in relations with India.
EN
The objective of the study is to verify the implementation, by the EU, of the treaties’ obligations to proliferate “non-trade” European values in agreements with Asian countries. The thesis of the study is that the EU with “new generation” agreements strengthens the cohesion of the western hemisphere and creates the conditions for its enlargement. An instrument supporting the strengthening and development of the western hemisphere is the policy of “change through trade” combined with the promotion of “free and fair trade”. We claim that this policy contributed to political change in the world – the expansion of international law, the principles of the UN Charter, and EU values. Influence beyond the parties to the agreements takes place, although formally the agreements only govern the relationship between the parties. This influence is the outcome of, among other things, demonstrating the implementation of the values and benefits of value-based cooperation. By agreements (FTAs, IPAs and political) with Asian countries, the network of connections among the states of the Western hemisphere is developed and the community of values reinforced. The institutionalisation of the community of values of EU-Asian countries also fosters the institutionalisation of ties among the democratic Asian countries.
PL
W 2007 rozpoczęły się rokowania dotyczące utworzenia strefy wolnego handlu (SWH) między Unią Europejską i Indiami. Dynamiczny rozwój indyjskiej gospodarki, jak również wysoki poziom ochrony krajowego rynku, sprawiają, że kraj ten jest jednym z priorytetowych partnerów handlowych, z którymi Unia chce zawrzeć dwustronną umowę SWH. Nowe porozumienie powinno regulować nie tylko zasady obrotu towarowego, ale także wzajemny dostęp do rynku usług, zasady przepływu inwestycji, politykę konkurencji oraz kwestie odnoszące się do prawnej ochrony własności intelektualnej. Mimo składanych już kilkukrotnie deklaracji, toczących się od ponad pięciu lat rokowań nie udało się jak dotychczas zakończyć. Wśród najważniejszych kwestii spornych, stojących na drodze do osiągnięcia ostatecznego porozumienia, znalazły się: dostęp europejskich samochodów do indyjskiego rynku, produkcja leków generycznych w Indiach, liberalizacja sektora usług czy dostęp dla europejskich firm do indyjskiego rynku zamówień publicznych. Wskazane trudności uniemożliwią zapewne osiągnięcie porozumienia przed końcem 2012 r., co deklarowały dotychczas obydwie strony.
EN
In 2007, the European Union started together with the Republic of India negotiations on the creation of free trade area. Dynamic development of the Indian economy as well as a relatively high level of domestic market protection in relations with the EU makes the country one of the priority partners for concluding a new bilateral free trade agreement. The agreement should regulate not only trade in goods, but also reciprocal access to the service sectors, foreign direct investments, competition policy as well as issues related to intellectual property rights. Despite the previously declared deadlines, the negotiations are still ongoing. There are many contentious issues occurring during negotiations. The most important and destructive for the negotiations are: an access for European car producers to the Indian market, production of generic medicines in India, liberalisation of trade in services as well as an access for European companies to the Indian market of public procurement. The mentioned contentious issues probably make the final agreement unlikely by the end of 2012.
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EN
A crucial factor of ever-growing regionalization of the world trade is the lasting negotiation impasse at multilateral level. Finding common ground among all WTO members has proven to be a task beyond their capabilities, consequently, some countries focused their efforts on concluding Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which are of a smaller or larger regional range and importance to the global economy. The last group includes the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This partnership will surely affect not only the world trade flows but also the progress of negotiations in the ongoing Doha Development Round and in consequence the further functioning of the WTO. It is difficult to resist the impression that the TTIP has a different dimension from other, currently formed trading blocs. It mainly concerns the geopolitical context and another case of merging of Western superpowers, which may result in the reluctance of TTIP members to take part in multilateral negotiations for some time, which consequently may negatively affect the ongoing WTO negotiations. The fact that the former superpowers have been overshadowed by the increasingly stronger emerging markets and their lack of political will to conclude the multilateral negotiations do not bode well for the future of the WTO.
EN
The author of the paper has focused on the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea, which came into force on 1 July 2011. The Agreement is the first concluded by the European Union with an Asian country and also, so far, it has the highest degree of complexity. In his research, the author concentrates on the presentation of changes in trade policies of both partners toward preferential trade arrangements (PTA), but he also describes most important provisions of the agreement on the liberalization of industrial goods, agricultural products and services.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
PL
Gospodarka światowa ewoluuje w kierunku wielobiegunowej globalizacji, a Chiny stały się nowym biegunem rozwoju gospodarczego. Ukraina, podobnie jak inne kraje, szuka sposobów współpracy z Chinami w zakresie handlu i inwestycji. Z kolei Chiny oferują model współpracy w ramach inicjatywy OBOR. Ponieważ oprócz chińskich inwestycji w infrastrukturę transportowo‑logistyczną OBOR ma na celu zawarcie umów o wolnym handlu z krajami uczestniczącymi w inicjatywie, artykuł skupia się na zagadnieniach polityki handlowej, przemysłowej i innowacyjnej Ukrainy w kontekście inicjatywy OBOR. Warunki handlu między Ukrainą a Chinami nie są symetryczne ze względu na różnice w wielkości gospodarek i handlu. Warunki handlu na Ukrainie są również dość liberalne, podczas gdy rynek chiński jest chroniony przez wyższe bariery o charakterze taryfowym i pozataryfowym. Obecna sytuacja we wzajemnym handlu ma również charakter asymetryczny. Ukraina eksportuje do Chin głównie surowce, podczas gdy eksport z Chin na Ukrainę jest zdominowany przez dobra inwestycyjne i konsumpcyjne. Zależność ukraińskiej gospodarki od importu jest duża, bez zauważalnych oznak spadku. W latach 2014–2018 udział importu towarów i usług w PKB na Ukrainie wynosił średnio 54% (dla porównania w Chinach – 19%). 55% ujemnego salda handlu Ukrainy towarami w 2018 roku było wynikiem wymiany handlowej z Chinami. Chiny dążą do zawarcia umów o wolnym handlu w ramach inicjatywy OBOR, ale w obecnej sytuacji liberalizacja handlu z Chinami spowoduje wzrost ukraińskiego eksportu surowców do Chin i zwiększy zależność od chińskiego importu. Z drugiej strony możliwości inwestycyjne, produkcyjne oraz naukowe i technologiczne Chin mogą stać się znaczącym czynnikiem służącym modernizacji gospodarczej Ukrainy. Gałęzie przemysłu wysokich technologii, takie jak lotnictwo, przemysł stoczniowy, bioinżynieria, rozwój nowych materiałów itp., są obiecującymi obszarami przyciągającymi chińskie inwestycje. Interesujące dla Ukrainy są chińskie doświadczenia w realizacji szeregu programów państwowych w zakresie rozwoju innowacji w chińskich przedsiębiorstwach przemysłowych. Wskazane jest wprowadzenie systemu wspierania klastrów, parków przemysłowych, Wolnych Stref Ekonomicznych (WSE) i parków technologicznych do ukraińskiego ustawodawstwa dotyczącego systemu innowacji na Ukrainie.
EN
The world economy is evolving towards multipolar globalization, and China has become a new pole of economic development. Ukraine, like other countries, is looking for ways to cooperate with China in the field of trade and investment. China, for its part, offers a model of cooperation within the framework of the OBOR (One Belt, One Road) initiative. Along with Chinese investment in transport and logistics infrastructure, OBOR aims to conclude FTAs with the countries participating in the initiative; thus, the article focuses on the issues of trade, and Ukraine’s industrial and innovation policy in the context of the OBOR initiative. A comparative analysis of both countries’ trade and industrial policies was conducted to provide a basis for evaluation. The terms of trade between Ukraine and China are not symmetrical due to the difference in the scale of the economy and trade. Additionally, Ukraine’s trade regime is relatively liberal, while the Chinese market is protected by higher tariff and non‑tariff barriers. Furthermore, the current situation in mutual trade is asymmetric. Ukraine exports mainly raw materials to China, while exports from China to Ukraine are dominated by investment and consumer goods. The import dependence of the Ukrainian economy, in general, is high without any noticeable signs of decline. In 2014–2018, the share of imports of goods and services in GDP in Ukraine averaged 54% (for comparison, in China, this parameter was 19%). In 2018, 55% of Ukraine’s negative balance in trade in goods was due to trade with China. China seeks to conclude FTAs under the OBOR initiative, but in the current context, the liberalization of trade regimes with China will result in Ukraine growing its raw material exports to China and increasing its dependence on Chinese imports. On the other hand, China’s investment, production, research, and technological opportunities can become an important resource for Ukraine to modernize its economy. Promising areas of Chinese investment include high technology, in particular, aviation, shipbuilding, bioengineering, the development of new materials, and more. Ukraine is interested in China’s experience in implementing a number of state programs in the field of innovation development of Chinese industrial enterprises. The support system for clusters, industrial parks, Free Economic Zones (FEZs), and technology parks can be recommended for introduction into Ukrainian legislation in the sphere of developing an innovation structure in Ukraine.
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