In its judgment of the 4th September 1964 the German Federal Court of Justice had to deal with a German-Polish case of murder. The accused persons were members of the German minority in Poland and lived in the Western part of Poland, when German troops occupied that territory in the autumn of 1939. Short after the invasion they killed the members of a Jewish family living in the same territory. Both, the perpetrators as well as the victims were Polish nationals, when the crime was committed. The perpetrators have got the German nationality in the following. It is not clear, whether they have been naturalized by German authorities during WW II, but if not, they were seen as German nationals with the Getting-into-Force of the German Basic Law (Constitution), because they were refugees from Poland to Germany. Therefore, Article 116 § 1 Basic Law naturalized them as German nationals. For the criminal case it was crucial whether the later naturalization can give the German Justice system jurisdiction over a case which happened before the perpetrator has reached the German nationality, as it was (and still is) stated in section 4 (resp. today section 7) of the German Criminal Code. The paper should deal with the implications of this so-called "New Citizenship Clause" and with the circumstances of the case and the following cases at Western German Courts against German people for committing murder in the occupied Polish territories during WWII. Shortly after the named case, the Auschwitz trial started in Frankfurt. On that background, the paper reflects on the situation between West and East Germany as well.
The text explains the role of the Supreme Court in the civil justice system in Germany with reference to a major reform of civil procedure that was enacted in 2001. The reform of access to the Federal Court of Justice aimed at striking a balance between individual justice and public interest. The author discusses the requirements of admissibility of ordinary appeal and appeal on points of law, which may be filed to the Federal Court of Justice. The German legislator has notably renounced the ratione valoris criterion (monetary threshold) and adopted the requirement of the leave to appeal. The power to restrict access to the Supreme Court was conferred on appellate courts. As a consequence, an appeal on points of law may be lodged only if it is admitted by judex a quo. Although the denial of admission is subject to appeal, the text argues that the reasons for admittance ensure that the public interest in uniform adjudication and clarification of law will be duly served.
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