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Francisca de Vitorii uzasadnienie kolonizacji Ameryki z perspektywy rozwoju idei praw naturalnych

100%
Merkwa M.
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio G (Ius)
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2019
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vol. 66
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issue 2
EN
The article presents the way in which Francisco de Vitoria justified the colonization of America. The considerations are based on the assumption that according to Vitoria, the relationship between the Spaniards and the inhabitants of the New World was based on the doctrine of natural powers. For this reason, the concept of the Spanish thinker should be taken considered. Its originality is based primarily on the fact that it used the idea of natural powers to solve current problems, and also let the concept known widely, but treated as an impractical legacy of the Middle Ages, became the basis for law and policy considerations. In this way he paved the way for modern ways of recognizing natural rights and, finally, human rights.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono sposób, w jaki Francisco de Vitoria uzasadniał kolonizację Ameryki. Rozważania podjęte w pracy opierają się na założeniu, że określenie relacji, w jakie mieli wchodzić Hiszpanie i mieszkańcy Nowego Świata, było według Vitorii oparte na doktrynie uprawnień naturalnych. Z tego względu należy się uwaga koncepcji hiszpańskiego myśliciela. Jej oryginalność zasadza się przede wszystkim na tym, iż wykorzystał on ideę uprawnień naturalnych do rozwiązania bieżących problemów, a także pozwolił, by koncepcja powszechnie znana, lecz traktowana jako niepraktyczna spuścizna średniowiecza, stała się podstawą rozważań w zakresie prawa i polityki. Utorował w ten sposób drogę nowożytnym sposobom ujmowania uprawnień naturalnych i w końcu praw człowieka.
2
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Just war against infidels? Similar answers from Central and Western Europe

84%
Díaz B.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2017
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vol. 53
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issue 3
55-75
EN
The aim of this paper is to take a closer look at the similitudes between the ideas of Paweł Włodkowic (Paulus Vladimiri) and Francisco de Vitoria concerning the relations between Christians and infidels, especially on the issue of just war, and to advance a hypothesis to explain such similarities. Both scholars come from “frontier States” in the process of expansion and in close contact with non-Christian peoples. They had therefore direct knowledge of these different human groups. The equality between Christians and infidels, the right of all men to property and self-rule as well as their freedom to accept faith, the idea of a community of mankind, are some of the concepts developed by both thinkers. That is why they have been pointed out as beginners of the modern ius gentium. At the end of the paper, I will advance a hypothesis on the influence of Włodkowic on Vitoria.
3
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Teória spravodlivej vojny Francisca de Vitoriu

71%
Vyšný P.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2021
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vol. 160
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issue 9
759-778
EN
The paper deals with the theory of just war by Francisco de Vitoria. The theory under examination is complex, dealing ius ad bellum, ius in bello and (to a lesser extent) ius post bellum. The theory is characterized by efforts of its authors to promote the understanding of war as ultima ratio of the resolution of interstate conflicts, as well as to ensure that war is conducted effectively, with discipline, only to the extent necessary and only for as long as is really necessary, as well as humanely. According to Vitoria, war was just if it was waged by a legitimate authority (the ruler of the state that suffered harm), if there was demonstrably a just cause for it (iusta causa; harm caused by one state to another state) and if it was waged with the right intent (appropriate punishment of the enemy for causing harm) as well as in the correct way, i. e. in accordance with certain rules or restrictions.
4
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Přirozená subjektivní práva mezi středověkem a novověkem

30%
Šejvl M.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2017
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vol. 156
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issue 5
416-452
EN
This article focuses on different conceptions of natural rights in scholars of the high Middle Ages (Henry of Ghent,Duns Scotus, Ockham,Marsilius of Padua,Gerson, Summenhart) and of early Modernity (Vitoria, Suárez,Grotius). First the opinions of these scholars’ on natural law are presented, then their „definitions“ of ius as right, their use of permissive natural law and finally their conceptions of natural rights are analysed (natural right to private property is used to demonstrate the last point). Instead of the „dividing line“ between medieval and modern ideas on natural rights the paper argues for the continuity that lies in the fact that the same or similar concepts are reinterpreted and used to build new theoretical constructions. It tries to show that various natural „rights“ (in Henry of Ghent, Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham) are in fact Hohfeldian liberties and not Hohfeldian claims and in this sense they are not rights. It criticizes the thesis which is still common (at least in the Czech and Slovak literature) that natural rights theories were triggered by the development of metaphysical nominalism and voluntarism in the high Middle Ages. Instead it tries to find reasons for the development of particular natural rights theories in various ways the scholars reacted on the particular problems of their times.
CS
Tento článek se pokouší zmapovat různé názory na přirozená práva myslitelů vrcholného středověku (Jindřich z Gentu, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Marsilius z Padovy, Gerson, Summenhart) a raného novověku (Vitoria, Suárez,Grotius) tak, že nejdříve představí jejich názory na přirozené objektivní právo, jejich vymezení ius jakožto subjektivního práva, operace s permisivním přirozeným objektivním právem a konečně jejich koncepce přirozených práv (k jejichž demonstraci používá především právo na soukromé vlastnictví). Místo někdy postulovaného předělu mezi středověkem a novověkem ukazuje naopak kontinuitu v názorech, která podle autora spočívá v tom, že často stejné či podobné koncepty jsou různými autory reinterpretovány a použity v nových kontextech. Ukazuje, že přirozená „práva“ u některých myslitelů (Jindřich z Gentu,Marsilius, Ockham) nejsou hohfeldovskými nároky (claims), a tedy subjektivními právy, ale hohfeldovskými volnostmi (liberties). Kritizuje také (minimálně v tuzemské literatuře převládající) tradiční přístup hledající spojitost mezi koncepcemi přirozených práv a nástupem metafyzického nominalismu či voluntarismu. Naopak hledá důvody pro partikulární rozvinutí koncepce přirozených práv v tom, jak zde představení myslitelé reagují na problémy, které před ně postavila doba, v níž žili.
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