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Lidská morálka a morálka u zvířat

100%

Kocourek D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 3

525-543

EN

The text examines the question as to whether (non-human) animals can be moral. The starting point of the discussion is Frans de Waal’s critique of veneer theory, which is here identified as being a false dichotomy that misses the possibility that morality could be something different than natural, instinctive behaviour, but at the same time not conflict with such behaviour. This is the view of morality that the text advocates. After a brief presentation of some of the other authors engaged in the debate about animal morality (e.g., Korsgaard or Bekoff and Pierce), the author suggests a criterion to distinguish a proper morality from mere pro-social behaviour: this criterion is cultural variability. The key difference between human moral behaviour and animal “moral” behaviour is that human moral norms vary greatly across different cultures or time periods, while in animals – as far as we know – they stay the same for any community of a given species.

CS

Text se zabývá otázkou, zda má smysl mluvit o existenci morálky u zvířat. Vychází z kritiky teorie pozlátka Franse de Waala, která je zde identifikována jako falešná dichotomie opomíjející možnost, že by morálka mohla být něco jiného než přirozené, instinktivní chování, přičemž by zároveň s takovým chováním nebyla v rozporu. Právě takový pohled na podstatu morálky ovšem text obhajuje. Po stručném představení několika dalších autorů věnujících se otázce zvířecí morálky (např. Korsgaardová či Bekoff a Pierceová) autor navrhuje kritérium vymezující rozdíl mezi skutečnou morálkou a pouhým pro-sociálním chováním: tímto kritériem je kulturní variabilita. Klíčový rozdíl mezi lidským morálním chováním a zvířecím „morálním“ chováním spočívá v tom, že lidské morální normy se výrazně liší napříč jednotlivými kulturami a časovými obdobími, zatímco ty zvířecí – jak se zdá – zůstávají stejné pro všechny komunity daného živočišného druhu.

2

Nie-ludzkie emocje

85%

Cygan M. B.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2021

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issue 71

225-236

EN

This article is a review of Frans de Waal's book Mama's Lust Hugs. Animal Emotions and what They Tell Us about Ourselves, which was released in Polnad in 2019. The book deals with the problem of animal emotionality. One of the conclusions reached by the author and which was emphasized in the review is the thesis that there is no such thing as unique human emotions that animals would not have. Emotions are universal; they are shared both by humans and animals. The review noted that although the book is interesting, it is not new in terms of content, because it deals with issues that de Waal wrote about many times in his earlier publications. On the other hand, thanks to the collection and inclusion in one book of the issues related to emotionality in animals, the publication can be a good starting point for reflection not only on animals (their emotionality and rights), but also on humans and their place in the world. It puts the reader in facing the question of human nature. For this reason, what has been tried to show in the review, Frans de Waal's book is a good example of how scientific issues lead to philosophical reflections.

3

What Is Moral Competence and Why Promote It?

57%

Nowak E.

Ethics in Progress

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2016

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vol. 7

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issue 1

322-333

EN

This short review paper focuses on Georg Lind's approach to the moral competence as described in his recent book (2016) How To Teach Morality? Promoting Deliberation and Discussion, Reducing Violence and Deceit. Berlin: Logos Verlag. Lind's dual-aspect approach is discussed as one of the leading conceptions of personal moral competence and moral cognition today. Intuitionist approach and "embodied cognition" are not enough, the author (E. Nowak) claims. As participants of social contexts and institutions, we need manifest, discoursively articulated reflection, self-reflection, and conversation. However, Lind's hypothesis of two leyers of morality, i.e., a conscious and unconscious finds evidence in cognitive sciences too. Lind's approach is not as reductionist as that of radical cognitivists. On the contrary, it combines all relevant aspects of moral cognition discussed right now, worldwide – when cognitive sciences flourish and the challenges for moral mind grow up dramatically.

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1 Ethics in Progress

1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

1 Cygan M. B.

1 Kocourek D.

1 Nowak E.

2 2021

1 2016

Lidská morálka a morálka u zvířat

Nie-ludzkie emocje

What Is Moral Competence and Why Promote It?