Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help

  1. 2 Avant

Authors help

  1. 2 Górski J.

Years help

  1. 2 2016

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Górski Jan
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Awareness of Self Attention (translated by Krzysztof Gajda)

100%
Górski J.
Avant
|
2016
|
vol. 7
|
issue 3
EN
Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the ex- pression “sense of self” is more natural than saying “representing” or even “im- agining one’s self”. It is also easier and neater to talk in French about “sentiment du moi” than “representation du moi”; the expression “das Ichgefühl” is less grating than “die Ichvorstellung”, the latter being rather used to mean the con- ceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image. [...]
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Awareness of Self Attention (translated by Krzysztof Gajda)

100%
Górski J.
Avant
|
2016
|
vol. 7
|
issue 3
EN
Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the ex- pression “sense of self” is more natural than saying “representing” or even “im- agining one’s self”. It is also easier and neater to talk in French about “sentiment du moi” than “representation du moi”; the expression “das Ichgefühl” is less grating than “die Ichvorstellung”, the latter being rather used to mean the con- ceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image. [...]
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.