Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  GREAT PURGE
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FAR EASTERN CONCENTRATION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES AT THE EXTENDED SESSION OF THE WAR COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENCE OF THE USSR , 1-4 JUNE 1937

100%
Wojtkowiak J.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2006
|
issue 2
3-30
EN
A session of the War Council of the People's Commissar for Defence of the USSR, the highest supreme collegiate agency of the Red Army, held in Moscow at the beginning of June 1937, remains one of the most significant events in the history of the Great Purge carried out within the Soviet officer corps. It was upon this occasion that official information was given about the detention of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevski and other high ranking Red Army commanders accused of espionage in cooperation with foreign military Intelligence aimed against the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state. The article, based on documents in Russian archives, primarily a stenographic record of the War Council session, presents and analyses the declarations made upon that occasion by representatives of the Far Eastern Concentration of the Soviet Armed Forces - the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army, the Trans-Baikal Military District, and the Pacific Fleet. Similarly to the rest of the Soviet military elite, none of the participants, headed by Marshal Vasilii Blyukher (Blucher) ), commander of the Special Far Eastern Army, undermined the thesis about the existence of a 'military-fascist conspiracy' within the Red Army, or the guilt of Marshal Tukhachevsky and his comrades. Blucher himself agreed to join a special Military Tribunal which issued death sentences several days after the War Council debates ended. Everyone condemned the accused, whom Stalin and the NKVD regarded as 'enemies of the people'. Some of the representatives of the Far Eastern Concentration, such as Commodore Ivan Fedko, former commander of the Maritime Group under the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army, denounced consecutive officers as potential participants of the mythical conspiracy. The further fate of the commanders and members of the war councils of the Far Eastern Concentration of the Soviet Armed Forces proves that the contents of the declarations made by them at the June session did not exert greater impact upon their future. All, with the exception of the future Marshal Kiril Meretskov, former Chief of Staff of the Special Far Eastern Army, accused at the session of links with 'enemies of the people', became the victims of the Great Purge.
2

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF THE SOVIET 'GREAT PURGE' IN THE POLISH PRESS (1936-1938)

100%
Tokarz T.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2004
|
issue 4
47-57
EN
The so-called 'Great Purge' taking place in the Soviet Union in 1936-1938 stirred great interest in the Polish press, which published assorted interpretations of the origin of Stalinist terror. One of its interpretation perceived Soviet terror as the outcome of Stalin's intentional steps towards the realisation of select targets. The majority of the journalists drew attention to the fact that the heart of the matter involved predominantly the organisation of an apparatus of power in order to safeguard the authority enjoyed by Stalin and to expand its range. This was the reason for the elimination of those who posed a threat to the dictator. Others indicated that repressions served as a tool for attaining further reaching objectives: the construction of a totalistic-bureaucratic centralised state ( perceived as a symptom of Thermidor, the end of the revolution) or a nationalisation or, more precisely, Russification of Bolshevism. According to the deterministic interpretations of the sources of terror it was to have been a product of the specific social, political and historical conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union. The Catholic press frequently indicated that Stalinist terror constituted a logical consequence of the implementation of the premises of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, the democratic press maintained that the bloody events in the Soviet Union sprung from the dictator-totalitarian nature of the local authorities. Another characteristic feature of the Polish press was interpreting the terror of 1936-1938 as an outcome of the impact exerted by Russian political tradition.
3

THE SOVIET 'GREAT PURGE' IN THE OPINIONS OF GERMAN EMIGRÉ WRITERS (1936-1939)

100%
Jedynakiewicz K.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2004
|
issue 2
73-92
EN
A discussion of the evolving stand of the German anti-Nazi émigrés towards the 'great purge' in the Soviet Union in 1936-1939 is presented. To the mid-1930s the Soviet 'experiment' enjoyed the interest of leftist and liberal groups among the German intelligentsia. The achievements of the Soviet Union were confronted with the economic breakdown in the West and the growing political crisis in the Weimar Republic. After the NSDAP came to power, the German opponents of Hitler placed their hope in a change in the foreign policy of the Kremlin. Particular expectations were inspired by the conception of 'people's fronts', formally accepted at a Comintern Congress in 1935. Due to the above mentioned tendencies the political trials held in the Soviet Union became for the German refugees a test of ethical and world outlook stances. Many émigrés failed to tackle the moral challenge. In the name of preserving an illusory unity of the refugee milieu its members either avoided an open criticism of Soviet reality (Thomas Mann) or directly ( Bertolt Brecht, Heinrich Mann) or indirectly (Lion Feuchtwanger) defended the official interpretation of the trials. Another frequent stand was passive observation of the undertakings pursued by the Kremlin (Klaus Mann). The critics of the Soviet 'purge' (Leopold Schwarzschild), who regarded the events in Russia to be a confirmation of the impossibility of cooperating with émigré members of the German Communist Party, found themselves in a minority. Even communist dissidents (Arthur Koestler, Manes Sperber) did not openly criticise the Soviet Union until the signing of the Stalin-Hitler pact, i. e. after 23 August 1939.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.