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1

EPISTEMIC VALUE OF MUSIC

100%
Bakalova M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 2
303 – 325
EN
Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressiveness has epistemic value. The article has six parts. In the first part, I provide examples of what music can express. I suggest that it can express inner states with phenomenal character. In the second part, I build up an argument in favour of the claim that, granted its expressiveness, music can convey conceptual content which is not verbal, and which cannot be expressed verbally. This conclusion is limited to concepts like lyrical, nostalgic, melancholy, joyful, distressful etc. In the third part, I explain what musical expressive content is, in contrast and by analogy to, propositional content. In the fourth part, I apply Mitchell Green’s multi-space model of artistic expression to music. I argue that Green’s theory of expression provides a powerful explanation of how a musical sequence can express states with phenomenal character. In the fifth part, I use that model to define adequacy conditions for musical expressive ascriptions. In the last part, I attempt to explain musical knowledge by combining Green’s multi-space model with Sosa-style virtue epistemology.
2

MUST EXPRESSION BE INSTRUMENTAL?

100%
Bäckström S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 2
282 – 302
EN
This article engages critically with the theory of expression proposed by Mitchell Green in his Self-Expression (2007). In this book, Green argues that expressions are signals designed to convey information about mental states. By putting pressure on one of the examples Green uses in his book, I will challenge this thesis. Then I will deepen this challenge by developing a contrast between two philosophical perspectives on expression, which I name the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘descriptive’. I take Green’s theory of expression to be an exemple of the instrumental perspective. Expression, in the instrumental perspective, is a means for transmitting information about mental states from organism to organism. I articulate the descriptive perspective with the help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ludwig Wittgenstein. On the descriptive view, expression is (at least a part of) an answer to the question what it is so much as to have mental states and a living body. I suggest at the end of the article that if we remain within the instrumental perspective, we will not be able to use expression to satisfactorily answer this question.
3

SELF-EXPRESSION IN SPEECH ACTS

86%
Witek M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 2
326 – 359
EN
Inn this paper my aim is to examine Mitchell S. Green’s notion of self-expression and the role it plays in his model of illocutionary communication. The paper is organized into three parts. In Section 2, after discussing Green’s notions of illocutionary speaker meaning and self-expression, I consider the contribution that self-expression makes to the mechanisms of intentional communication; in particular, I introduce the notion of proto-illocutionary speaker meaning and argue that it is necessary to account for acts overtly showing general commitments that are not ‘marked’ as being specific to one or another illocutionary force. In Section 3, I focus on Green’s account of expressive norms and argue that their function is to stabilize rather than constitute the structure of illocutionary signalling systems; moreover, I examine critically Green’s idea according to which expressive norms enable us to indicate the force of our speech acts and suggest that they play a key role in the mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Finally, in Section 4, I elaborate on the idea of discourse-constituted thoughts—or, in other words, thoughts that exist in virtue of being expressed in making certain conversation-bound speech acts—and use it to develop a more comprehensive model of the expressive dimension of speech acts.
4

COMMON GROUND, CONVERSATIONAL ROLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

86%
Bräuer F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 2
399 – 419
EN
People partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In doing so, I am going to focus on two kinds of speech acts: making assertions and asking certain kinds of questions. And I am going to look at three varieties of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, inquiring injustice and interpretative injustice. I am going to argue that what all these varieties of epistemic injustice have in common is that they unfairly inhibit the speaker’s ability to add to the common ground in the way intended by her. This in turn negatively affects which conversational roles a speaker can play in a given conversation. Based on these results, I am going to end by looking at some of the harms that epistemic injustice inflicts upon its victims.
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