Substantive regulations of the said Council of Europe Convention are critically examined, and compared to the earlier UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979. History of the adoption of the text appears to be a factor for the contents. Discussions in the Czech Republic so far have been centred around the question whether the Istanbul Convention does or does not imply changes in applicable national law. This author, however, sees as a main problem not the substantive rules of the Convention, but rather its Monitoring mechanism, notably the GREVIO. Future evaluations and requirements by the Monitoring mechanism are not predictable which is due to the poorness of substantive regulations; the author’s conclusion is, the Istanbul Convention should never be ratified.
CS
Kriticky se zkoumají materiální ustanovení Istanbulské úmluvy a porovnávají se se starší úmluvou OSN o odstranění všech forem diskriminace žen („CEDAW“, 1979). Historie přijetí textu se jeví jako faktor jejího obsahu. Diskuse v ČR se až dosud koncentrují na otázku, zda Istanbulská úmluva vyžaduje anebo nevyžaduje provedení změn v našem platném právu. Autor ale hlavní problém vidí nikoliv v materiálních ustanoveních úmluvy, nýbrž v jejím kontrolním mechanismu, zejména v GREVIO. Budoucí hodnocení a požadavky kontrolního mechanismu nejsou předvídatelné, a to v důsledku nedostatečných materiálních ustanovení; autorův závěr je, že Istanbulská úmluva by neměla být ratifikována vůbec.
The article focuses on issues related to ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. It includes an analysis of constitutionality of the Convention itself and, then, of an international monitoring mechanism of its implementation (The Group of experts on action against violence against women and domestic violence, “GREVIO”). It also examines the possibility of ratification of the Convention without prior ratification of international law instruments referred to in its Preamble (e.g. the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse). In the author’s view, the Convention does not contain any provisions inconsistent with the Constitution. However, he claims that proper interpretation of this document requires analysis of its authentic texts in English and French. He does not find it necessary to accede to other international agreements specified in the Preamble of the Convention, since the Convention is a comprehensive and autonomous instrument whose proper application does not depend on implementation of other acts.
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