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1

Some Problems With Judging Rationality

100%

Swistak P.

Decyzje

|

2015

|

issue 23

5-22

PL

The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make.

2

Sociological Game Theory: Agency, Social Structures and Interaction Processes

75%

Burns T. R., Roszkowska E., Corte U., Machado N.

Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne

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2017

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vol. 5(89)

EN

Game theory can be viewed as an important contribution to multi-agent modeling, with widespread applications in economics and other social sciences. This paper presents two distinct approaches to extending – sociologizing – classical game theory: firstly, a system/institutional approach – social science game theory (SGT), and secondly, Erving Goffman’s interactionist approach (I-game theory). The two approaches are presented and compared; they are also contrasted with the classical theory. The article ends by concluding that due to the social science game theory, sociologists and social scientists are no longer forced into the classical straightjacket with its hyper-rationality, anomic players, and the absence of any social fabric (institutional and cultural formations). Moreover, the new game theory offers a reliable toolbox of social science concepts and methods for describing, analyzing, and explaining highly diverse interaction phenomena. We claim that those two approaches have already proved themselves useful for investigating and modeling a variety of interaction processes including cooperation, conflict, and negotiation.

3

Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations

75%

Sokolovskyi D. B., Sokolovska O. V.

Management and Business Administration. Central Europe

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2015

|

issue 3

47-70

EN

Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.

Refine search results

1 Decyzje

1 Management and Business Administration. Central Europe

1 Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne

1 Burns T. R.

1 Corte U.

1 Machado N.

1 Roszkowska E.

1 Sokolovska O. V.

1 Sokolovskyi D. B.

1 Swistak P.

1 2017

2 2015

Some Problems With Judging Rationality

Sociological Game Theory: Agency, Social Structures and Interaction Processes

Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations