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EN
My aim in the present paper is to challenge an established doctrine according to which Leibniz conceives of causation – in sharp contrast to Hume – in terms of a sort of the so-called hypothetical necessity, to the effect that causation involves a hypothetical necessitation a parte rei explicable in terms of purely conceptual connections. I argue that as far as one can tell from the direct textual evidence, Leibniz's concept of causation can be interpreted as coming surprisingly close to an essentially Humean view according to which far from implying any necessities a parte rei, conceptual connections impose necessity only on our thought while in reality causation involves only regularities in the conjunction of contiguous objects. Then I try to reconcile this claim with the well-documented fact that within the larger framework of Leibniz's theory of truth and his principle of suffi cient reason, Leibniz was indeed committed to a 'necessitarian' position – in the sense that every item in the actual world is, after all, a matter of hypothetical necessity in rebus (or nearly so) – and that he was prepared to integrate causes into this larger picture. My point will be that the apparent confl ict between these two views is due to our failure to distinguish the analytic task concerning causation from various explanatory tasks in which causation is involved.
EN
The Application of the Leibniz’s Dialogical Method in the Correspondence with Clarke In the annotated Czech translation of Leibniz’s dialogue Pacidius Philalethi, which was published in 2019, but also in an earlier essay by the same translator on Leibniz’s dialogic way of writing as well as in other interpretations, there is little discussion of the practical implications of his dialogic method. Leibniz’s dialogical argumentation strategy, as he later applied it in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke, is therefore either completely neglected or is referred to as being typical of the time, or alternatively is confused with Zeno’s dialectical method. Thus, the aim of this study is to clarify the practical implications of Leibniz’s application of the dialogic method in his final correspondence with Clarke.
CS
V komentovaném českém překladu Leibnizova dialogu Pacidius Philalethi, který vyšel v roce 2019, jakož i v dřívějším pojednání téhož překladatele o Leibnizově dialogickém způsobu psaní, ale i v dalších výkladech se o praktických důsledcích Leibnizovy dialogické metody lze dočíst jen málo. Leibnizova dialogická argumentační strategie, jak ji posléze aplikoval ještě i při korespondenci s Clarkem, tak zůstává buď zcela opomenuta, nebo bývá označována za dobově typickou, případně zaměňována s dialektickou metodou Zénónovou. Cílem této studie je proto objasnit praktické důsledky Leibnizovy aplikace dialogické metody při jeho závěrečné korespondenci s Clarkem.
DE
Das Thema des Artikels betrifft die Grundlagen von Leibniz’ sog. „nominalistischem“ Standpunkt, dem zufolge in der geschaffenen Welt keine abstrakten Dinge (res) existieren. Im Aufsatz werden allmählich Leibniz’ Begriffe des Konkreten und Abstrakten rekonstruiert (Abteilung I), die Argumente für seine „nominalistische“ Position diskutiert (Abteilung II) und die erzielten Ergebnisse im weiteren Rahmen seines Denkens untergeordnet (Abteilung III). In der I. Abteilung zeigt der Verfasser, dass Leibniz Abstrakta auf der Grundlage der Inhärenz-Relation zu definieren versucht. Daraufhin werden seine Versuche diskutiert, den genauen Funktionsrahmen dieser Relation zu bestimmen. Schließlich folgert der Autor, dass seine Konzeption abstrakter und konkreter Dinge wesentlich an die Problematik des Grundes a parte rei für wahrheitsgemäße Prädikationen gebunden ist. In der II. Abteilung werden zwei Typen von Leibniz’ Argumentation für seine „nominalistische“ Position analysiert. Der erste Typ gründet sich auf den Nachweis der Fatalität eines bestimmten unendlichen Regresses, den die Voraussetzung einer aktualen Existenz abstrakter Dinge impliziert. Das Argument des zweiten Typs wird in der Art einer reductio ad absurdum der in Frage gestellten Voraussetzung geführt. Nichtsdestotrotz zeigt der Verfasser, dass letzteres doch von der Argumentation des ersten Typs abhängig ist, die von daher als fundierend bezeichnet werden muss. In der III. Abteilung macht der Autor auf den provisorischen Charakter von Leibniz’ „Nominalismus“ aufmerksam und dann bringt er diesen „Nominalismus“ in eine wesentliche Beziehung zu Leibniz’ Ablehnung der aktualen Existenz allgemeiner Gegenstände.
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Jakým relacionalistou byl Leibniz?

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EN
In this paper, I am trying to challenge the mainstream interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics of space, introduced in his letters to an English scholar Samuel Clarke. Based on the correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz’s metaphysics of space is usually considered to be a sharp counterpart to Clarke’s as well as Newton’s one. However, in this paper I am pointing out that this interpretation becomes untenable, especially considering Leibniz’s geometry called “analysis situs”. Leibniz did not defend a typically relational conception of space.
CS
V rámci tohoto příspěvku se pokusím zpochybnit dosavadní mainstreamovou interpretaci Leibnizovy metafyziky prostoru, jak ji představil v dopisech anglickému učenci Samuelu Clarkovi. Přestože bývá Leibnizova metafyzika prostoru právě na základě jeho korespondence s Clarkem obvykle považována za ostrý protipól metafyziky Clarkovy, respektive Newtonovy, v rámci tohoto příspěvku poukážu na to, že při zvážení Leibnizovy geometrie zvané „analysis situs“ se taková interpretace stává neudržitelnou. Leibnize nelze považovat za zastánce typicky relačního pojetí prostoru.
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Leibniz and the First Law of Thermodynamics

89%
EN
The article presents the German philosopher G. W. Leibniz as a key precursor of the First Law of Thermodynamics. In this way, Leibniz tried to oppose Newton, who seems to have completely rejected the First Law of Thermodynamics, while at the same time remarkably anticipating the Second. Based on his polemics not only with Newton, from whose Laws of Motion thermodynamics originates, and with his advocate Samuel Clarke, but also with René Descartes, whose conception Leibniz partially followed, Leibniz’s reasoning turns out to be the most convincing. It is certainly no coincidence that the later founders of thermodynamics frequently acknowledged him.
CS
Článek představuje německého filosofa G. W. Leibnize jakožto klíčového předchůdce prvního termodynamického zákona. Leibniz se totiž touto cestou pokoušel oponovat zejména Newtonovi, jenž první termodynamický zákon patrně zcela odmítal, zatímco současně pozoruhodně předjímal druhý. Na základě polemiky nejen s Newtonem, z jehož pohybových zákonů přitom termodynamika skutečně vychází, resp. s jeho obhájcem Samuelem Clarkem, jakož i s René Descartem, na jehož pojetí Leibniz částečně navazoval, se však Leibnizova argumentace ukáže být vůbec nejpřesvědčivější. Jistě tudíž není náhodou, že se pozdější zakladatelé termodynamiky nezřídka hlásili právě k němu.
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PL
Leibniz's idea of creation is best epitomized by a note written by him on the margin of his work entitled 'Dialogus'. The note reads:'When God thinks things through and calculates, the world is made'. Simple calculations are almost mechanical. The true mathematical thinking begins when one is confronted with a problem that has to be solved, when starting from the known mathematical structure one has to construct a new structure, to comprehend its intricacies, the ways of its functioning, and its connections with other mathematical structures. And when one successfully applies the new mathematical structure to a physical theory, the new world is made. This was Leibniz's experience when he was discovering calculus and tried to apply it to mechanical problems. Leibniz's doctrine that our world is the best of all possible words is often ridiculed, but this attitude is the result of a very superficial reading of Leibniz's texts. In fact, God's calculations to choose the best possible world are similar to solving the variational problem in mathematics. Leibniz claims that in mathematical reasoning if there is neither 'maximum' nor 'minimum' nothing can happen. Similarly, if there were no world better that other possible worlds, God's wisdom would have not been able to create anything. Some consequences of this doctrine, concerning the nature of space, time and causality, are also considered.
EN
This article deals with the ways Voltaire makes references in his texts to the philosophical thought of Leibniz. To achieve maximum coherence, this paper only discusses those writings by Voltaire that most directly refer to the Leibnizian issues. These are primarily Poem on the Lisbon Disaster and the philosophical tale Candide, or Optimism. The article critically examines various aspects of Leibniz’s philosophy, such as the theory of pre-established harmony and the concept of monads, and above all the notion of the best possible universe. Moreover, selected aspects of Voltaire’s and Leibniz’s thoughts are compared. For the purpose of consistent analysis, the article primarily focuses on those features in the German philosopher’s system that were particularly questioned by the author of Candide.
PL
Our present knowledge in the field of dynamical systems, information theory, probability theory and other similar domains indicates that the human brain is a complex dynamical system working in a strong chaotic regime in which random processes play important roles. In this environment our mental life develops. To choose a logically ordered sequence from a random or almost random stream of thoughts is a difficult and energy consuming task. The only domain in which we are able to do this with a full success is mathematics. Leibniz’s life ambition was to extend this success, with the help of what he called characteristica universalis, to other areas of human activity. The belief that this is possible lies at the basis of Leibniz’s rationalist system. Reasoning within his system, Leibniz claimed that also fundamental laws of physics can be deduced from the “first principles”. Just as linguistic or conceptual units are at the basis of the charactersistica universalis, his monads are responsible for physical activity of material bodies. When this rationalistic strategy is applied to the philosophy of space and time, it leads to their radically relational conception. Leibniz’s rationalistic approach to philosophy and science arouses out sympathy but it was Newton’s mathematical-empirical method that turned out to be effective in human endeavour to understand the functioning of the physical world. Successes of the Newtonian method  compel us to revise our concept of rationality.
EN
The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s The Monadology. There are many similarities and analogies between those works, and the key concept for them is the category of the inner and acknowledged importance of consideration based on basic categories of thinking about the world. The Leibnizian prospect allows for a broader look at Wittgenstein’s analysis of the relation between propositions and facts, between language and the world. Using the Hanoverian philosopher’s terminology allows for the demonstration of the ambivalence of the concept of logical form in the philosophy of Wittgenstein and also the metaphysical nature of his first book.
PL
The article concerns the metaphysical problem of divine will as it is discussed in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Its essence can be expressed in the following question: in which way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of freedom in action and deciding? Leibniz is convinced that there is no contradiction between these two theses. Clarke is strongly opposed to that view. He is the protagonist of indeterminism. The article is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the divine will in relation to the principle of the sufficient reason. The second part points to some difficulties related to Leibniz's view on determinism.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2017
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vol. 65
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issue 2
5-21
EN
The aim of this paper is to set out the following: firstly, the most important facts from Leibniz’s biography; secondly, the position of Leibniz’s philosophy within the philosophical thought of the 17th century; thirdly, the diverse ways to explicate Leibniz’s philosophical thought that are still in use in literature today; fourthly, basic features which define the general spirit as well as the methods of Leibniz’s philosophizing.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie, po pierwsze, najistotniejszych faktów z bio¬gra¬fii Leibniza; po drugie, miejsca filozofii Leibniza w ramach myśli filozoficznej wieku XVII; po trze¬cie, głównych trendów interpretacyjnych jego pism, czynnych do dzisiaj w literaturze histo¬rycznofilozoficznej; po czwarte, podstawowych cech, które określą zarówno postawę filozoficzną Leibniza, jak też przyjęty przezeń sposób filozofowania.
EN
In this article we will analyze Andreas Wissowatius’s arguments which were presented in the discussion between two eminent thinkers: the Polish Socinian and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibinz, a German philosopher of the Enlightenment, in the late seventeenth century. This exchange of views makes it possible to observe the philosophical premises that led Andreas Wissowatius to reject the dogma of the Holy Trinity. The discussion, from which the Antitrinitarians arguments were quoted, became very well known among European theologians and philosophers, mainly due to the reputation which was decades later enjoyed by Leibniz. The discussion became known in Germany thanks to Lessing who was an editor and commentator of the dispute about the Holy Trinity as well as an advocate of tolerance, and a German writer of the Enlightenment.
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