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EN
This article is a comment on Wlodek Rabinowicz Utilitarianism by Way of Preference Change?, in which I defend Richard Hare's argument for utilitarianism. I argue that Hare's role reversal thought experiments can, despite of Rabinowicz's criticism, lead to transforming interpersonal preference conflicts into intrapersonal ones, but, in order to achieve this, we need to interpret his thought experiment correctly. I distinguish three interpretation of reversing roles experiment and argue, that for at least two of them, which de facto Hare endorse, Rabinowicz criticism fails.
EN
This paper is a translation of my Preference Utilitarianism by Way of Preference Change?, in which I revisit Richard Hare's classical and much discussed argument for preference utilitarianism (Moral Thinking, 1981), which relies on the conception of moral deliberation as a process of thought experimentation, with concomitant preference change. The paper focuses on an apparent gap in Hare's reasoning, the so-called No-Conflict Problem. A solution to this difficulty which was proposed in (Rabinowicz, Strömberg, 1996) is re-examined and shown to lead to a number of difficulties, not least in connection with the choice of an appropriate measure of distance between preference states. The paper therefore also considers an alternative idea, due to Daniel Elstein. This new proposal may well turn out to be the best way of filling the gap in Hare's argument. The paper also examines whether the gap is there to begin with: The problem should perhaps be dissolved rather than solved. This suggestion goes back to an idea of Zeno Vendler (1988). Unfortunately, it turns out that Vendler's move does not save Hare from criticism: It does dissolve the No-Conflict Problem, but at the same time gives rise to another, potentially more serious difficulty.
EN
In Thought Experiments and Utilitarianism, which is a comment on my Utilitarianism by Way of Preference Change?, Krzysztof Saja delineates three alternative ways in which one might interpret Richard Hare's famous thought experiments involving role reversals. He suggests that each of them would underwrite Hare's claim that moral deliberation transforms an interpersonal conflict of preferences into an intrapersonal one, which obtains between the deliberator's own preferences. In this reply to Saja (Role Reversals), I discuss the three proposals in turn and argue that the first two do not solve the problem. The third one, which was already considered in my original paper, is based on Zeno Vendler's suggestion that role reversals in moral thought-experiments are merely different 'takes' on one and the same real situation, as seen from different subjective perspectives. I argue that, in order to succeed in transforming interpersonal preference conflicts into intrapersonal ones, this proposal requires equating empathy, i.e. putting oneself in someone else's shoes, with sympathy, which Hare would not be prepared to do.
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