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HEMPEL’S DILEMMA AND RESEARCH PROGRAMMES: WHY ADDING STANCES IS NOT A BOON

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Prelević D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2017

vol. 24

issue 4

487 – 510

Hempel’s Dilemma is intended to force physicalists to make an unfavourable choice between the current physics and a future physical theory. The problem with the first horn of the dilemma is related to the fact that current physics is, strictly speaking, inconsistent, while the problem with its second horn is that we do not know how a future, completed physical theory will look like. In this paper, the two strategies of avoiding the dilemma are compared and assessed: the attitudinal approach, according to which physicalism is a stance or an attitude, and Lakatosian approach, according to which physicalism is best understood as a research programme. It is argued that the latter approach ought to be preferred over the former approach because, among other things, it better explains how some physicalists and their opponents sometimes switch the sides, as well as why different physicalists undertake different activities within a given time interval.

THERE IS A QUESTION OF PHYSICALISM

70%

Dahan O.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2019

vol. 26

issue 4

542 - 571

The most common catchphrase of physicalism is: “everything is physical”. According to Hempel’s Dilemma, however, physicalism is an ill-formed thesis because it can offer no account of the physics to which it refers: current physics will definitely be revised in the future, and we do not yet know the nature of future physics. The dilemma arises due to our difficulty to set the boundaries of the concept ‘physical.’ In order to confront the dilemma, a physicalist must ensure that physics is not going to broaden itself artificially (or in some trivial way) to become complete—perhaps by adding non-reductive mental entities to elementary physical theory, making it impossible to distinguish physicalism from dualism. I offer a solution to the dilemma which is a version of the ‘via negativa’ (standardly taken to be a stipulation that the physical not include the mental), albeit one that is specified and worked out in a distinctive way. My suggested formulation of the physicalist hypothesis allows us to establish a refutation condition of physicalism. The refutation condition is general and not only dualistic. Consequently, the physicalist can choose the second horn of the dilemma, and hold that physicalism is indeed refutable (and not a trivial thesis).

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2 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 Dahan O.

1 Prelević D.

1 2019

1 2017

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HEMPEL’S DILEMMA AND RESEARCH PROGRAMMES: WHY ADDING STANCES IS NOT A BOON

THERE IS A QUESTION OF PHYSICALISM