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1

HEMPELOVE ŠTANDARDNÉ PRÍKLADY NA NEKAUZÁLNU EXPLANÁCIU VO SVETLE SKOWOVEJ TEÓRIE KAUZÁLNEJ EXPLANÁCIE

100%
Makovník D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2022
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vol. 77
|
issue 5
311 – 324
EN
The paper attempts to respond to some possible objections that could be raised by Skow’s theory of explanation against the two standard examples of non-causal explanation given by Hempel. If these objections would prevail the two standard non-causal examples could be reconstructed as causal explanations. In this paper it is argued that this kind of reconstruction is not possible. The article starts with a detailed analysis of Skow’s theory of causal explanation. Subsequently it tries to show that each of Hempel’s examples put up against the potential objections that could be given in terms of Skow’s theory is ultimately resistant to these objections. Finally, the paper’s conclusion is that Skow’s theory although an interesting approach for reconstructing causal explanations fails as an adequate framework for reconstructing Hempel’s standard examples of non-causal explanation.
2

NEKAUZÁLNA EXPLANÁCIA: HEMPELOVE DEDIČSTVO A JEHO MODERNÉ PODOBY

100%
Makovník D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
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vol. 76
|
issue 10
752 – 765
EN
This paper not only summarizes Hempel`s analysis of the D-N model that shows how it is possible for the covering-law model to provide both a causal account of particular facts and a non-casual one, but also offers four prominent examples of non-causal explanation. Subsequently a detailed analysis of the examples shows that there is a common denominator between these examples: the presence of a law that describes an empirical system in its atemporal state. But the paper also shows what differences are there in the applicability of the laws in the given explanations. Finally, it reviews the evolution of the conception of non-causal explanation with respect to the discussed examples.
3

COMMENTS ON GIACOMO BORBONE’S BOOK THE RELEVANCE OF MODELS. IDEALIZATION AND CONCRETIZATION IN LESZEK NOWAK

88%
Hanzel I.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
|
vol. 30
|
issue 2
163 – 164
EN
Chapter II of Borbone’s book addresses Nowak’s innovative views and reconstruction of the methods used in Marx’s economic works, namely, Marx’s delineation of the law of value, as well as Marx’s explanation based on this law as performed by the method of gradual concretization. In Chapter III, Borbone provides a comparison of Nowak’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation with that of Hempel. From that comparison Nowak’s approach comes out as superior to that of Hempel due to the former’s ability to reconstruct laws containing equations, the possibility to address the issue of the explanation of a scientific law from other scientific laws, as well as a more fine-grained view on the very nature scientific explanation.
4

NEUKONČENÝ PROJEKT TRANSPARENTNEJ INTENZIONÁLNEJ LOGIKY

75%
Hanzel I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
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vol. 74
|
issue 2
126 – 138
EN
In my paper I present a new view on the Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), namely, from the point of view of Carnap’s so-called logic of science understood by him as logic of the language of science and, to be more specific, logic of the language of empirical science. First, I present Carnap’s project of the logic of science and show that it was not realized on the basis of Carnap’s semantics of intension and extension. Next, I show the negative effects of the absence of this realization for the philosophy of empirical science as it became apparent in the dispute between P. K. Feyerabend and C. G. Hempel. Finally, I indicate the set of issues that TIL could solve in the future by realizing Carnap’s (reformed) project.
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