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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2007
|
vol. 62
|
issue 9
801-812
EN
The aim of this paper is to show the incompleteness of the exclusively logico-syntactical and logico-semantical approaches to one of the core issues of philosophy of science, namely, scientific laws and scientific explanation in C. G. Hempel works. The author starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel approach (labeled 'the D-N model') to the deductive explanations based on the universal scientific laws and then analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. Next, he traces these characteristics back to the Hempel and Carnap attempts to ground the concepts of scientific law and explanation exclusively on logic (i.e. logical syntax and/or logical semantics), which led to a highly normative approach alienated from the practice of real science.
EN
The paper tries to provide an alternative to C. G. Hempel's approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel's approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. The paper makes an attempt to provide a new approach to the scientific laws and scientific explanations. The author gives a brief overview of Hempel's approach to the scientific laws and scientific explanation, as well as of its failures and paradoxes. As a way out, the author analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, he provides a differentiated typology of the scientific laws and scientific explanations.
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