The paper deals with the covering-law model of explanation as formulated by Carl Hempel and the role it plays in the area of philosophy of explanation. The first part of the paper begins with the exposition of the model and finishes with emphasizing some of its most important features, such as its non-causal and non-pragmatic character and the thesis of the symmetry of explanation and prediction. The main goal of the second part is to show that the covering-law model is the starting point in the modern discussion about explanation. Therefore, without a proper understanding of Hempel's model it is impossible to correctly appreciate the subsequent developments in the area of philosophy of explanation.
The paper presents the logical milieu of the Paradox of ravens, identified by Hempel in his 'Studies in the Logic of Confirmation'. It deals with Hempel's interpretations of Nicod's criterion of confirmation as well as with its inadmissible consequences. The author, subsequently, suggests an epistemological and semantic specification of empirical properties, i.e., of their identity; then he formulates a criterion of the test of properties expressed by empirical hypothesis. Finally, he proposes a procedural conception of confirmation by means of the testing procedure schema. The confirmation is, therefore, conceived as an attribute which can be ascribed to a hypothesis through the process of its testing. The methods of testing are central to the hypothesis's qualification as confirmed.
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