Although modern theory of law insists that civil-law courts are not obliged to follow their previous judgements (A), it does not imply automatically that these judgements may be entirely ignored (nonA). Absence of general obligation does not mean total practical irrelevance. Influence of caselaw on the Continent is classified by different set of expressions: although case-law is not „binding“, it can still be „significant“; it does not have formal „normative“ force, but it has substantive „argumentative“ force, it cannot „oblige“, but it can „persuade“… Even if the case-law is not binding, it does not mean that there are no practical reasons why to apply it. And at the same time: even if the case-law is regularly followed, it does not come from its „bindingness“ but from its „significance“. Initial dichotomy „binding/not binding“ (A/nonA) has switched to dichotomy „binding/significant“ (A/B). Although there is change in the meaning of one of the alternatives (nonA became B), it is not accompanied with the change of logical relation which was between the alternatives in their initial state (excluding disjunction). Main aim of the present paper is to show that modern doctrinal reflection of practical effects of the case-law in common-law and civil-law countries is distorting. The main argument in favour of this proposition consists in description, analysis and critique of the way in which genus-species dichotomical definitions are usually advanced. The author of the paper is inclined to believe that accurate description of practical effects of the case-law can be achieved by the complex factor analysis and not by dichotomical classifications.
The “stranger” and “familiar” heuristics are judgmental heuristics used to estimate distance between self and other people. It was predicted that the judged distance would be smaller when a person is evaluated in terms of competence rather than moral categories. In line with the assumptions of dual-process models, it was predicted that this effect should occur only in conditions of cognitive load or lack of motivation. In the first experiment participants (N = 38) rated moral or competence traits of a perceived target person in conditions of free cognitive resources or under cognitive load and then rated distance between self and the target person. The results were consistent with expectations. Under cognitive load participants who rated the person’s competence traits rated the distance as smaller than participants who rated moral traits. In the condition of free cognitive resources there was no difference between participants’ ratings of competence and moral traits of the target person. In the second experiment (N = 98) two different ways of category activation, relevant or irrelevant to the given task, were manipulated. Relevant categories were activated by asking participants to list these traits of the target person which they would like to know. Irrelevant categories were activated by asking participants to list traits that they would like to know about an unknown person. Effects of cognitive load and of the moral/competence-related content of traits were replicated while no significant effects of information relevance were obtained.
This article deals with self-organizing migrating algorithm (SOMA) for solving the vehicle routing problem with time windows (VRPTW). Our interest in VRPTW arises from a real-life distribution problem in one of the regions of Slovakia (individual customers’ commodities delivering times were restricted by their available service time), where the previous distribution was realized on the base of solution derived with heuristic Clarke & Wright's savings algorithm with time windows. The importance of that problem follows from many practical applications as well as from its computational complexity, therefore the use of optimization techniques seems to be relatively complicated, and nowadays many researchers turn their attention to applications of alternative computational techniques that are inspired by evolutionary biology. The obtained solution allows reducing the total time needed by 16.2%. The presented approach could be used also for solving various economic problems with time restrictions in the field of distribution.
Discussions in contemporary epistemology are burdened with confusions about the terms “rational”, “rationality” and their antonyms. In economy, for an agent to be rational simply means to satisfy the Bayesian probability axioms, but the situation in philosophy is much more complicated. Two kinds of rationality are usually distinguished. Epistemic rationality is an ability to achieve justified and true beliefs, whereas instrumental rationality is a capacity to act in accordance with one’s own interests. This division cleared the way to contemplation about rational irrationality, which is the case when an acceptance of epistemically unwarranted beliefs may increase instrumental profit for an individual. In my article, I will criticize this approach. The proponents of rational irrationality 1) misunderstand the primacy of epistemic rationality over instrumental one; 2) underestimate social nature of normative terms; and 3) misinterpret the evolution of human cognition. I will illustrate my conclusions with an example from applied epistemology – conspiracy theories. It is misleading and disparaging to use the term “rational” in relation to sets of unjustified beliefs that are based on conspiratorial ideation. If philosophers cannot make their ideas on rationality clear, it might be better to leave out rationality completely from the epistemological discourse.
The study is aimed at analysing the position of intuitive thought as reflected in current polemics within the dual processes models. In the first section, theories concerned with functionality of heuristics are presented, where evolutionary and ecological lenses offer insights that uncover details of human cognitive functioning under uncertainty and time pressure. The shift from normative models towards alternative explanations of 'heuristic person' reasoning is discussed. In the second section, views of human cognitive uniqueness as manifested in inferential activity are presented, emphasizing the primacy of inferential cognitions in progression of human intelligence. Within cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics, transmission and comprehension of relevant meanings is attributed to cognitive mechanisms that go beyond mere verbal functioning and underlie mutually efficient strategies in communication of humans as intelligent actors in various environments.
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