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1

The effects of tax rates and corruption on the labour market. A cross-sectional comparative analysis of the OECD countries

100%
Lacko M.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2006
|
vol. 53
|
issue 11
961-985
EN
The study examines how tax rates, corruption and various labour-market institutions affect the relative sizes of various segments of the labour market - the unemployed, the employed, the self-employed, and those working in the hidden economy - in the developed market economies. Regressive analyses of the OECD countries for 1995-2000 confirm that differences of tax rates and market institutions are joined by differences in the scale of corruption as important explanatory factors for relative size of the labour-market segments. With the hidden economy and self-employment, the coefficients of expressing the effect of tax rates themselves depend on the scale of corruption, as a manifestation of interaction between these.
2

The hidden economy and taxation--related behaviour, 1996-2001

100%
Semjen A., Toth I. J.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2004
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vol. 51
|
issue 6
560-583
EN
Based on an empirical survey in 1996, 1998 and 2001 of 300 medium-sized and large firms each in the manufacturing, construction and commercial sectors, the study analyses developments in contract and fiscal discipline and the prevalence of some phenomena in the hidden economy. It is found that the range of the hidden economy lessened in these segments of the Hungarian economy between 1996 and 2001, while contract and taxpaying discipline improved and the soft budget-constraint syndrome continued to retreat. A part was played in this by the improving business prospects and by the increasing integration into the European economy. The improving prospects and growing GDP raised the incomes expected from the legal economy, while tax inspection was also improving. The latter raised the costs of participating in the hidden economy for registered business organizations. The opinions of entrepreneurs on fiscal policy and tax administration also improved strongly between 1996 and 2001. Tax laws were felt to be more transparent and comprehensible and the tax system more predictable. Small firms showed much greater sensitivity than large to complexity and frequent change in tax regulations, which were more likely to upset small firms' business plans and thereby their commercial prospects. The findings support the supposition that transparency of the tax system influences competitiveness, and that the introduction of simplified taxation forms for small firms will promote efficiency and competition on an equal footing.
3

DILEMMAS OF ENTERPRISES LEAVING THE HIDDEN ECONOMY. CASE STUDY. MESSENGER SERVICE PROVIDERS IN BUDAPEST, 2006-2008 (A rejtett gazdasagbol valo kilepes dilemmai. Esettanulmany. Budapesti futarszolgalatok 2006-2008)

88%
Fazekas M.
Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)
|
2009
|
vol. 19
|
issue 4
87-108
EN
Some of the enterprises providing messenger services in Budapest radically decreased their involvement in the hidden economy in the summer 2006, which provides a unique opportunity to study the combined effect of two specific government measures: increasing the expected costs of hidden economic activities and tax amnesty. Furthermore, it could be explored how the two initiatives interact with the crucial variables defining involvement in hidden economy, and which additional impacts for the whole market emanate from the legalization of a small number of market players. Through interviews with CEOs of major companies on the market and a few of their employees, the study focuses on the following: from which motivations, according to what conditions and based on which strategies did the enterprises change their tax paying behavior? Furthermore, the success and downsides of such strategies were also examined. According to the results, the key ingredients for changing the involvement in the hidden economy are: the moral costs of the CEO stemming from illegal taxpaying practices (tax morale) and the subjective appraisal of costs and benefits of operating in the hidden economy. Nevertheless, these factors can only lead to alterations in the degree of tax evasion if the financial situation, market position of the enterprise, and its relation towards customers and employees can provide a solid basis for covering the additional costs of fulfilling all legal obligations. These factors, in turn, determine the slices of the extra costs each involved actor has to bear. The main findings suggest, firstly, that governments can successfully fight hidden economy by decreasing the administrative burden of enterprises, clear communication of regulatory intentions, and lowering the expected net benefits of involvement in the grey economy. Secondly, improving the public opinion on government and tax morale both motivate economic actors to reveal their hidden economic activity. Lastly, tax amnesties entail relatively low long-run costs in an economic environment where tax compliance is not the prevalent norm. However, these factors can only lead to a permanently lower proportion of hidden economy if they are able to motivate a sufficiently high proportion of economic actors of a given market to leave the hidden economy.
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